Slater v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 28
Date Issued: February 4, 2025
File: CS-003785
Indexed as: Slater v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 28
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Heather Slater
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fraser Health Authority
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Sections 27(1)(c) and (g)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Heather Slater
Counsel for the Respondent: Jessica Fairbairn, Ellen Ferguson
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Heather Slater alleges her employer, Fraser Health Authority, discriminated against her in employment based on physical disability and sex contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . She makes two broad allegations. First, she says between 1995 and 2007 she was denied job and education opportunities because she is female. Second, she says in 2021 she was assigned duties that were unsuitable because of her hearing impairment and that she was not provided necessary equipment to perform her duties.
[2] Fraser Health denies discriminating. It applies to dismiss Dr. Slater’s allegations about events between 1995 and 2007 under s. 27(1)(g) because they occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed. It applies to dismiss the other allegations under s. 27(1)(c) because it says Dr. Slater’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success as she has not alleged facts from which the Tribunal could infer a connection between her protected characteristic and the adverse impact.
[3] Dr. Slater did not file a response to the dismissal application. I am satisfied, on the materials before me including correspondence between Dr. Slater and the Tribunal, that Dr. Slater had notice of this dismissal application. Because Dr. Slater had an opportunity to respond to the application, I find no procedural unfairness in making my decision based on the materials before me.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the application to dismiss the complaint is granted. I dismiss Dr. Slater’s allegations of events between 1995 and 2007 because it is untimely, and it is not in the public interest to accept them. I dismiss the 2021 allegation because there is no reasonable prospect Dr. Slater could prove a connection between her disability and an adverse impact.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The background facts are taken from the parties’ materials.
[7] Dr. Slater began working for Fraser Health in 1995. She says that between 1995 and 2007 Fraser Health denied her job and education opportunities because she is a woman.
[8] Dr. Slater was on a medical leave of absence from 2014 to 2018. When she returned to work in 2018, she began a new role as a Communicable Disease Environmental Health Officer in the Population & Public Health program. Her duties in the role included conducting investigations on communicable disease outbreaks over the phone.
[9] Dr. Slater told her supervisor that she has hearing issues which required her to face whoever she is speaking to in-person. She did not indicate that her hearing was impacted on the telephone or that she had any restrictions or limitations with respect to performing her job duties.
[10] Dr. Slater was provided standard office equipment including a phone headset by Fraser Health. When office equipment malfunctioned or was no longer working, it would be replaced by Fraser Health. Dr. Slater did not request any specialized equipment or indicate that the standard equipment was inadequate.
[11] On October 17, 2020, Dr. Slater was assigned to work in the COVID Hub, tracking the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus. After being assigned to work in the COVID Hub, Dr. Slater went on a medical leave of absence from November 12, 2020, to March 30, 2021.
[12] When she returned to work at the COVID Hub in or about April 2021, Dr. Slater requested an upgraded headset as she found the equipment she was provided had connectivity issues with her computer. Fraser Health provided an upgraded headset on or about April 1, 2021.
[13] Dr. Slater filed her complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and physical disability on April 13, 2021. She says that in 2021 she was assigned job duties that are unsuitable for her because of her disability and that she was denied equipment provided to other employees.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(g) – Timeliness of the Complaint
[14] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62 , 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[15] Section 27(1)(g) permits the Tribunal to dismiss a late-filed complaint. Fraser Health argues that Dr. Slater’s allegation that she was denied job and education opportunities between 1995 and 2007 are untimely as they occurred between 26 and 14 years prior to her filing the complaint. It says these allegations that she was discriminated based on sex are distinct from her allegation that she was assigned work duties that were unsuitable because of her physical disability. It says the untimely allegations do not constitute a continuing contravention and should be dismissed.
[16] While Dr. Slater has not made any arguments, I consider whether her allegations constitute a continuing contravention.
[17] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code , s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child , 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code , and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[18] The assessment of whether discrete allegations are a continuing contravention is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209 at para. 17. A relevant consideration is whether there are significant gaps between the allegations: Dickson at paras. 16-17. Whether or not a gap is significant will be assessed contextually, considering the length itself and any explanations for the gap: Reynolds v Overwaitea Food Group, 2013 BCHRT 67, at para. 28. A significant, unexplained, gap in time will weigh against finding a continuing contravention: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General , 2018 BCHRT 204 at para. 14.
[19] In this case, I am unable to reasonably interpret the allegations of being denied job and education opportunities as part of a continuing contravention with the timely allegation. This is because the untimely allegations allege discrimination based on a different protected characteristic than in the timely allegations, relate to discrete factual events about job and education opportunities, and are separated by a significant gap in time of over a decade. Dr. Slater has not provided submissions explaining why the separate allegations constitute a continuing contravention. In my view, other than the parties involved, the untimely allegations are of a different character than the timely allegations and therefore do not constitute a continuing contravention.
[20] Under s. 22(3) the Tribunal may accept late-filed allegations. The onus is on Dr. Slater to persuade the Tribunal that it would be in the public interest to accept the late-filed parts of the complaint, and that no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay in filing: A by Parent v. Interior Health Authority and others , 2019 BCHRT 213 at para. 30.
[21] Dr. Slater has not filed a response to the dismissal application. In her complaint Dr. Slater says it would be in the public interest to accept her complaint because Fraser Health has discriminated for more than 30 years and punitive measures against it are appropriate. She has not provided an explanation for her delay in filing.
[22] Based on the information before me, I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept a complaint containing allegations originating over a decade ago. I find the significant delay without a persuasive reason for such a delay weigh against the public interest.
[23] Having concluded it is not in the public interest to accept the late-filed portion of the complaint, it is not necessary to consider whether substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – Is there no reasonable prospect the complaint could succeed?
[24] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[25] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[26] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[27] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Dr. Slater will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, in this case a physical disability, she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[28] Fraser Health does not dispute that Dr. Slater has a physical disability in her hearing impairment but say there is no reasonable prospect that she suffered an adverse impact in employment. It says that Dr. Slater’s allegation that she was assigned unsuitable work duties and that she was denied standard equipment is contradicted in the evidence and not supported in the facts.
[29] Fraser Health submits documentary evidence showing Dr. Slater stating in her correspondence with her supervisors that “[she] was not adversely affected by the duties [she] performed.” Fraser Health says the evidence shows that Dr. Slater did not inform it that she had any restrictions or limitations from her physical disability that interfered with the performance of her job duties. Rather, it says Dr. Slater stated she had no issues with the duties she was given and the only disability related limitation Dr. Slater raised was that she required she face people directly when speaking in person.
[30] Fraser Health also says the documentary materials show that when Dr. Slater raised an issue with her equipment, Fraser Health took immediate action through its helpdesk and administrative staff to determine the reason for the issue, troubleshoot malfunctioning equipment, and replacing the equipment Dr. Slater requested be replaced. It says that Dr. Slater did not request any specialized equipment, and she was issued the standard equipment given to all employees.
[31] Because Dr. Slater did not file a response to the application, and she provided no details in her complaint of why she believes the work duties she was assigned were unsuitable, I am left only with Fraser Health’s version of events.
[32] Based on the evidence before me, I am persuaded that Dr. Slater has no reasonable prospect of proving she was adversely impacted in employment. Viewed in light of Fraser Health’s evidence that it provided Dr. Slater standard work equipment and Dr. Slater did not inform it that she had any restrictions or limitations which impacted her ability to perform her job duties or that she required any specialized equipment, the allegation that Dr. Slater was adversely affected in employment has not been brought out of the realm of conjecture.
[33] In this context, I find Dr. Slater has no reasonable prospect of succeeding in her complaint. I dismiss this portion of the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
IV CONCLUSION
[34] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c) and (g).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member