Ramstead v. Rocky Mountain Riders Snowmobile Tours and Rentals Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 71
Date Issued: March 21, 2025
File(s): CS-004071
Indexed as: Ramstead v. Rocky Mountain Riders Snowmobile Tours and Rentals Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 71
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lisa Ramstead
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Rocky Mountain Riders Snowmobile Tours and Rentals Ltd. and Robert Luke Burley
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam
Advocate for the Complainant: Aleena Sharma
Counsel for the Respondent: Bruce McKenzie
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Lisa Ramstead alleges that Rocky Mountain Riders Snowmobile Tours and Rentals Ltd. [ RMR] and Robert Luke Burley [together, Respondents ] discriminated against her in the area of employment on the grounds of sex contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . She says she was targeted, bullied and treated differently than men in the workplace because she is a woman.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They say she was frequently late for work, which caused interruptions in their business activities. Mr. Burley frequently told her she must arrive on time. The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code because it has no reasonable prospect of success because it does not set out any basis for possible discrimination, and they had a wholly non-discriminatory basis for ending her employment.
[3] The only issue I need to decide is whether there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Ramstead could prove a connection between her sex and the adverse impact she experienced.
[4] For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[5] RMR is a company that offers guided snowmobile tours. Mr. Burley is the owner and operator of RMR.
[6] RMR hired Ms. Ramstead as an office manager in November 2019. Her role required her to plan, prepare, and manage the administrative tasks that would ensure the daily snowmobile tours ran safely and efficiently. Her work required her to meet with customers for the snowmobile tours, accept payments, ensure each day’s tour group had waivers completed or ready to sign upon their arrival, and arrange food for the trip.
[7] Ms. Ramstead also packed the guides’ day bags with a functioning safety transceiver, extra batteries, and lunches for the day. Guides took these bags on the snowmobile tours into the backcountry. While she did this, the guides outfitted the clients and prepared the snowmachines for the day.
[8] The office is located at the base of a mountain resort. An active set of train tracks cross the only road that leads to RMR’s office. Occasionally, an active train would cause RMR employees to stop and wait at the crossing on their way to work.
[9] Ms. Ramstead says she was occasionally late when she had to pick up groceries and the grocery store was unexpectedly busy. Ms. Ramstead says around the first two weeks of March 2021, she was late to work “quite a few times” because she was delayed by the train. She was also late on March 12, 2021, for a “personal reason.”
[10] Mr. Burley was frustrated with the number of times Ms. Ramstead was late to work. Mr. Burley remarked on her tardiness on at least three occasions. On the evening of March 14, 2021, Mr. Burley told her over the phone that if she was late again, RMR would end her employment.
[11] In early April 2021, RMR terminated Ms. Ramstead’s employment because of her tardiness.
III ADDING NEW ALLEGATIONS TO COMPLAINT
[12] As a preliminary matter, the Respondents argue that Ms. Ramstead has improperly added new allegations in her response to the application to dismiss.
[13] A complainant who wants to amend their complaint during an outstanding application to dismiss must apply to do so: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [ Rules ], Rule 24(4)(b). The purpose of this rule is to ensure that a respondent who files an application to dismiss a complaint does not face a moving target: Pausch v. School District No. 34 and others , 2008 BCHRT 154 at paras. 28-29. Respondents are entitled to know the allegations against them to assess whether, or on what basis, to bring their application to dismiss the complaint: Purdy v. Douglas College and others , 2016 BCHRT 117 at paras. 35-37.
[14] At the same time, the Tribunal’s complaint forms are not the equivalent of pleadings in a civil litigation process: White v. Nanaimo Daily News Group Inc. and Klaholz , 2004 BCHRT 350 at para. 23 . It is not uncommon, or a violation of the Rules , for a complainant to add new particulars of their complaint in response to an application to dismiss. The distinction between particulars and new allegations was set out in Powell v. Morton , 2005 BCHRT 282 at para. 20 :
… I must consider whether the amendment contains, on the one hand, further details of the facts on which the complainant intends to rely, or whether, on the other, it constitutes an expansion of the allegations made against the respondents. If the former, it will constitute particulars; if the latter, an amendment. This determination is not to be made in a narrow or technical way, but in a manner which will ensure that the parties are accorded procedural fairness, and that particulars are not used to expand a complaint beyond what can reasonably be said to have been alleged in it. Another way of looking at the questions is to ask whether the materials in issue come within the scope of the complaint filed with the Tribunal, or whether they seek to expand the scope of the complaint.
[15] Ms. Ramstead did not apply to amend her complaint. Nevertheless, the Tribunal may allow an amendment under Rule 24(4)(b) if it would be procedurally fair to do so, and further the purposes of the Code: Hawknes v. Vancouver Public Library (No. 2), 2017 BCHRT 250 at para. 86.
[16] I turn now to whether the impugned allegations are properly characterized as further particulars or an amendment to the complaint.
[17] In her complaint, Ms. Ramstead makes a broad allegation
that she was bullied and harassed in “many instances” before she had to go
on medical leave. She was targeted because she was a woman and treated
differently from men in the workplace. She focuses on being targeted and
conversations where she was spoken to aggressively, told she was
disrespectful, and not performing her job well. She says Mr. Burley
threatened to end her employment if she was late from the trains again. She
does not allege she was terminated in the complaint. Taking a broad and
liberal approach to characterizing the impugned allegations, I find that
some of her response to the application are further particulars, and others
are amendments.
[18] The new details that I consider to be properly
characterized as further particulars include Mr. Burley’s communications
with her generally, his communications with her outside of working hours,
such as on weekends, evenings, and her days off, and misaligned job
expectations about the role and job expectations. The misaligned job
expectations relate to her allegation that her role was intended to be an
executive level office manager job, but she was given routine clerical
office management work; and she accepted the job with expectations around
work hours that did not materialize. She did not particularize these new
specific incidents in her complaint. As stated in Hawknes at para.
80 :
It would have been preferable for the complaint to have set out the factual basis for the general allegation of discrimination. This would allow the respondent to understand with some reasonable specificity the allegations against it, and – on that basis – make an educated decision about whether to bring an application to dismiss the complaint and, if so, on what grounds.
[19] As in Hawknes , the Respondents only discovered the
nature of those allegations in the response to their application and have
had to put in their position by way of reply. This is not ideal, and it is
a practice to be discouraged: Hawknes at para. 80. Nevertheless,
the Respondents replied to these details mostly based on referencing the
initial affidavits they filed in support of the application, so I am
satisfied that they could have anticipated these details and had a
meaningful opportunity to do so in response to the new details set out in
Ms. Ramstead’s response. As such, I find that it would be fair in the
circumstances to consider these new details in the analysis.
[20] I find that the remainder of Ms. Ramstead’s allegations are
amendments. In her response to the Respondents’ application, Ms. Ramstead
alleges for the first time that she was terminated while on mental health
leave (while simultaneously acknowledging that she was terminated because
she was late for work “occasionally…mostly for reasons outside of [her]
control”) and she experienced adverse impacts connected to her mental
health. I agree with the Respondents that the scope of Ms. Ramstead’s
complaint was limited to her sex, and Ms. Ramstead has set out allegations
in the response that are beyond what was stated in the complaint.
[21] Ms. Ramstead’s new allegations constitute an expansion of
the allegations. The allegations about her disability and being terminated
while on mental health leave adds a new protected ground that did not form
part of the complaint that was accepted by the Tribunal and puts forward a
new allegation that she was terminated based on disability. These
allegations could not have been in the reasonable contemplation of the
Respondents when they originally assessed the complaint and determined how
to frame their application to dismiss: Pausch at
para. 30 ;
Hawknes at para. 85.
[22] As previously stated, while Ms. Ramstead did not apply to
amend her complaint, the Tribunal may allow an amendment under Rule
24(4)(b) if it would be procedurally fair to do so. In this case, it would
be procedurally unfair to the Respondents to expand Ms. Ramstead’s
complaint to include a new protected ground and allegations that
substantively reframe the initial complaint. In this instance, I am not
satisfied the Respondents had a reasonable opportunity to respond to Ms.
Ramstead’s amendment to expand her complaint to include the ground of
disability. In Reply, the Respondents understood her allegation in the
Response to be that Mr. Burley impacted her mental health. They
subsequently made a brief argument about the nexus of her evidence with her
sex, because her initial complaint was accepted on that basis. I decline to
exercise my discretion to allow an amendment to Ms. Ramstead’s complaint.
IV DECISION
[23] The Respondents apply to dismiss Ms. Ramstead’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[24] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[25] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77 .
[26] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20 ; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27 .
[27] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia , 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34 . However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City) , 2017 BCCA 242 at para. 67.
[28] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Ramstead will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code , she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[29] The Respondents say Ms. Ramstead has no reasonable prospect of proving she was bullied or targeted, as alleged or at all, or that her alleged treatment was connected to her sex. I also understand the Respondents to argue that they were reasonably justified in terminating her employment because she was frequently late to work, being punctual was essential to the work being performed, and she was warned many times to arrive to work on time but continued to be late to work.
[30] I find that I can decide this application by determining whether there is a connection between Ms. Ramstead’s sex and the adverse impact she alleges she experienced. Mr. Burley does not deny he was frustrated with the frequency in which Ms. Ramstead was late to work. Based on Mr. Burley’s prolific use of curse words in his written communications with Ms. Ramstead, I do not find it difficult to accept that she is reasonably certain to prove that he spoke to Ms. Ramstead aggressively, or that she found it belittling or insulting. For these reasons, I accept, without deciding, that Ms. Ramstead has taken the first two elements of her case out of the realm of conjecture.
[31] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that Ms. Ramstead has no reasonable prospect of proving that her sex was a factor in the adverse impacts she experienced.
1. Legal framework – nexus
[32] Ms. Ramstead says a nexus exists between her treatment at
work and her sex. First, she says that there was an “inherent power
imbalance” between her and Mr. Burley. She argues that he had “economic
power” as well as “gendered power” over her. Ms. Ramstead says the Tribunal
must view her experience and interactions with Mr. Burley through the lens
of economic and sexual power because Mr. Burley was Ms. Ramstead’s
employer, and Ms. Ramstead is a woman, and Mr. Burley is a man.
[33] The Tribunal has stated not all bullying and harassment will constitute sex discrimination simply because it was done by a man to a woman: Loiselle v. Windward Software Inc. (No. 2) , 2021 BCHRT 7, at para. 275. The Code does not protect people from general bullying and harassment. The Code only protects individuals from bullying and harassment that is connected to a protected characteristic: Complainant v. Douglas College and another , 2019 BCHRT 5 at para 40 ; Curtis v. Fraternal Order of Eagles and others , 2012 BCHRT 45 . It is not enough to say one has protected characteristics and has been treated unfairly. There must be a connection between the two: Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para. 52 . Where the allegations relate to bullying and harassment, Ms. Ramstead must show she has a reasonable prospect of proving that her treatment was connected to her identity as a woman.
[34] Human rights law recognizes that discrimination can be subtle and an assessment of whether discrimination occurred must be considered in context. It can be the result of unconscious biases and prejudices that are not displayed openly and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence: Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3) , 2005 BCHRT 302 at para. 48 ; Mezghrani v. Canada Youth Orange Network (CYONI) (No. 2 ), 2006 BCHRT 60 at para. 28 .
[35] Below, I outline Ms. Ramstead’s allegations that I may draw an inference that her sex was a factor in the adverse impact she experienced. I then explain why Ms. Ramstead has no reasonable prospect of proving that her sex was a factor in the adverse impacts she experienced.
2. Allegations
[36] Ms. Ramstead has not disputed:
a. all the discrete allegations took place in or around her last month of employment, from early March 2021 to early April 2021;
b. during this time, she was frequently late to work;
c. being on time was an essential part of her work and that her tardiness detrimentally impacted RMR’s operations;
d. all the discrete allegations and evidence about Mr. Burley’s conduct took place around the time she was frequently late to work;
e. Mr. Burley threatened to end her employment for being late to work; and
f. Mr. Burley did, in fact, terminate her for being late to work.
[37] Ms. Ramstead says Mr. Burley spoke to her “in a manner that reinforced a gendered hierarchy and power-imbalance in the workplace.” She alleges that throughout her employment, Mr. Burley regularly verbally abused her. She says he raised his voice, swore at her, spoke to her in an aggressive, belittling and insulting manner, once even shouting at her in front of customers. If her work was not completed to his standards, he would “relentlessly criticize” her, yelling that she was “bad at [her] job” and a “terrible employee.” He yelled and screamed at her when she was late to work, even though he “did not appear to yell or scream” at male employees who arrived late to work.
[38] Ms. Ramstead says Mr. Burley held her to a higher standard at work than her male colleagues because of her sex. Specifically, she says Mr. Burley treated her differently than male employees when she was late to work. Ms. Ramstead says she was late to work most often due to “unavoidable delays”, such as long lines at the grocery store, or being stuck at the train crossing. She alleges that when she was late, Mr. Burley was angry, reprimanded her, yelled, screamed, and swore at her. He “did not appear” to do this to other male employees. She says other male staff members were late but were not reprimanded or terminated.
[39] She points to one, discrete incident where there was alleged differential treatment between her late arrival and a male guide’s late arrival. On that occasion, the guide was allegedly 10 minutes late to work and she was 20 minutes late to work because of the train. She said while Mr. Burley was angry at her for being late, he did not “appear to be angry” at the male employee.
[40] In the first two weeks of March 2021, she alleges she was frequently late to work because of the train. On March 12, 2021, Ms. Ramstead was late to work for personal reasons. Her text exchange with Mr. Burley was as follows:
Mr. Burley: Why are you late? Again? (9.08 a.m.)
The guests are there. (9:09 a.m.)
This is fucking…ridiculous. (9:10 a.m.)
And now ignoring my calls. [Next time] your late your fired [sic]
(9:20 a.m.)
I’m not okay with the way you conduct your self [sic]. This will be the 3 rd time I write you up for being late. This is a big problem. (9:21 a.m.)
Ms. Ramstead: I wasn’t ignoring your call I was with the guests so I just
tried to call you back now that they left.
I just tried to call you again. I am sorry for being late today. That’s on me, it doesn’t matter why I was late since it wasn’t a train so I’m not giving you an excuse. But I was only not answering your calls because I was with the guests and helping Ashly sort them out.
I haven’t been written up though only verbal warnings you haven’t given me any write up for me to sign. (10:12 a.m.)
[41] Ms. Ramstead also argues that Mr. Burley verbal conduct exploited the power-imbalance between them to ensure she was always available to him. She was expected to respond immediately, even on her days off. She alleges that he called and texted her outside of working hours. He responded angrily if she did not immediately respond when he communicated with her outside of office hours. She specifies one incident on March 14, 2021. Mr. Burley allegedly called to yell at her while she was dining out to tell her that if she was late due to the train “one more time you’ve lost your job” and “you better not fucking do this again.” He texted her, “I feel like you don’t respect me because we just talked about this yesterday. This was the last thing I wanted to talk about again. And that bothers me. So please be best yet.” She says this made her feel controlled by him, and that she was more of his personal assistant than the office manager.
[42] On March 31, 2021, she alleges Mr. Burley “reprimanded” her for requesting compensation during her lunch breaks where she simultaneously monitored and answered the phone. The text exchange was as follows:
Mr. Burley : I need to come back to the office to fix something so I will be back in shortly (2:59 p.m.)
Ms. Ramstead : I’m just finishing my lunch I’ll be back in a few minutes (3:00 p.m.)
Not paying for lunches might apply to some positions but not office since we have to answer the phone during our lunch breaks.
Mr. Burley : Office was shut down you were not in the office. If you wanted to get paid for it you [shouldn’t] have left! (6:23 p.m.)
Don’t give me a bunch of bs shit I don’t want to hear it. Forward phone to me. (6:24 p.m.)
[43] In response, Ms. Ramstead texted Mr. Burley a screenshot that read:
Scheduling meal and coffee breaks
Employers are not required to provide coffee breaks.
A 30-minute unpaid meal break must be provided when an employee works more than five hours in a row. The employee must be paid for the meal break if they’re required to work (or be available to work) during their meal break. Working through a meal break does not always result in overtime pay.
[44] She says his response was belittling and left her feeling powerless.
[45] In response to the application to dismiss, she alleges Mr. Burley said on April 2, 2021, she had “a lot of attitude”. She alleges he said this because she tried to rebut his accusation that she was not productive at work. In response, he allegedly said, “I’m your boss Lisa…you cannot talk to me like this, I will not tolerate it.” She says these comments are rooted in gender-based stereotypes about women who try to speak up for themselves when confronted. She says, as in The Sales Associate v. Aurora Biomed Inc. and others (No. 3), 2021 BCHRT 5 [ Aurora Biomed Inc. ], at paras. 112-121, these statements are forms of sex-based discrimination that reinforced gender power hierarchies and signaled that she was not worthy of being taken seriously at work.
[46] In her response to the application to dismiss, she refers to an occasion Mr. Burley contacted her on her day off. On April 5, 2021, she had a scheduled day off. She alleges Mr. Burley asked her to call an upset customer. She texted him to let him know that she didn’t have good cellular service and would call the customer two days later on her next scheduled working day. He replied that this was, “not really [acceptable]…for an office manager.”
[47] In her response to the application, she specifies that Mr. Burley terminated her in the first half of April 2021 for being, “occasionally late, mostly for reasons outside of [her] control.”
3. Was Ms. Ramstead’s sex a factor in the adverse impacts she alleges?
[48] I have considered all of Ms. Ramstead’s allegations in the context she has provided. The Respondents say, and I agree, that Ms. Ramstead’s allegations are based on broad power-imbalances based on sex that may exist in any workplace. I have considered that verbal conduct constituting sexual harassment is not limited to explicit sexual topics or conversations, but can also include hostile, derogatory, and threatening verbal and physical conduct. However, even if I were to assume that Ms. Ramstead could prove at a hearing that the incidents occurred exactly as she described, I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect that her evidence before the Tribunal could support an inference that Mr. Burley ever made derogatory or hostile comments about gender or sex, or that his verbal conduct was in the context of a sexualized workplace environment: Mercier v. DaSilva , 2007 BCHRT 72 .
[49] Nor is Ms. Ramstead reasonably certain to prove that the comments could have the effects of discriminating against her based on her sex when considering the context of “the subtle forces which continue to reinforce, perpetuate, and exacerbate the disadvantage faced by many women in their workplaces”: The Sales Associate v. Aurora Biomed Inc. and others (No. 3) , 2021 BCHRT 5, at para. 115. Ms. Ramstead has not tethered her allegations to anything to suggest that the comments adversely impacted her in employment based on sex: see, The Sales Associate v. Aurora Biomed Inc. and others (No. 3) , 2021 BCHRT 5, at paras. 112-117. I am satisfied that Ms. Ramstead has no reasonable prospect at a hearing of establishing that her sex was a factor in Mr. Burley’s conduct.
[50] I first turn to Ms. Ramstead’s specific allegation of differential treatment. On the one occasion she particularized, Mr. Burley was allegedly angry at her for being late, but he did not “appear to be angry” at the other employee. Respectfully, this allegation is conjecture. She arrived to work 10 minutes after the other employee was allegedly late to work. She did not have an opportunity to observe Mr. Burley’s immediate reaction to the employee’s alleged tardiness. Mr. Burley’s appearance at the time of her arrival is not indicative of his earlier interactions with the employee. Additionally, other than being late, Ms. Ramstead has not explained how she and the other staff person were otherwise similarly situated, either in their morning duties at RMR, or the frequency of their tardiness. Ms. Ramstead has not shown that she is reasonably certain to prove her allegation is beyond the realm of conjecture.
[51] I also find Ms. Ramstead’s allegations about the misaligned job expectations and a connection to her sex have not been taken out of the realm of conjecture. She says when she was being interviewed, Mr. Burley told her that she would be involved in the future implementation of RMR’s online forum that was under development, that she would help develop other, long-term business plans, and there would be some expectations about work hours that did not materialize.
[52] Ms. Ramstead argues that reducing her role to clerical and reception work was reinforcing a gendered hierarchy within the workplace, limited her employment opportunities because she had no time for “big picture’ projects that she expected to work on when she was hired. She cites Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd , 1989 97 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1252 at para. 48.:
Sex or gender discrimination in the workplace may be defined as practices or attitudes which have the effect of limiting the conditions of employment of, or the employment opportunities available to, employees on the basis of a characteristic related to gender.
[53] I find that it is mere conjecture that Ms. Ramstead’s role as office manager was reduced at any point in her employment. The only information available for me to infer that there is a connection between her expectations and the role she performed, is her referring to the role as clerical or reception work. Even if I accept that she believed the office manager job was an executive position during her interview, she has not connected the duties she performed since the start of her employment to her termination, to her sex. Ms. Ramstead does not dispute that she was the office manager. She does not dispute that she performed the duties as described by the Respondents starting from her first day of work. She does not dispute the affidavits in the Respondents’ application that speak to her inability to do her job. She does not rebut the Respondents’ examples of how she struggled with essential components of her job, and how her inability to perform her work, either substantively or because she was frequently late to work, impacted other staff members and customers. I am satisfied Ms. Ramstead has no reasonable prospect of success at proving this at a hearing.
[54] I now turn to Ms. Ramstead’s view of how Mr. Burley’s conduct made her feel. In the employment context, unequal power dynamics may contribute to an employee feeling bullied by the people exercising power over their employment. However, subjective feelings or even genuinely-held beliefs are not enough to prove that the impugned conduct has occurred. There must be an objective element to the assessment as well – one that distinguishes between reasonable conduct arising from management of a workplace and conduct that is degrading or otherwise demeaning of an employee’s dignity: Gaucher v. Fraser Health Authority and others , 2019 BCHRT 243 [ Gaucher ], at paras. 60 to 63 ; The Employee v. The University and another (No. 2) , 2020 BCHRT 12 [ Employee (No. 2) ], at para. 187.
[55] Ms. Ramstead’s submission that she felt powerless does not bear out with the evidence that she initiated the lunch compensation conversation, asserted her perceived employment rights, or responded to her employer with a screenshot of employment standards. Similarly, the evidence does not bear her assertion that the March 12 conversation about her tardiness made her feel controlled by Mr. Burley. He asked her why she was late, and she responded that it “didn’t matter because the train hadn’t made her late.” When Mr. Burley said he would need to write her up for tardiness a third time, she corrected him, saying he had given her verbal warnings, but had never written her up. Even if I accept that there was an inherent power dynamic where Ms. Ramstead had less power, that alone does not determine an inference that sex was a factor in the adverse impact she experienced. Without more, I cannot find she is reasonably certain to prove this claim at a hearing.
[56] I have considered Mr. Burley’s alleged statements about Ms. Ramstead’s attitude, and his unwillingness to tolerate the way she spoke to him because he was her boss. I have no difficulty accepting that a woman could be unfairly perceived as having an attitude problem for speaking up for herself at work. However, in the circumstances, I cannot accept Ms. Ramstead’s position that these statements are “forms of sex-based discrimination that reinforced gender power hierarchies and signaled that she was not worthy of being taken seriously at work.” Ms. Ramstead does not provide any further context regarding the exchange that can lead me to infer that her sex was a factor in his comments. The evidence before me is that Mr. Burley allegedly made the statements after he had spoken with her numerous times about her tardiness, and after he had expressed he felt disrespected by Ms. Ramstead for her continued inability to arrive at work on time. It was made after he had asked for a reason for her tardiness and she refused to give him one, stating “it doesn’t matter.” Lastly, the statements were made shortly before RMR terminated her employment for tardiness. In my view, these statements are more aligned with reasonable conduct arising from the management of a workplace than conduct that is degrading or otherwise demeaning of an employee’s dignity: Gaucher , at paras. 60 to 63 ; The Employee (No. 2) , at para. 187.
[57] Ms. Ramstead’s allegations, without more, has not taken her complaint out of the realm of conjecture. There is no reasonable prospect Ms. Ramstead will prove at a hearing that the Respondents’ alleged conduct was connected to her sex.
V CONCLUSION
[58] The application is granted. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1) of the Code .
Laila Said Alam
Tribunal Member