Pattinson v. University of Northern British Columbia (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 57
Date Issued: March 4, 2025
File: CS-000130
Indexed as: Pattinson v. University of Northern British Columbia (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 57
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Richard Pattinson
COMPLAINANT
AND:
University of Northern British Columbia
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Richard Pattinson
Counsel for the Respondent: Paige Ainslie
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision, I explain why I dismiss Richard Pattinson’s complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Human Rights Code , based on a reasonable settlement offer.
[2] Mr. Pattinson filed two complaints which were joined by the Tribunal, alleging discrimination by his employer, the University of Northern British Columbia between April 6, 2018, and January 23, 2020. He says the University failed to accommodate him when his supervisor’s behaviour exacerbated his mental disability, and he was required to complete an independent medical examination before returning to work.
[3] The University made a with prejudice offer to Mr. Pattinson to resolve the complaint. Mr. Pattinson did not accept the offer. The University applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with a hearing in circumstances where it made a reasonable settlement offer.
[4] Mr. Pattinson opposes the dismissal application and disputes that the University’s offer is reasonable.
[5] For the following reasons, I grant the application and dismiss the complaint. I find the University’s settlement offer is reasonable and it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] Mr. Pattinson was employed by the University as an English Language Studies instructor.
[7] On April 6, 2018, Mr. Pattinson met with his supervisor to discuss his job duties and performance. Mr. Pattinson says the meeting negatively affected his mental health.
[8] On June 12, 2018, Mr. Pattinson went off work. Mr. Pattinson submitted to the University, medical forms completed by his physician stating: he suffered from anxiety and panic attacks, he would be off work, and he would require accommodations when he returned to work.
[9] On July 13, 2018, while he was off work, Mr. Pattinson made a complaint about his supervisor bullying him to the University. The University hired an investigator who ultimately concluded that the complaint did not require action from the University.
[10] On August 22, 2018, Mr. Pattinson submitted a Return-to-Work Form signed by his physician stating he was fit to return to work as of August 27, 2018, with no restrictions. The University thought this information appeared to contradict the earlier medical information stating Mr. Pattinson would require accommodation. The University decided that Mr. Pattinson must attend an Independent Medical Examination [ IME ] to determine the nature and extent of his disability, if any, and what accommodations may be required before he could return to work.
[11] On April 16, 2019, Mr. Pattinson attended an IME with a psychiatrist. Mr. Pattinson was diagnosed with major depressive disorder that was in remission.
[12] While Mr. Pattinson was off work, the University discontinued the English Language Studies program, and the role of English Language Studies instructor was eliminated. The University laid off Mr. Pattinson. Upon receiving the IME results the University, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, arranged for Mr. Pattinson to bump into the position of Employment Services Representative [ ESR ] for a trial period of four months.
[13] On July 8, 2019, Mr. Pattinson returned to work in the ESR role.
[14] On October 8, 2019, Mr. Pattinson informed his supervisor that he was having difficulties processing and retaining information because of his mental health and requested accommodation. Mr. Pattinson subsequently took a medical leave from October 17, 2019, to January 2, 2020.
[15] On January 2, 2020, Mr. Pattinson returned to work in the ESR role.
[16] On January 23, 2020, the University determined that Mr. Pattinson did not have the ability to satisfy the job requirements of the ESR role and laid him off.
[17] Mr. Pattinson filed multiple complaints and amendments to these complaints between July 17, 2018, and July 17, 2024, alleging discrimination in employment by the University. The scope of the present complaint is set out in Pattinson v. University of Northern British Columbia and another (No. 2) , 2024 BCHRT 110 as allegations of events between April 6, 2018, and January 23, 2020. Mr. Pattinson’s allegations of events occurring after January 23, 2020, in other positions with the university were not accepted as part of this complaint. As at the date of this decision, Mr. Pattinson has filed six other complaints against the University which are at earlier stages of the Tribunal’s process.
[18] On May 28, 2024, Mr. Pattinson filed his statement of remedies seeking:
(a) A declaration that the conduct complained of is discriminatory.
(b) An award of $960,000 or more for lost wages.
(c) An order of $40.00 for out-of-pocket expenses.
(d) An order of $800,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
(e) Interest on the monetary awards.
[19] On December 13, 2024, the University wrote to Mr. Pattinson and made a with prejudice offer to settle the present complaint. The terms of the offer are:
(a) A lump sum payment of $54,038 for lost wages.
(b) A lump sum payment of $3,945 for pension contributions.
(c) A payment of $1,159 for pre-judgment interest on the wage loss and pension awards.
(d) A payment of $40.00 for out-of-pocket expenses.
(e) A payment of $15,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
(f) In exchange for the above, Mr. Pattinson will withdraw the present complaint.
(g) The offer remains open for acceptance notwithstanding the filing of the application to dismiss the complaint. The offer will expire two weeks following the Tribunal’s decision on the University’s application to dismiss.
[20] The University also informed Mr. Pattinson that, although he did not request it as a remedy, the University is reviewing its Respect in the Workplace and Bullying & Harassment policies, training materials regarding these policies, and the frequency of training.
[21] Mr. Pattinson did not accept the University’s settlement offer.
III DECISION
[22] The University applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because it says, it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed where it has made a reasonable offer to settle the complaint.
[23] There are two prerequisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia , 2003 BCHRT 73 at para. 64; Carter v. Travelex Canada and Travelex UK (No. 3) , 2007 BCHRT 275 at para. 25. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance even if the complainant initially rejects it and regardless of the outcome of the application to dismiss: Spina v. City of Kamloops (No. 2) , 2022 BCHRT 59 at para. 14. There is no dispute that both prerequisites are met in this case.
[24] In cases like this, where the prerequisites are met, the Tribunal engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to dismiss the complaint. The first step is to assess whether the offer is reasonable: Dar Santos at para. 59. If it is, the next step is to address whether allowing the complaint to proceed would serve the purposes of the Code .
[25] I begin my analysis by determining whether the offer is reasonable.
A. Is the settlement offer reasonable?
[26] The Tribunal’s remedial powers under s. 37(2) of the Code include making cease and refrain orders against the person who discriminated, declarations regarding the discriminatory conduct, compensatory orders related to wage loss and out-of-pocket expenses related to the discrimination, and issuing a monetary award for injury to the complainant’s dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
[27] In assessing whether an offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations. At the same time, the settlement offer does not have to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order and does not need to contain an admission of liability: Carter at para. 30. Rather, the offer must provide reasonable compensation and other remedies the Tribunal would likely order if the matter was to proceed to a hearing and be successful: Heitner v. BC Provincial Renal Agency and others (No. 3) , 2020 BCHRT 134 at para. 48.
1. Non-monetary remedies
[28] In his statement of remedies Mr. Pattinson seeks a declaratory order that the conduct is discrimination. While the settlement offer does not incorporate the order sought, the absence of such an order does not in itself provide a basis for denying the dismissal application: McQueen v. Three Point Motors , 2017 BCHRT 120 at para. 33.
2. Out-of-Pocket Expenses
[29] Mr. Pattinson seeks $40.00 for the cost of ordering medical files in pursuing his complaint. The University’s offer fully compensates him for this amount. Therefore, I find the University’s offer, in this respect, is reasonable.
3. Wage Loss
[30] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to award compensation to a successful complainant for all, or part, of any wages or salary lost because of a contravention. The purpose of such an award is to restore a complainant, to the extent possible, to the place that they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9) , 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 300.
[31] The offer includes an amount of $54,038 for lost wages that the University says is the amount Mr. Pattinson would have earned for the period of August 27, 2018, to March 9, 2020, in the English language studies instructor and ESR roles. The University also offers $3,945 representing employer pension contributions.
[32] Mr. Pattinson does not dispute the University’s calculation of his lost wages and pension contributions. Rather, he argues that he should have been considered for a faculty position as an accommodation. In his statement of remedies, Mr. Pattinson requests an amount of $960,00 or more for lost wages. He says wage loss should be calculated based on the possibility that he would have been given an associate professor position where he would have earned $83,475 annually until his planned retirement in 2028. Mr. Pattinson has not provided any further calculation or documentation in support of his wage loss claim.
[33] I find the amount for lost wages in the offer falls within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order if Mr. Pattinson succeeds at the hearing for the following reasons.
[34] First, Mr. Pattinson does not dispute that the University’s offer compensates him for the period from August 27, 2018, when his physician said he could return to work to March 9, 2020. The timeframe of this complaint is from April 6, 2018, to January 23, 2020. Allegations of events occurring after March 9, 2020, when Mr. Pattinson returned to work, and any loss of wages arising after the time period of this complaint, are the subject of Mr. Pattinson’s other complaints. The University provided detailed calculations showing how they arrived at the amount in their offer which Mr. Pattinson does not dispute.
[35] Second, Mr. Pattinson has not provided additional information to support his argument. Mr. Pattinson’s calculations are not clear to me. At an annual rate of $83,475, Mr. Pattinson would have had to work 11.5 years to earn $960,000, which if he started in this role in 2018 (when he went off work) would take him past 2028. Further, there is no evidence before me that an associate professor position was available or if there was, that Mr. Pattinson applied for such a position. In his submissions Mr. Pattinson concedes that whether he would have obtained such a position is speculative. I have little evidence before me on which I could conclude that Mr. Pattinson’s basis for the amount claimed is reasonable.
[36] Finally, a reasonable settlement offer does not need to mirror exactly what the Tribunal might award.
[37] Under the circumstances I am satisfied the University’s offer of $54,038 for lost wages and $3,945 for pension contributions to be within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might award at a hearing.
4. Injury to Dignity
[38] The Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity: Code , s. 37(2)(d)(iii). The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case and relevant factors: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2) , 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases. In making an injury to dignity award the Tribunal often considers several factors including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s vulnerability; and the effect on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7) , 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225.
[39] In his statement of remedies, Mr. Pattinson requests $800,000 in compensation for injury to his dignity. In support of his request Mr. Pattinson says as a result of the discrimination he suffered physical and psychological effects including sleep disruption, problems concentrating, and complications from diabetes.
[40] The University offers a lump sum payment of $15,000 for injury to dignity and argues that this amount is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order assuming Mr. Pattinson proves his case.
[41] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that $15,000 falls within the reasonable range the Tribunal might award if Mr. Pattinson was successful at a hearing.
[42] I begin with the nature of the discrimination. Any discrimination is serious; however, the egregiousness of the discriminatory conduct varies depending on the specific facts of the case: Cyncora v. Axton Inc. , 2022 BCHRT 36 at para. 114. The scope of the present complaint is discrete. The complaint deals with Mr. Pattinson’s allegations of events between April 6, 2018, and January 23, 2020. Mr. Pattinson alleges the University failed to accommodate his mental disability during this time, failed to investigate his complaint about his supervisor, and required him to undergo an IME before returning to work.
[43] Mr. Pattinson says there are aggravating factors because he says the University was dishonest in how they communicated with him during the accommodation process. He says he disagrees with the University that they made a reasonable effort to accommodate his disabilities and says they were biased in how they responded to his complaints. The purpose of an injury to dignity award is compensatory and not punitive. I appreciate that Mr. Pattinson feels the accommodation process was unfair. However, based on the evidence before me I cannot say the University’s conduct aggravated Mr. Pattinson’s injury such that it is a significant factor in my analysis.
[44] Next, I consider Mr. Pattinson’s vulnerability or the social context of the discrimination. Mr. Pattinson has a mental disability. The Tribunal has recognized that people with mental disabilities face pervasive stigma: Cyncora para. 119. I find Mr. Pattinson’s vulnerability was compounded by the inherent power imbalance between employers and employees that make employees vulnerable: Malin v. Ultra Care and another (No. 2) , 2012 BCHRT 158 at para. 198.
[45] Finally, I consider the effect of the discrimination on Mr. Pattinson. Mr. Pattinson says the discrimination had significant negative physical and mental effect on him. Mr. Pattinson says the discrimination resulted in his developing complications from diabetes, sleep problems, and stress.
[46] Mr. Pattinson has provided a graph of his blood glucose levels and a letter from a doctor dated January 30, 2025, saying “poorly controlled blood sugar levels could be [attributed] to [increased] stresses with resultant increased production of cortisol level.” He also provided a letter from a psychiatrist dated January 24, 2025, stating that Mr. Pattinson complained of having symptoms of anxiety and depression.
[47] The University argues that I should put little weight on the medical documents. It says the psychiatrist first examined Mr. Pattinson on March 30, 2020, a month after the events in the complaint and after Mr. Pattinson started a new role at the University. It further notes the letter from the doctor does not state when they examined Mr. Pattinson or what information they have reviewed to prepare their opinion about his diabetes. Rather, the doctor simply says it is a possibility that there is a correlation between stress and reduction of cortisol and elevated blood sugar levels. The University argues that Mr. Pattinson’s graph shows most of the spikes in his blood sugar level occurred outside of the time period of the complaint.
[48] The parties have cited a number of cases in support of their positions. None of the cases cited by the parties mirror the exact circumstances of this case. However, I have reviewed and considered all of them in my reaching my conclusion in relation to the range of reasonable injury to dignity awards that Mr. Pattinson might expect to receive if he is successful in a hearing of his complaint.
[49] Mr. Pattinson refers me to several cases he says are comparable to his circumstances: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5) , 2021 BCHRT 16 ($176,000); AB v. Joe Singer Shoes Limited , 2018 HRTO 107, ($200,000); Sulz v. Attorney General of Canada et al , 2006 BCSC 99, upheld 2006 BCCA 582 ($125,000); Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9) , 2011 BCHRT 185 ($25,000); Hughes v. Transport Canada , 2018 CHRT 15 ($15,000). Mr. Pattinson says the discrimination in his case is far more egregious and warrants an award four times the highest award in the cases he cites.
[50] I find the circumstances of Mr. Pattinson’s complaint distinguishable from the cases he cites. They are not complaints about accommodation of disability in employment. Instead, Francis involves egregious racial discrimination that included direct explicit racial slurs. AB involves repeated sexual assaults over decades. Sulz is a complaint in tort about multiple instances of sexual harassment that resulted in serious and documented psychological harms. Gichuru is a case where the Tribunal found systemic discrimination with respect to membership in an occupational association. Similarly, Hughes is a case about discriminatory practices in the selection process for a job.
[51] While they do not mirror the present circumstances exactly, I find the cases relied on by the University to be more relevant to my analysis. The cases cited are complaints about accommodation of disabilities in employment and include awards for injury to dignity between $6,500 to $15,000: Singh v. Dodd’s Furniture , 2021 BCHRT 85 ($10,000); Kurpel v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) , 2021 HRTO 83 ($10,000); Knight v. Surrey Place Centre , 2019 HRTO 482 ($15,000); Tervit v. Canadian College of English Language , 2014 BCHRT 53 ($6,500); Gebresadik v. Black Top Cabs, 2017 BCHRT 278 ($15,000); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 772 v. University of Ottawa , 2019 CanLII 29865 [ University of Ottawa ] ($7,500). I note that the cases cited by the University are dated. The Tribunal’s trend for injury to dignity awards is trending upwards: Benton v. Richmond Plastics , 2020 BCHRT 82 at para 78.
[52] The Tribunal has recognized that termination of employment attracts the top end of the Tribunal’s awards: Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2) , 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-470. Mr. Pattinson was not terminated and remained an employee of the University at all material times. Therefore, an award for injury to dignity in this circumstance will be less than a similar case that involves termination of employment. Notably, the complainants in Kurpel , Tervit , Gebresadik , and University of Ottawa all continued their employment.
[53] While any discrimination is serious, I cannot accept that the nature of the discrimination in this case is as severe as the cases Mr. Pattinson cites. I acknowledge that Mr. Pattinson says he was negatively impacted by the discrimination. He says he experienced stress, sleep disturbance, and anxiety. He says he suffered from negative self-esteem, feelings of worthlessness, and sadness and hopeless. At the same time, he has not persuaded me that the Tribunal is likely to order four time the amount awarded in AB where the respondent was found to have harassed and sexually assaulted the complainant over the course of decades.
[54] In the circumstances of the complaint, I would estimate a reasonable range of injury to dignity award between $5,000 and $35,000 if the complaint succeeded at a hearing. The payment offered in the settlement offer is at the lower end of this particular range. Still, on the information and case law before me, I find that the Tribunal, exercising its broad discretion to determine compensatory remedies, could reasonably award Mr. Pattinson damages in the range of what the University has offered for injury to dignity. I find that the University’s offer of $15,000 to Mr. Pattinson for injury to dignity is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order in the event that Mr. Pattinson is successful at the hearing on its merits.
5. Interest
[55] The University’s offer provides interest in the amount of $1,159 on the wage loss and pension payment awards calculated at 2.00% interest rate, representing the average pre-judgment interest rate from August 17, 2018, to the date of the offer. Mr. Pattinson does not dispute the University’s calculation of the interest on his wage loss and pension award. Therefore, I find the University’s offer, in this respect, is reasonable.
B. Will it serve the purposes of the Code to proceed anyway?
[56] The assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code , involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint, but encompasses broader public policy issues including the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing: Dar Santos at para. 59. In general, it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing where the respondent has made a reasonable settlement offer: Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another , 2024 BCHRT 119 at para. 47.
[57] I find there are no factors that favour proceeding with the complaint in light of the University’s reasonable settlement offer. Mr. Pattinson’s complaint of discrimination, while serious, is not unique or novel. The Tribunal routinely hears and decides cases that concern allegations of discrimination based on mental disability and accommodation of disabilities in the workplace. I am not persuaded on the materials that the present complaint engages broader public policy issues.
[58] Further, I note that the settlement offer does not require Mr. Pattinson to withdraw any of his multiple other complaints with the Tribunal. This means that Mr. Pattinson can continue to use the resources of the Tribunal to pursue his other complaints about other allegations of discrimination.
[59] I am also not persuaded that it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing where a reasonable means of redress has been offered. The complaint is currently scheduled for a ten-day hearing. The parties have indicated that they intend to cumulatively call at least 15 witnesses. Considerable resources will be required for a hearing. In the present case where I have found the settlement offer is fair and reasonable, and will remain open for Mr. Pattinson’s acceptance, I am not persuaded that it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed.
IV CONCLUSION
[60] The University’s settlement offer is reasonable. It would not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed where Mr. Pattinson has rejected this offer.
[61] I grant the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code .
[62] As set out in the University’s materials, Mr. Pattinson has two weeks following the date of this decision to accept the offer.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member