Patel v. Convertus Digital, 2025 BCHRT 52
Date Issued: February 27, 2025
File: CS-001813
Indexed as: Patel v. Convertus Digital, 2025 BCHRT 52
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Payal Patel
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Convertus Digital
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On their own behalf: Payal Patel
Counsel for the Respondent: Susan Crawford and Misbah Anis
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a decision about whether to dismiss Payal Patel’s human rights complaint without a hearing.
[2] Ms. Patel worked for Convertus Digital. In 2020, Convertus terminated her employment. Ms. Patel alleges that her pregnancy (sex), race, and political belief were a factor in the termination. She says this is discrimination in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[3] Shortly after her termination, Ms. Patel accepted a lump sum payment in exchange for signing a release of all claims [ Release ]. In that Release, Ms. Patel agreed she would not file a human rights complaint against Convertus. One month later, she filed this complaint.
[4] Convertus argues that it does not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed in the face of the Release. It asks the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. Ms. Patel argues that the complaint should proceed because she signed the Release under duress, and there are unresolved issues regarding her termination.
[5] For the following reasons, I find that it does not further the purposes of the Code to allow this complaint to proceed in the face of the Release. The complaint is dismissed.
II DECISION
[6] Ms. Patel began her employment with Convertus on May 1, 2018. In early April 2020, Convertus suspended its normal operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It temporarily laid off just under 250 employees during this time, including Ms. Patel. Ms. Patel was placed on a temporary layoff effective April 10, 2020.
[7] Ms. Patel says that, after she was laid off, she emailed Human Resources to inform them that she was 8 weeks pregnant. She says that she asked them to keep her part-time, but they said no. She says that she was told they would consider her case, and “hire me back soon”.
[8] In early July, Convertus says that it determined there was still not enough work for many employees, including Ms. Patel. It says senior management decided to permanently terminate Ms. Patel’s employment. In doing so, Convertus says that management did not know she was pregnant. In her complaint, Ms. Patel disputes this. At this point, she was 22 weeks pregnant.
[9] On July 6, 2020, Convertus gave Ms. Patel a termination package that included her severance entitlement. It also offered to pay her an additional two weeks’ salary in exchange for the execution of the Release. Convertus gave Ms. Patel one week to consider the offer.
[10] The Release is just over one page, and includes the following relevant terms:
IN CONSIDERATION of the terms and conditions of a settlement as evidenced in a letter dated July 6, 2020 from Beth Worthington to Payal Patel , a copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Schedule “A”, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Payal Patel , on behalf of myself, my heirs, successors and assigns (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Releasor”) hereby release and forever discharge Convertus, along with all parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and associated companies, and together with all respective officers, directors, employees, servants and agents and their successors and assigns (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Releasee”) jointly and severally from any and all actions, causes of action, contracts, covenants, whether express or implied, claims, demands for damages, including disability, life or other insurance claims, indemnity benefits, costs, interest, loss or injury of every nature and kind whatsoever and howsoever arising, whether statutory or otherwise, which I may heretofore have had, may now have, or may hereinafter have, in any way relating to the hiring of, the employment by and the cessation of the employment of the Releasor by the Releasee.
AND FOR THE SAID CONSIDERATION it is further agreed that the Releasor shall not make any claims (including any cross-claims, counter-claims, third party claims, actions or applications) or take any proceedings against any person or corporation who might claim contribution or indemnity against the Releasee.
…
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE that I have not been subjected to any form of discrimination whatsoever and hereby represent and warrant that I have not commenced any complaint and undertake not to commence any complaint under the British Columbia Human Rights Commission.
…
I HEREBY CONFIRM that I have been afforded an opportunity to independently review, read and obtain independent legal advice with respect to the details of this Final Release and Indemnity and the settlement relating thereto, and, upon having satisfied myself that the within offer is fair, reasonable and acceptable to me, I hereby confirm that I am executing this Final Release and Indemnity freely, voluntarily and without duress. [all emphases in original]
[11] On July 10, 2020, Ms. Patel signed the Release. On August 8, 2020, she filed this human rights complaint.
[12] The parties do not dispute that the scope of the Release captures Ms. Patel’s human rights complaint. Notwithstanding its reference to the “BC Human Rights Commission”, rather than the Tribunal, there is no dispute that the Release was intended to preclude Ms. Patel from bringing a human rights complaint, and that she understood that. The issue in this application is whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed notwithstanding the Release.
[13] People cannot contract out of their rights under the Code : Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink , [1982] 2 SCR 145 at 158. For that reason, the fact that parties have entered into a settlement agreement respecting a human rights dispute does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear the dispute: Thompson v. Providence Health Care , 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 38.
[14] Nevertheless, there are strong policy reasons that favour holding people to agreements they have voluntarily entered into:
When parties are able to resolve human rights disputes by way of a settlement agreement, considerable public and private resources may be saved. They may be able to resolve the complaint more expeditiously than would a formal hearing process. The parties may also be able to craft a resolution which more closely matches their needs and interests than would a decision of the Tribunal. Finally, the mediation process itself may be better for the parties’ relationship than a formal hearing. For all of these reasons, the Tribunal encourages and assists parties in attempting to resolve complaints.
Nguyen v. Prince Rupert School District No. 52, 2004 BCHRT 20 at para. 15
[15] These advantages are undermined if parties who resolve their complaints are subsequently permitted to come forward and pursue the same complaint at the Tribunal: Thompson at para. 28. The Tribunal has frequently dismissed complaints in the face of a settlement agreement on the basis that proceeding with the complaint would not further the purposes of the Code : s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
[16] The burden is on the person seeking to pursue their complaint in the face of an agreement to persuade the Tribunal that the purposes of the Code are best served by allowing the complaint to proceed: Thompson at para. 46. In this case, that means that Ms. Patel bears the burden of persuading me that her complaint should be allowed to proceed in the face of an agreement that expressly purported to preclude it.
[17] In considering this issue, the Tribunal has recognized a number of relevant factors, including: the language of the release; unconscionability; undue influence; whether the party received independent legal advice; conditions of duress, which may be related to the timing of the agreement, financial need, or other circumstances; and whether the party received little or no consideration for the release: Thompson at paras. 42-44, citing Chow (Re) (1999), 37 CHRR D/442 (Alta. Q.B.), and Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (No. 1) (1999), 1999 35 CHRR D/39 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) at para. 17. The Tribunal may also consider “the seriousness of the allegations in a complaint and what is at stake for the complainant”: Gerard v. Olive’s Market Whistler and others , 2015 BCHRT 102 at para. 17.
[18] Here, Ms. Patel says that she signed the Release while she faced “significant financial insecurity” and did not have “a comprehensive understanding of all relevant aspects of the situation”. She acknowledges she had the opportunity to receive legal advice but says she could not afford to. She says that she was the primary earner in her family, and the loss of her job while she was 22 weeks pregnant caused her significant stress. Finally, Ms. Patel questions the reasons given for her termination, in circumstances where she says that Convertus posted a job vacancy for a manager role around the same time as she was terminated.
[19] I accept that Ms. Patel signed the Release to secure an extra payment for her family during a difficult time. However, this alone is not evidence that she was signing under duress. This Tribunal has previously acknowledged that “[a]ll employees facing termination face some stress and pressure to act”: Ghane v. Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics Ltd., 2009 BCHRT 13 at para. 18. However, such ordinary stress and pressure do not, themselves, amount to duress or create circumstances of undue influence: Craig v. Sony Entertainment Canada Inc. and Abson, 2005 BCHRT 54 at para. 35. In this case, I am not persuaded that Ms. Patel signed the Release under duress.
[20] Ms. Patel was already on a temporary layoff when she signed the Release. She was not confronted with the prospect of a sudden loss of income. There is no dispute that Convertus paid Ms. Patel her statutory severance entitlement at the time of her termination. This was, properly, not dependent on her signing the Release. Ms. Patel does not say that she did not understand the difference between the severance payment she was entitled to and received, and the extra payment she accepted in exchange for the Release. Whether she signed the Release or not, she received some money at the time of her termination.
[21] In my view, Ms. Patel had a meaningful opportunity to consider whether to sign the Release. Convertus gave Ms. Patel one week to consider its offer. She did not ask for more time to get advice or seek information about the implications of signing the Release. In fact, she did not use the full time that Convertus gave her to consider the Release. She signed and returned it four days after her termination.
[22] Ms. Patel does not say that she did not understand the Release. The Release uses legal language, but it is relatively short. Its significance is clear: Ms. Patel was accepting extra money in exchange for her agreement not to file any legal action against Convertus, including – expressly – a human rights complaint. While Ms. Patel says that she was unaware of her rights at this time, she does not explain what she was unaware of and why she could not obtain necessary information before signing the Release. Within one month, she had gathered enough information to file this human rights complaint. She does not explain why she could not have considered that option during the time that she was considering the Release.
[23] Ms. Patel has not persuaded me that the circumstances in which she signed the Release amount to duress and weigh in favour of allowing her complaint to proceed.
[24] Finally, I acknowledge that this complaint is important to Ms. Patel, who says that it raises questions about why she was terminated. However, I am not persuaded that the nature of the complaint weighs in favour of allowing it to proceed. I agree with Convertus that Ms. Patel’s complaint sets out very few facts to support an allegation that her termination was discriminatory. Based only on the material before me, which includes the layoff of 250 people at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is a weak complaint. It does not raise any systemic or novel issues that may engage the public interest.
[25] On balance, I find that the Code’s purposes are best fulfilled by holding the parties to the bargain they made at the time of the termination. Ms. Patel had the benefit of an extra payment at a time when her family needed the money, and Convertus had the benefit of a Release which addressed its legal liability. The context of this bargain does not support that it was reached under duress, or is otherwise unconscionable or contrary to the Code. The nature of the allegations in the complaint do not outweigh the benefit of encouraging people to resolve their disputes fairly and directly. I find it does not further the Code’s purposes to allow the complaint to proceed, and dismiss it under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[26] In reaching this conclusion, I do not question that the termination of her employment was very difficult for Ms. Patel. It happened when she was pregnant and a primary earner for her family. It caused her stress during her pregnancy, and shortened the time she was able to bond with her baby after the birth. These impacts were very serious, and reflects the reality that losing employment has profound impacts on an employee and the people who depend on them.
III CONCLUSION
[27] I have decided that it does not further the purposes of the Code to allow this complaint to proceed in circumstances where Ms. Patel accepted a payment in exchange for signing a Release. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair
Human Rights Tribunal