Patterson v. Environmental 360 Solutions Ltd., 2025 BCHRT 39
Date Issued: February 20, 2025
File: CS-004691
Indexed as: Patterson v. Environmental 360 Solutions Ltd., 2025 BCHRT 39
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
James Patterson
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Environmental 360 Solutions Ltd.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(f)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Counsel for the Complainant: Alison Moore and Meredith Shaw
Counsel for the Respondent: Colin J. Edstrom
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a decision about whether to dismiss James Patterson’s complaint without a hearing.
[2] Mr. Patterson worked for Environmental 360 Solutions [ E360 ] as a truck driver. He was represented in his employment by the Teamsters, Local 213 [the Union ]. E360 terminated his employment after he was absent from work for a few days. Mr. Patterson says that his absences were related to a physical disability, specifically abdominal pain that required testing. He alleges that his termination was discrimination based on physical disability, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[3] The Union grieved Mr. Patterson’s termination. The grievance was resolved through a settlement agreement, in which E360 agreed to withdraw its termination for cause and reinstate Mr. Patterson. The parties referred the outstanding issue of wage loss to an arbitrator, who concluded that the Union had failed to prove that Mr. Patterson was fit to work during the period he was seeking wage loss. The Labour Relations Board denied Mr. Patterson’s application to set aside the arbitrator’s decision. As a result, Mr. Patterson has received no compensation for the ten-month period between his termination and E360’s agreement to reinstate his employment.
[4] E360 argues that the grievance procedure has resolved the substance of Mr. Patterson’s human rights complaint. It argues that Mr. Patterson should not be permitted to re-litigate the issue at the Human Rights Tribunal and asks that the complaint be dismissed under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code. In the alternative, it argues that Mr. Patterson has no reasonable prospect of proving that his termination was connected to a physical disability, within the meaning of the Code, and so the complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(c).
[5] I acknowledge the difficult circumstances that Mr. Patterson faced when he lost his employment, and that he is not satisfied that he has been made whole through the grievance process. However, for the following reasons, I agree that the substance of Mr. Patterson’s human rights complaint has been appropriately dealt with in the grievance process. It is dismissed under s. 27(1)(f).
II DECISION
[6] The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code if the substance of the complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. The principles underlying s. 27(1)(f) flow from the doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack, and abuse of process. They include finality, fairness, and protecting the integrity of the administration of justice by preventing unnecessary inconsistency, multiplicity, and delay: British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola , 2011 SCC 52 [ Figliola ] at paras. 25 and 36. Ultimately, “it is really a question of whether it makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute”: Figliola at para. 37.
[7] I begin with a brief background.
A. Background
[8] Mr. Patterson began working for E360 as a truck driver in around March 2020. Before that he was a municipal truck driver for over ten years. He is now in his late 50s. In 2019, Mr. Patterson was in a motor vehicle accident. After that, he says that he began experiencing back and neck pain, which was aggravated by driving trucks at work.
[9] In the summer of 2020, Mr. Patterson says that he began to experience certain physical symptoms that were difficult to manage at work. He says that his doctor told him that the potential cause may be bowel cancer, and further screening was required.
[10] On August 17, 2020, Mr. Patterson missed his shift to attend a medical appointment. He says he forwarded his supervisor a copy of the appointment details. On August 25, Mr. Patterson again missed work for a scheduled colonoscopy. During the procedure, the doctor found a polyp and did a polypectomy. Mr. Patterson then missed work on August 26, 31, and September 1-7. On September 1, he gave his employer a medical note, which indicated that he was unable to work on these dates “for medical reasons”. In addition to the recovery from the procedure, Mr. Patterson says that his neck and back pain were a contributing factor in these absences.
[11] On September 8, E360 suspended Mr. Patterson for three days due to “time off again without producing paperwork for stated appointments and procedures”. Two days later, on September 10, E360 terminated Mr. Patterson’s employment for cause. The termination notice cited “Manager’s Rights – employee unreliable (job abandonment)”. It attached a copy of Mr. Patterson’s medical note, with a handwritten notation: “This is not acceptable as a physicians note as there is no clarification that the driver has been, or should be off work for [medical reasons]”.
[12] On September 15, the Union grieved Mr. Patterson’s termination. The grievance said “James Patterson was wrongfully terminated as he was off with illness and produced a doctors note” [as written]. The “settlement desired” was “to have Environment E360 to reverse the termination & remove all disciplinary records and to be made whole for all missing wages and benefits”. Mr. Patterson signed the grievance form. The Union was represented by a lawyer in the grievance process.
[13] On July 22, 2021, the Union and E360 settled the grievance. The terms of the settlement were:
a. The Employer withdraws its allegation of cause to terminate Mr. Patterson’s employment;
b. Mr. Patterson will be reinstated effective immediately;
c. The parties will meet to determine the quantum owed to Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Patterson will supply any necessary medical information with respect to his ability to work since the termination of his employment; and
d. In the event that the parties cannot agree on quantum, [the arbitrator] will remain seized of the matter.
[the Settlement ]
[14] Mr. Patterson says that he was not involved in negotiating the terms of the Settlement, and did not see the written agreement. He says that he was told orally by Union counsel that they had reached a deal.
[15] Mr. Patterson did not return to work. In this application, he says that he was not told why, and was not told he needed to provide any more medical information. In the arbitrator’s decision, discussed below, the arbitrator recorded that Mr. Patterson had left E360 “to be retrained in another occupation”. Nothing turns on this.
[16] On August 8, 2021, Mr. Patterson filed this human rights complaint. His brother completed the complaint form for him. Mr. Patterson alleged that his employer had fired him while he was “on approved medical leave” and had failed to accommodate his medical needs which were “reasonable, and were only for a short term period (one week)”. On the complaint form, he indicated that there was a grievance underway related to the same events and asked the Tribunal to defer its process pending the resolution of the grievance. He said:
I want to see if the [complaint] can be resolved by the Union and the Employer first, or through the formal arbitration process. However, I am not confident that the complaint will be successfully resolved. It has been almost a year, since I was illegally fired and there has been no resolution so far. I want my rights to file a [complaint] under Human Rights law to be preserved, so I am filing this now before the one year period expires.
[17] In the meantime, the Union and E360 could not agree on a quantum of damages. They asked for this issue to be decided by an arbitrator. The arbitration proceeded for one day, on January 31, 2022. Mr. Patterson was the only witness. The only issue for the arbitrator was the amount of wages owed to Mr. Patterson. This issue turned on whether Mr. Patterson was fit to work for any of the period between his termination and the reinstatement of his employment.
[18] Arbitrator Noonan issued his decision on February 17, 2022. He found that the Union had failed to establish that Mr. Patterson was fit to work at all during this period and, as such, Mr. Patterson was not entitled to any compensation under the terms of the Settlement. Mr. Patterson, through his brother, sought review of the arbitrator’s decision through the Labour Relations Board. This application for review was denied: 2023 BCLRB 15.
[19] On February 15, 2023, the Tribunal gave E360 notice of this human rights complaint.
B. Has the substance of Mr. Patterson’s complaint been dealt with in the grievance process?
[20] To decide whether the substance of a complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding, the Tribunal considers:
a. Did the other proceeding have jurisdiction to decide human rights issues under the Code ?
b. Was the previously decided legal issue essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal?
c. Did the complainant have the opportunity to know the case to be met and have a chance to meet it, regardless of whether the previous process mirrored the Tribunal’s?
Ultimately, the Tribunal must decide “whether it makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute”: Figliola at para. 37. Respectfully, in this case, I do not think it makes sense to allow Mr. Patterson to relitigate his termination at the Tribunal.
[21] First, there is no dispute that labour arbitrators have jurisdiction to decide human rights issues under the Code: Labour Relations Code, ss. 81-82; Sebastian v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2019 BCCA 241. For the purposes of a dismissal under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code, the Tribunal will consider the “ complete grievance procedure, and disposition during any stage of it”. There is no requirement that the matter proceed to arbitration: Vetro v. Klassen, 2005 BCHRT 263 at para. 14.
[22] Second, I am satisfied that the issue that was resolved in the grievance proceeding was essentially the same as what is being alleged in Mr. Patterson’s human rights complaint: Figliola at para. 37. Both are about the termination of Mr. Patterson’s employment due to medical-related absences. Mr. Patterson acknowledged this in his human rights complaint form, when he indicated he was waiting to see whether the grievance would resolve the complaint. In my view, it did.
[23] Mr. Patterson argues that the issues are not the same in the grievance proceeding and the human rights complaint. He says the grievance proceeding did not consider whether E360 violated the Human Rights Code and did not include any compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect. He says the arbitrator’s decision did not address the allegations of discrimination.
[24] It is not necessary that another proceeding undertake a full human rights analysis to deal with the substance of a human rights complaint, or provide a complainant with all the remedies they may be entitled to under human rights legislation. In this case, the substance of the complaint was resolved by a settlement in which E360 withdrew the termination and agreed to make Mr. Patterson whole, including by reinstating his employment and compensating him for lost wages. Aside from Mr. Patterson’s disagreement with the arbitrator’s decision about wage loss, the only issue that possibly remains outstanding is compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect under the Code. This is a remedial issue and does not raise an outstanding issue regarding the discrimination analysis .
[25] An award for injury to dignity damages is “not a mandatory but a discretionary one”: AB v. BC Emergency Health Services, 2021 BCHRT 122 at para. 59. The fact that the grievance proceeding did not include these damages is not determinative of whether it dealt with the substance of Mr. Patterson’s complaint. In this case, Mr. Patterson did not ask for injury to dignity damages in his grievance form. Rather, he asked for E360 to reverse the termination, remove disciplinary records, and make him whole. Notwithstanding the outcome regarding wage loss, the Settlement gave him what he asked for. Through the grievance process, Mr. Patterson had the benefit of a relatively efficient and effective resolution of his termination, which included the reinstatement of his employment – a remedy that is rare in human rights proceedings.
[26] Finally, I am satisfied that Mr. Patterson had the opportunity to know the case to be met and a chance to meet it: Figliola at para. 37. He got everything he asked for in the Settlement. He was aware of the Settlement at the time of the arbitration hearing. He participated in the arbitration hearing, where he was represented by the Union through legal counsel. He was the only witness to testify. The Union submitted medical documents on his behalf. Although he says that the Union did not communicate effectively with him throughout the process, Mr. Patterson does not point to any evidence that he says he would have presented to support a claim for lost wages between his termination and reinstatement under the Settlement.
[27] Mr. Patterson argues that the Union did not include him in the settlement process, or tell him that E360 required further medical information before he could return to work. He says he was not told that the Settlement would have implications for his human rights complaint. He says the circumstances are similar to Garnier v. Flavelle Sawmill Co Ltd ., 2023 BCHRT 147, where the Tribunal denied an application to dismiss the complaint on the basis of a settlement negotiated by the complainant’s union and employer. He cites paras. 48-50, where the Tribunal reasoned:
Even accepting that the grievance was settled between the parties, the Respondents acknowledge that the parties to the settlement were the Employer and the Union. There is no evidence that Mr. Garnier acceded to any resolution of his complaints such that it could be said the substance of the complaint has been dealt with appropriately, or at all. Further, it is unclear on the materials before me that the Union was advancing the claim that Mr. Garnier’s termination was discriminatory, which forms the substance of the complaint before me.
Further, while it appears Mr. Garnier was offered his job back through the grievance process, there is no evidence of any compensation or other remedy offered to him to resolve his complaint of discrimination.
Accordingly, I deny the application to dismiss under s. 27(1)(f), as I am not persuaded that the substance of the complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding.
[28] It appears that, in Garnier, the Tribunal had relatively little information about the grievance procedure. However, even based on the limited information set out in these paragraphs, I find the circumstances here to be distinguishable. As I have said, whether he “acceded” to it or not, the Settlement gave Mr. Patterson everything he asked for in the grievance, subject only to Mr. Patterson being able to establish that he was fit to work for the period when he was seeking lost wages. E360 withdrew its termination for cause.
[29] Considering all of these factors together, it is my respectful view that it does not make sense to expend public and private resources on relitigating what is essentially the same dispute: Figliola at para. 37. It is not clear what further purpose a human rights proceeding could serve, aside from affording Mr. Patterson the ability to relitigate the same issue in hopes of a different outcome. This is what s. 27(1)(f) of the Code, and the judicial doctrines which underlie it, seek to avoid.
III CONCLUSION
[30] I am satisfied that the substance of Mr. Patterson’s human rights complaint was appropriately resolved through the grievance process. The complaint is dismissed.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair