Okhrimchuk v. Domino’s Pizza and others (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 73
Date Issued: March 25, 2025
File:CS-000476
Indexed as: Okhrimchuk v. Domino’s Pizza and others (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 73
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Alexey Okhrimchuk
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Mad Pizza Company Inc. dba Domino’s Pizza and Bryan Dobb and Sandeep Kaur
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Alexey Okhrimchuk
Counsel for the Respondents: Michelle Quinn, Esra Yacout
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mr. Okhrimchuk filed a complaint alleging his former employer, Mad Pizza Company Inc. dba Domino’s Pizza, its owner Bryan Dobb and the general manager Sandeep Kaur discriminated against him on the basis of his race, ancestry, colour and place of origin contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . The Tribunal dismissed the complaint after a five-day hearing: Okhrimchuk v. Domino’s Pizza and others (No. 2) , 2025 BCHRT 37 (the “ Original Decision ”).
[2] Mr. Okhrimchuk now applies for reconsideration of the Original Decision. Further, he argues that the Original Decision gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and asks that another Tribunal member be assigned to decide the reconsideration application.
[3] I have not found it necessary to seek submissions from the Respondents.
[4] For the following reasons, I deny Mr. Okhrimchuk’s request to have another member decide the reconsideration application, and I deny the application for reconsideration.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The background to Mr. Okhrimchuk’s complaint is set out in the Original Decision and I will not repeat it here: Okhrimchuk at paras 5-14. Briefly, Mr. Okhrimchuk alleged that the Respondents favoured employees of Indian origin, reduced his hours of work and ultimately fired him because he is Russian.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
A. The Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Allegation
[6] Reconsideration applications at the Tribunal are usually decided by the member who made the original decision. That member is most familiar with the evidence and issues in the complaint and is best placed to efficiently determine whether there is a basis to reconsider the original decision: Karbalaeilali v. BC (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2010 BCSC 1130 at para. 65; see also University of British Columbia v. University of British Columbia Faculty Assn ., 2007 BCCA 201 at para. 84.
[7] An exception arises where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board , 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), as follows (at p. 394):
… what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would [they] think that it is more likely than not that [the decision maker], whether consciously or unconsciously would not decide fairly.
[8] Tribunal members are presumed to be impartial in the exercise of their duties, and that presumption is not easily displaced: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, at para. 25. In the present case, Mr. Okhrimchuk bears the burden of displacing the presumption of impartiality, and the evidence of bias must be substantial: CS v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2017 BCSC 1268 at para. 155, upheld in 2018 BCCA 264.
[9] Mr. Okhrimchuk asserts that aspects of the Original Decision give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. As I understand Mr. Okhrimchuk’s submissions, he disagrees with aspects of my reasons and says that because I did not prefer his arguments and evidence over the Respondents’, this gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. He says I should not have considered the Respondents’ Book of Documents because it was submitted late, I should not have allowed any objections to his cross-examinations and allowed him to freely ask witnesses whatever he wanted, and I should have forensically verified documentary evidence for its veracity.
[10] As I said in the Original Decision, I considered all of the evidence and submissions of the parties. I set out detailed reasons for why I found a party’s evidence more persuasive on specific points and why I dismissed the complaint. Regarding the procedural issues Mr. Okhrimchuk raises, throughout the hearing I made rulings on procedural and evidentiary issues pursuant to my authority under s. 27.2(1) of the Code and Rule 32(12) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure .
[11] The fact that Mr. Okhrimchuk disagrees with my reasons, or that the Tribunal rejected his arguments, does not on its own displace the presumption of impartiality: C.S. v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2017 BCSC 1268 at para. 164. If Mr. Okhrimchuk takes issue with the substantive findings of the Original Decision, the proper forum for reviewing those findings is judicial review.
[12] I am not persuaded by Mr. Okhrimchuk’s evidence and arguments that a reasonable and informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would conclude that I did not adjudicate Mr. Okhrimchuk’s complaint fairly, or would not adjudicate his reconsideration application fairly.
B. Whether to Reconsider the Decision
[13] The Tribunal has limited jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions: Rule 36. Specifically, the Tribunal may reconsider a decision if it is in the interests of justice and fairness to do so: Routkovskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2012 BCCA 141 at para. 23. The Tribunal exercises this power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality in administrative proceedings: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 [ Grant ] at para 10.
[14] The burden is on the person seeking to have a matter re-opened to show that the interests of fairness and justice demand such an order: Grant at para. 10.
[15] The Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal , 2014 BCCA 499 [ Fraser Health ] at paras. 135 and 160. The Tribunal will not reconsider a decision to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to hear a party reargue its case: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2) , 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13. When a party simply disagrees with a Tribunal decision, the appropriate recourse is judicial review.
[16] The Tribunal may reconsider a decision where there has not been procedural fairness ( Fraser Health at para. 161).
[17] The Tribunal may reconsider a decision where there is new evidence that was not available at the time the party made its submission: Gichuru v. Vancouver Swing Society and others , 2018 BCHRT 18 at para. 22. Relevant factors include whether the new evidence could affect the result, and whether reconsideration would result in prejudice: Gichuru at paras. 22, 43.
[18] First, Mr. Okhrimchuk argues that there is new evidence. In support of his reconsideration application Mr. Okhrimchuk submits documents including a report from a graphoanalyst dated February 28, 2025, opining about whether the signatures on the documentary evidence are consistent. Mr. Okhrimchuk explains that he could not afford an “expensive handwriting analysis” for the hearing but has since found a “more affordable option.” Mr. Okhrimchuk says the graphoanalyst report supports his assertion that the Respondents’ documentary evidence is forged and not credible.
[19] I am not persuaded that the new evidence is a basis to allow reconsideration. I acknowledge that the report Mr. Okhrimchuk seeks to rely on was prepared after the hearing and therefore was not available at the time of the hearing. I am, however, of the view that the report could have, with due diligence on the part of Mr. Okhrimchuk, been prepared and made available at the time of the hearing. Mr. Okhrimchuk says he does not have the economic means to obtain a handwriting analysis but found an affordable option after the hearing. He has not explained why the affordable option was not available at the time of the hearing. In my view, new evidence is not simply evidence that was not prepared at the time of the hearing but evidence which, despite due diligence by the parties, could not have been available. Here, I see no reason why the graphoanalyst’s report could not have been prepared prior to the hearing.
[20] In any event, I find that the report of the graphoanalyst, assuming it was admissible, is not evidence that could have affected the result of the hearing. The graphoanalyst report opines that the signature on paperwork submitted by the Respondents differ from the signature provided by Mr. Okhrimchuk. The Original Decision did not turn on whether Mr. Okhrimchuk signed onboarding paperwork. Rather, the issue before me was whether on the whole of the evidence I was persuaded that Mr. Okhrimchuk’s protected characteristics were a factor in the reduction of his work hours. I was satisfied that the Respondents’ assertion that Mr. Okhrimchuk was a poor employee who did not improve despite being cautioned and coached was in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities affecting the case. Even if the graphoanalyst report had been available, it would not have been determinative and would not have changed the outcome of the Original Decision.
[21] Next, Mr. Okhrimchuk argues that the hearing was not procedurally fair because the Tribunal did not allow him to ask certain questions of witnesses. I deny this part of the application for the following reasons.
[22] The issue to be addressed at the hearing was a specific one: whether Mr. Okhrimchuk’s protected characteristics were a factor in the reduction of his work hours and termination of employment. Because Mr. Okhrimchuk was self-represented and assisted by an interpreter, I allowed him a degree of latitude in presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses.
[23] Despite the flexibility afforded to Mr. Okhrimchuk, the Tribunal has the authority and the responsibility pursuant to Rule 32(12) to preside and maintain order in a hearing. Throughout the hearing, the Tribunal made rulings about the relevance and appropriateness of questions put to witnesses pursuant to s. 27.2(1) of the Code and Rule 32(12). Parties were also reminded of their obligation under Rule 7(4) to “treat all persons in the course of a complaint with courtesy and respect”.
[24] Mr. Okhrimchuk was reminded several times about the scope of his complaint, including during cross-examination of the Respondents’ witnesses. Where I found his questions to be repetitive, argumentative, irrelevant, or disrespectful, I cautioned Mr. Okhrimchuk and advised him to rephrase the question or adhere to the scope of the complaint.
[25] In the circumstances of this complaint and hearing, Mr. Okhrimchuk has not persuaded me that the Tribunal presiding over the hearing, maintaining order and making rulings on what questions can properly be put to witnesses amounts to procedural unfairness.
[26] Finally, Mr. Okhrimchuk’s primary argument on the reconsideration application appears to be that the Tribunal ought to have preferred his evidence and submissions over that of the Respondents and consequently found in his favour.
[27] Reconsideration is not an opportunity to reargue issues that have already been conclusively determined in the original decision. It appears Mr. Okhrimchuk is asking for reconsideration of whether his protected characteristics were a factor in the reduction of his work hours and termination of employment or simply disagreeing with the Original Decision. The issue has already been considered and decided.
[28] For these reasons, I am not satisfied that Mr. Okhrimchuk has met his burden of showing that it would be in the interests of fairness and justice to reconsider the Original Decision.
IV CONCLUSION
[29] Mr. Okhrimchuk’s request to have his application for reconsideration decided by a different member is denied, and his reconsideration application is denied.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member