Carefoot v. Velasco, 2025 BCHRT 43
Date Issued: February 21, 2025
File(s): CS-003892
Indexed as: Carefoot v. Velasco, 2025 BCHRT 43
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Christopher Carefoot
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Miguel Velasco
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Erica Chow
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In March 2021, Christopher Carefoot and his neighbour Miguel Velasco got into an altercation. During the altercation, Mr. Carefoot apparently blew his leaf blower in Mr. Velasco’s face, which prompted Mr. Velasco to retreat to his vehicle. Mr. Velasco says that while he was in his vehicle, Mr. Carefoot threw a rock at the windshield. Mr. Velasco called 911 to report the damage to his vehicle.
[2] Mr. Carefoot alleges that Mr. Velasco told the RCMP dispatcher that Mr. Carefoot was gay. Mr. Carefoot says this is one example Mr. Velasco repeatedly calling him gay. Mr. Carefoot also alleges that Mr. Velasco “repeatedly and publicly” stated that Mr. Carefoot was selling his property because he owed “many people” money, but provides no further details. Mr. Carefoot brings his complaint under s. 7 of the Human Rights Code , alleging discrimination based on gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, and family status.
[3] Mr. Velasco denies calling Mr. Carefoot gay and provides a transcript of the call to the RCMP. He applies to dismiss Mr. Carefoot’s complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
[4] The issue that I must decide is whether Mr. Carefoot’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
[5] There is a conflict between Mr. Carefoot and Mr. Velasco regarding what was said to the RCMP, particularly about Mr. Carefoot’s sexual orientation. Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia , 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. The Tribunal must consider whether credibility can be resolved based on corroborative affidavit and contemporaneous documentary evidence: Smyth v. Loblaw and another , 2017 BCHRT 73 at paras. 41-42.
[6] Because contemporary documentary evidence—the transcript—supports Mr. Velasco’s position that he did not call Mr. Carefoot gay, I am satisfied that Mr. Carefoot has not taken his complaint out of the realm of conjecture, and I grant the application to dismiss. Mr. Carefoot’s complaint is dismissed.
[7] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[8] Mr. Velasco applies to dismiss Mr. Carefoot’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on Mr. Velasco to establish the basis for dismissal.
[9] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[10] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77 .
[11] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20 ; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [ Hill ] at para. 27 .
[12] Mr. Carefoot says that Mr. Velasco violated s. 7(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Code , which prohibits discrimination in publications, when Mr. Velasco called him gay and told others that Mr. Carefoot was selling his property because he owed people money.
[13] Section 7 targets publications whose effects are to perpetrate discrimination and hatred against protected groups: British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 [ Schrenk ] at para. 48. Its two subsections address different ways that publications can exclude, marginalize, and harm people based on their connection with a historically disadvantaged group: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7) , 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 51.
[14] Section 7 reads:
7 (1) A person must not publish, issue or display, or cause to be published, issued or displayed, any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that
(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or class of persons, or
(b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred or contempt
because of the Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age of that person or that group or class of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication, a communication intended to be private or a communication related to an activity otherwise permitted by this Code.
[15] For the purposes of this application, I assume without deciding that s. 7 could apply to the circumstances of this complaint.
[16] First, I turn to the allegation that Mr. Velasco “accused” Mr. Carefoot of being gay. He says this happened repeatedly but only gives details of one instance where Mr. Velasco told an RCMP dispatcher that Mr. Carefoot was gay.
[17] Mr. Velasco argues that there is no reasonable prospect of success because he did not tell the RCMP dispatcher that Mr. Carefoot was gay. While Mr. Carefoot says he did make that statement, and while there are some situations where a conflict in the evidence necessitates a hearing, this is not one of those situations. Mr. Velasco has provided a transcript of his call to 911, which supports his claim that he did not make the comment. Mr. Velasco has therefore provided contemporaneous documentary evidence that he did not tell the RCMP that Mr. Carefoot was gay. I am satisfied upon a review of the materials filed to date in this case that Mr. Carefoot has no reasonable prospect of proving discrimination in publication. Mr. Carefoot has not taken this aspect of his complaint out of the realm of speculation and conjecture.
[18] Second, Mr. Carefoot says that Mr. Velasco repeatedly stated that Mr. Carefoot was only selling his property because he owed people money, which he says was discrimination based on family status. He gives no other details of this allegation. I am satisfied, in light of the lack of evidence regarding this allegation, that Mr. Carefoot has no reasonable prospect of proving an adverse discriminatory impact, or an intent to cause such an adverse discriminatory impact. Similarly, Mr. Carefoot has no reasonable prospect of establishing that the impugned comments are likely to expose him or to hatred or contempt.
[19] Section 7 imposes a high bar Mr. Carefoot is not likely to meet. I dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
III CONCLUSION
[20] I dismiss Mr. Carefoot’s complaint. Mr. Carefoot’s complaint will not proceed to a hearing.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member