Baylis v. Goodrich Realty Inc. and another, 2025 BCHRT 23
Date Issued: February 4, 2025
File: CS-002181
Indexed as: Baylis v. Goodrich Realty Inc. and another, 2025 BCHRT 23
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Shayfaye Baylis
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Goodrich Realty Inc. and Donna Louie
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Shannon Beckett
Counsel for the Complainant: Meredith Shaw
Advocate for the Complainant: Sohrab Rezaei
Agent for the Respondents: Donna Louie
Date of Hearing: February 14-15, 2024
Location of Hearing: MS Teams Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Shayfaye Baylis is a sixth generation Canadian from Nova Scotia, who identifies as Black and Mi’kmaq. She has been diagnosed with a combination of rheumatoid arthritis and lupus. Since approximately 2016, she has been designated as a “Person with Disabilities” for the purpose of receiving income assistance from the provincial government [ Disability Assistance ]. In July 2020, Ms. Baylis applied to rent a suite in an apartment building managed by Goodrich Realty Inc. At the relevant time, Donna Louie was a property manager with Goodrich, and acted as Goodrich’s managing broker. In this decision, I will refer to Ms. Louie and Goodrich together as the “Respondents”.
[2] Ms. Baylis says that the Respondents discriminated against her based on her race, disability, and lawful source of income, when they subjected her rental application to heightened scrutiny and ultimately refused to rent the apartment to her, after they learned she was receiving Disability Assistance and was Black. With respect to her disability and lawful source of income, Ms. Baylis says that Ms. Louie was reluctant to sign a “shelter information form”, which Ms. Baylis says she needed to have signed in order to retain her provincial Person with Disabilities coverage. Further, Ms. Baylis says that Ms. Louie made negative comments about experiences with previous tenants who used shelter information forms, and then required Ms. Baylis to provide extensive information about her employment income by impossibly tight deadlines. With respect to her race, Ms. Baylis says that throughout the application process Ms. Louie applied anti-Black stereotypes to her, accusing her of being hostile, aggressive and demanding. She further says that three days after she sent Ms. Louie her photo identification and Ms. Louie learned she was Black, Ms. Louie ended the tenancy application process.
[3] The Respondents deny discriminating. They deny being reluctant to sign Ms. Baylis’ shelter information form and instead say that the reason they focussed on Ms. Baylis’ employment income was because Ms. Baylis became upset when they asked about her other income, and refused to discuss her other income with them. The Respondents say that they tried their best to assist Ms. Baylis in completing the rental application, but despite providing Ms. Baylis with multiple opportunities to provide confirmation of the total amount of her employment income, she refused to do so and they were left without sufficient confirmation that Ms. Baylis could afford to rent the apartment. The Respondents say they were unaware of Ms. Baylis’ disability at the time she applied for the apartment, and the fact that Ms. Baylis had a disability or may have been receiving Disability Assistance did not factor into their decision not to rent the apartment to her. They further say that they did not learn that Ms. Baylis was Black until after she provided her photo identification, well into the application process, and they did not know Ms. Baylis was Indigenous until she filed her complaint with the Tribunal.
[4] I heard this complaint over two days, from February 14 to 15, 2024. In that time, I heard evidence from Ms. Baylis, Ms. Louie, and Mr. Lemuel Chan, an employee of Goodrich.
[5] At the heart of this complaint is a dispute about whether and when a request for financial information from a prospective tenant may give rise to an inference of discrimination. To decide this complaint, I must consider whether the Respondents’ conduct, including repeated requests for financial information, comments Ms. Louie made during the rental application process, and the Respondents’ ultimate decision not to rent to Ms. Baylis, give rise to an inference of discrimination. Timing is important in this complaint, and whether I will draw an inference of discrimination turns on the determination of several key issues, including:
i. when the Respondents began seeking information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income, and what information they were seeking,
ii. when the Respondents found out Ms. Baylis was receiving government financial assistance,
iii. whether the Respondents subjected Ms. Baylis’ rental application to heightened scrutiny after they found out she received government financial assistance, by focussing only on employment income,
iv. whether, ultimately, Ms. Baylis provided the Respondents with adequate information demonstrating she could afford to rent the apartment, and
v. whether, after the Respondents discovered Ms. Baylis was Black, they considered her and her rental application through the lens of negative and harmful anti-Black stereotypes.
[6] For the following reasons, I find Ms. Baylis has not proved that the Respondents discriminated against her in the area of tenancy, based on her disability, lawful source of income, or race.
II BACKGROUND
[7] At the hearing, Ms. Baylis testified about her disabilities. In particular, she testified that her rheumatoid arthritis and lupus can cause excruciating pain and inflammation, which she calls “flare ups”. She testified that her flare ups can be caused by stress, and that she is unable to work when she has a flare up. She said that her particular job as a frontline support worker requires her to be able to assist people when they are overdosing, and to navigate through other challenging environments, and she is not able to do that work accurately when she is experiencing a flare up.
[8] Ms. Baylis also testified, briefly, about when and how she receives Disability Assistance. She said that during the times she is unable to work due to a flare up, she takes time off work, but she still receives income through Disability Assistance payments. In particular, she testified that “because of my illness, at times when I have a flare up, working is not suitable…so I was on PWD in order to make my income sufficient at times when I needed to”. She produced an April 2022 British Columbia “Confirmation of Assistance” form at the hearing, which sets out different categories of financial assistance within Ms. Baylis’ Disability Assistance. Ms. Baylis testified that the April 2022 form confirmed “that I am somebody who has assistance, depending on the amount of income I make”, and that this was the “type” of form she would have received in 2020 during the period of time relevant to this complaint. Ms. Baylis did not produce the 2020 form(s) at the hearing.
[9] With respect to the events that underlie this complaint, the timeline of events is not entirely clear. The documentary record is dated and clearly shows when certain communications took place in writing, but neither Ms. Baylis nor Ms. Louie were specific about the timing or quantity of various phone calls they say they had together. I have reviewed the parties’ documents and testimony in detail and have drawn conclusions about the timing of certain events which I set out below.
[10] On July 19, 2020, Ms. Baylis attended in-person to view an apartment in a building managed by the Respondents which was available for a monthly rent of $1500. An agent of the Respondents showed Ms. Baylis the unit, and after viewing it, Ms. Baylis filled out a rental application and submitted it to the Respondents that same day. The rental application asked questions about employment and rental history. One section of the application asked about an applicant’s current employer, including the name and contact information for the employer, and the name, position, and contact information for the applicant’s supervisor. One question on the application asked about an applicant’s current “salary range”. On her application, Ms. Baylis left the questions about her current supervisor and supervisor’s position and contact information blank. Beside the question about salary range, Ms. Baylis wrote “27”.
[11] Sometime after Ms. Baylis sent her application, Ms. Louie contacted Ms. Baylis by telephone and they spoke about the application [the First Call ]. Neither party specified the date of this first telephone conversation, however, from the documentary record and the parties’ testimony at the hearing, I conclude that the call took place on July 19 after Ms. Baylis submitted her application to Goodrich. I draw this conclusion because on July 19 at 9:15 pm, Ms. Baylis sent a text message to her current landlord stating that she would probably move out on August 15 or September 1. When asked at the hearing why she sent her landlord notice she was going to move on July 19, Ms. Baylis testified that “because of conversations I had, I knew I was gaining tenancy”. Ms. Louie did not contradict this timeline when questioning Ms. Baylis.
[12] Some of what was discussed on the First Call is disputed, including whether Ms. Louie expressly asked Ms. Baylis for the number of hours she worked per pay period in order to calculate her total income, and whether it was Ms. Baylis or Ms. Louie who asked that the rental deposit be paid and for an employment letter. I will deal with material conflicts in the evidence later in this decision. However, the parties agree that they talked generally about the terms of the tenancy, and that Ms. Louie asked Ms. Baylis about her employment income. Further, Ms. Louie testified, and Ms. Baylis did not dispute, that during the First Call, Ms. Baylis told Ms. Louie that she received some kind of “ICBC” or “injury” related income in addition to her employment income and told Ms. Louie “don’t worry, I have lots of money”.
[13] Shortly after the First Call, Ms. Baylis emailed Goodrich two screenshots of her banking information from February 2020 and April 2020. The banking information for each month shows a deposit which is described as “Direct Deposit SHAFAYE JADIA ALMA BAY PROVINCE OF BC” [the BC Deposits ]. The BC Deposits for February and April were for different amounts. After she emailed this banking information, the parties spoke by telephone again [the Second Call ]. It was not clear from the parties’ testimony whether the Second Call took place before July 22, or on July 22 after Goodrich sent Ms. Baylis the 12:02 email setting out the terms of the tenancy. For reasons that I explain below, I find it is immaterial whether the Second Call took place before or on July 22.
[14] Ms. Louie testified that during the Second Call, she asked Ms. Baylis about the BC Deposits. Ms. Louie says Ms. Baylis became very angry and indicated she did not want to discuss the payments, so to avoid conflict, Ms. Louie stopped asking about them and instead focussed her query on Ms. Baylis’ employment income.
[15] On July 22, 2020, at 12:02 p.m., Goodrich sent Ms. Baylis an email with a summary of the terms of the tenancy. That email reads, in part:
Dear Shay;
This is to summarize terms of tenancy:
-Fixed tenancy from August 16, 2020 to August 31, 2021
-$1500/month rent. No pets, no smoking.
-Tenant pays hydro.
-Move in fee $50.
-Employment letter to follow from you.
Pls e-transfer the amount of $800 ($750 deposit + $50 move in fee) to:
collections@goodrichrealty.com
[Emphasis in original]
[16] Later that day, at 4:17pm, Ms. Baylis sent Goodrich an email with a screenshot showing she had e-transferred $800 to Goodrich. Later, at 9:04 p.m., Ms. Baylis emailed Goodrich a photo of her shelter information form and asked Goodrich to “sign the bottom” of it.
[17] Sometime after Ms. Baylis provided her shelter information form, she and Ms. Louie had another telephone conversation [the Third Call ]. The content of this conversation is also partially disputed. Ms. Baylis testified that during the call she advised Ms. Louie that she had a disability, and asked her to sign her shelter information form. She further testified that Ms. Louie told her that she always had problems with tenants who used shelter information forms and that she was reluctant to sign Ms. Baylis’ form. Ms. Louie disputes Ms. Baylis’ characterization of her comments about the shelter information form. Ms. Louie testified she never told Ms. Baylis she was reluctant to sign the form, but instead told Ms. Baylis that she had problems in the past with tenants initially setting up their shelter payments to go directly to the landlord, but later changing the payment so that it did not go directly to the landlord. As I explain below, it is not material which version of the conversation I accept as true for the purposes of deciding this complaint. At the very least, the parties agree that during the Third Call, Ms. Louie made comments to the effect that she had problems in the past with tenants who used shelter information forms.
[18] On July 23, 2020, the human resources department of Ms. Baylis’ employer provided the following “employment letter” to Ms. Baylis:
To Whom it May Concern:
Re: Shay Baylis
This letter serves to confirm Shay Baylis’s employment with [employer]. Shay has worked in a Support Worker capacity at [employer] since November 26, 2019. Shay currently holds a permanent casual position.
If anymore confirmation regarding Shay’s employment is needed please feel free to contact me.
[19] That same day, at 2:12 p.m., Ms. Baylis emailed the employment letter to Goodrich.
[20] On July 24, 2020, at 7:40 a.m., Ms. Louie responded to Ms. Baylis’ email by thanking her, and asking Ms. Baylis for further information about her “total income” as follows: “To complete the application papers pls provide income proof for [employer] as average income by pay period, or total income for this period ” [emphasis added].
[21] That same day, at 7:46 am, Ms. Baylis responded to Goodrich by stating that her employer had tried to contact Goodrich “many times”, and that she was beginning to feel like the application process was “extremely intrusive”, and she was “starting to feel like you are being discriminatory, maybe even it’s because of my race you are looking for reasons to now decline”. To this email, Ms. Baylis attached two screenshots of text messages between herself and CH, a human resources representative of her employer. The screenshots appear to show that CH had spoken with Ms. Louie, and Ms. Louie had asked whether Ms. Baylis made $27 per hour, and she had also asked for Ms. Baylis’ average number of shifts. In one screenshot of a text to Ms. Baylis, CH wrote:
I am not able to skew the results. For example, she asked if you made $27 per hour, and if I do confirm your wage I will be telling her you make $25.40 per hour. Also, I would have to specify if it is before or after taxes when I give an average amount of shifts .
Do I have your permission to do so ?
[emphasis added]
[22] In the other screenshot, which contains a text which appears to have come after the first text, CH wrote:
I called her back and left a message letting her know your wage plus the $2.25 for overnight shifts. I also said that casual workers have the option of working up to full-time, with overtime. …
[23] At 8:47 am on July 24, Ms. Louie responded to Ms. Baylis’ email stating “we do not know what race you are, as this application has been handled by phone and email.” Ms. Louie went on to explain what Goodrich was looking for in terms of “earnings”. She stated:
Earnings is the most basic and no 1 info for rental. We already talked to [CH] as you also know. She told us this is causal employment. As such it is not good for earnings indication. She said you did not give her authority to provide earnings info . Pls provide proof of earnings by 1pm today.
Going forward we will require IDs, etc. Pls ensure now you are willing to provide this and other info. We have held off other callers and another potential applicant who saw the suite already, to wait for you to put this together, in good faith. Unfortunately, if you do not provide us with earnings info, we cannot move forward with you and cannot hold other people longer. We can return your deposit if you prefer not to provide necessary info. [emphasis added]
[24] At 8:47 am, Ms. Baylis reattached the same screenshots she sent at 7:46 am and stated, “I just provided screen shots!”. Then at 9:01 am, Ms. Baylis emailed her photo identification to Goodrich. Ms. Baylis’ driver’s license clearly shows she is a woman of colour.
[25] At 9:04 a.m., Ms. Louie emailed Ms. Baylis back stating again “To complete the application papers please provide income proof for [employer] as average income by pay period, or total income for this period . Pls provide by 1pm today good and sufficient earnings proof” [emphasis in original].
[26] Ms. Baylis testified that after this email, she sent Goodrich a series of screenshots of her bank account deposit information, which she said demonstrated that she had a consistent stream of income over a number of months. Ms. Baylis did not produce the screenshots or emails she says she sent to Goodrich at the hearing. Instead, she produced an email that she sent to a CBC news reporter on July 27, 2020, which contained images of her bank information from February 2020 to June 2020. In the email Ms. Baylis states “I am trying to find the exact dialog but these were the screenshots I sent”.
[27] Ms. Louie testified that she had received two screenshots of Ms. Baylis’ account information for two months, February 2020 and April 2020, earlier in Ms. Baylis’ application process, “immediately after” the First Call. However, she testified that she had no record of having received any screenshots from Ms. Baylis on July 24.
[28] On July 27, 2020, Goodrich emailed Ms. Baylis and told her that the cheque refunding the money she had paid for her deposit was ready to be picked up. Ms. Baylis did not end up renting the apartment.
III PRELIMINARY ISSUE – LIMIT PUBLICATION
[29] At the very end of their submissions, the Respondents state:
Note: Request for exclusion of documents & information in publication to protect privacy as follows:
[rental apartment] applications
DL’s lab test report
Document of personal nature
[30] I have treated this statement as an application to limit publication of the materials set out in the Respondents’ list above. Ms. Baylis takes no position on the application.
[31] Tribunal proceedings are presumptively public, and a person seeking to limit publication of any part of the Tribunal’s proceedings must demonstrate why privacy interests outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Mother A. v. School Dist. C. , 2015 BCHRT 64; and Rule 5(6) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure .
[32] In the present case, although the Respondents have not specified how their privacy interests are engaged, it is clear that they are seeking to limit public access to the private information of third parties which is contained in rental applications tendered as exhibits in the hearing. Further, it is clear that they are seeking to limit public disclosure of Ms. Louie’s private medical records, which were also tendered as an exhibit.
[33] Under Rule 5(8) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure , public access to a complaint file, including exhibits admitted at a hearing, is governed by the Tribunal’s Public Access and Media Policy and its Freedom of Information Request Policy. The Public Access and Media Policy sets out that after a hearing has completed, if a member of the public wants access to a document in a complaint file, including one or more exhibits entered at the hearing, they must make a Freedom of Information Request. In accordance with the Tribunal’s Freedom of Information Request Policy, the Tribunal will not provide members of the public with information from a complaint file that would amount to an unreasonable invasion of a person’s privacy, including, for example, personal information relating to a medical condition.
[34] In my view, now that the hearing has completed, the operation of the Tribunal’s above-noted policies protects against the disclosure of both Ms. Louie’s private medical records, as well as the rental applications which contain private personal information about uninvolved third parties. Further, I have not found it necessary to reference the details of either type of document in this decision. As such, I do not find it necessary to make any order in relation to limiting publication of those two categories of documents.
[35] With respect to what the Respondents characterize as “documents of a personal nature”, I find this request is not specific enough for me to be able to consider whether privacy interests of any particular document outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. Therefore, I decline to make any order in relation to this category of documents. Having said that, again, I observe that the Tribunal’s above-noted policies provide robust protection against disclosure of a person’s private information.
[36] For the above reasons, I dismiss the Respondents’ application to limit publication.
IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[37] Ms. Baylis has brought her complaint under s. 10 of the Human Rights Code [ Code ], in the area of tenancy, based on race, physical disability, and lawful source of income. To prove her discrimination complaint, Ms. Baylis has to demonstrate:
i. she has one or more characteristics that are protected by the Code ,
ii. she experienced an adverse impact in the area of tenancy, and
iii. one or more of her protected characteristics were at least a factor in the adverse impact she experienced.
Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61, at para. 33
A. Discrimination based on Physical Disability and Lawful Source of Income
[38] I first consider whether Ms. Baylis has proved she has the protected characteristics of disability and lawful source of income. As I explain below, Ms. Baylis’ physical disability and lawful source of income are inextricably linked for the purposes of the discrimination analysis in this complaint. Although the parties sometimes address these protected characteristics separately in their submissions, I have considered them together in my analysis.
1. Protected Characteristics
[39] Ms. Baylis provided detailed oral testimony about her diagnoses of lupus and rheumatoid arthritis, and the documentary record demonstrates she has been designated as Person With Disabilities since 2016. Further, Ms. Baylis’ evidence at the hearing was that she has been receiving Disability Assistance since approximately 2016 due to her lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.
[40] The Respondents do not dispute Ms. Baylis has a physical disability for the purposes of the Code , and I accept that she does. The Respondents also do not dispute, and I accept, that at the relevant time, Ms. Baylis was receiving Disability Assistance, which is a lawful source of income for the purposes of the Code .
[41] However, the Respondents do dispute that at the relevant time they knew Ms. Baylis had a disability and was on Disability Assistance. This is not relevant to whether Ms. Baylis has a disability within the meaning of the Code , or whether her Disability Assistance falls within the scope of lawful source of income. I will deal with the Respondents’ arguments about their knowledge below, in relation to the connection between Ms. Baylis’ protected characteristics and any adverse impacts she experienced, where what the Respondents knew or ought to have known might be relevant.
[42] I next move on to consider whether Ms. Baylis has demonstrated she experienced adverse impacts in the area of tenancy.
2. Adverse Impacts
[43] There is no dispute that Goodrich did not accept Ms. Baylis’ application to rent. This on its own is enough to establish adverse impact within the meaning of the Code .
[44] However, Ms. Baylis argues she experienced other, discrete, adverse impacts throughout the course of her interaction with the Respondents, including: the stress she experienced throughout the rental application process, the embarrassment she felt as a result of what she characterizes as Ms. Louie’s “intrusive” questioning of her employer, and the judgment and humiliation she felt as a result of Ms. Louie’s comments about her shelter information form.
[45] For the reasons that follow, I find Ms. Baylis has not demonstrated that the additional hardships she says she experienced are the kinds of impacts that are captured by the term “adverse impact” as contemplated in human rights jurisprudence.
[46] Not every negative interaction in an area of daily life protected by the Code will amount to an adverse impact for the purposes of the Code : Brito v. Affordable Housing Societies and another , 2017 BCHRT 270, at para. 41 [ Brito ]; Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another , 2024 BCHRT 298, at para. 62 [ Clarke ]. In Brito , the Tribunal specified that “it is not the Tribunal’s purpose to adjudicate disputes other than where a person’s protected characteristic has presented as a barrier in their ability to fully, and with dignity, access an area of life protected by the Code ”. Further, in Clarke , the Tribunal explained that in order to determine whether conduct adversely impacts a person within the meaning of the Code , special attention to the language of the Code is required.
[47] In the present case, s. 10 of the Code expressly sets out that denying a person or class of people the right to occupy space as a tenant, or otherwise discriminating against a person or class of people regarding a term or condition of tenancy of a space, may amount to discrimination for the purposes of the Code . The language of s. 10 indicates that that the Legislature intended to prohibit adverse tenancy-related impacts that prevent a person (or class of people) from fully and with dignity accessing a space that is represented as being available for occupancy as a tenant.
[48] Here, Ms. Baylis’ argument about the stress she experienced as a result of having to undergo the difficult and ultimately unsuccessful rental application process, does not amount to the kind of adverse impact contemplated by s. 10 of the Code . Although I accept that Ms. Baylis found the process stressful, there is no indication in the evidence that the stress she experienced caused her to cease participating in the process, or otherwise, on its own, posed a barrier to her being able to access the tenancy. In other words, the possible tenancy relationship was not poisoned by the Respondents’ conduct. While Ms. Baylis evidence about the stress she experienced through the rental application process may well be important with respect to the assessment of any remedy that could be ordered if discrimination is found, the evidence does not demonstrate a stand-alone adverse impact.
[49] Similarly, Ms. Baylis’ evidence about the embarrassment she experienced as a result of Ms. Louie’s questions to her employer does not demonstrate that the questions Ms. Louie asked, on their own, posed a barrier to Ms. Baylis’ ability to access the tenancy. In fact, Ms. Baylis facilitated Ms. Louie’s questions to her employer, and the questions themselves were not intrusive, rather they were standard, reasonable, and directly related to outstanding information in Ms. Baylis’ rental application. In that way, Ms. Louie’s questions can be seen to have facilitated the rental application process, rather than having stymied it. In any event, the evidence demonstrates that Ms. Baylis remained engaged in the rental application process after Ms. Louie asked Ms. Baylis’ employer questions. Again, Ms. Baylis’ evidence about Ms. Louie’s questions embarrassing her might be relevant to remedy should the complaint succeed, but it does not establish an adverse impact distinct from denying her tenancy application.
[50] Finally, I do not accept Ms. Baylis’ submission that Ms. Louie’s comments about tenants who used shelter information forms, on their own, amount to an adverse impact for the purposes of the Code .
[51] Although the parties have provided different versions of events with respect to the comments Ms. Louie made to Ms. Baylis, they at least agree that Ms. Louie communicated to Ms. Baylis that she had had problems with tenants who used shelter information forms in the past. Given the social stigma attached to the receipt of government financial assistance, I accept Ms. Baylis’ evidence that she felt degraded and embarrassed by Ms. Louie’s comments, which implicitly suggested that because Ms. Baylis used a shelter information form she would or could cause a problem for Ms. Louie. However, while I agree that Ms. Louie’s comments were insensitive to the lived experiences of people who receive government financial assistance that necessitates the use of such forms, on their own, Ms. Louie’s comments were not so objectionable so as to create a barrier to Ms. Baylis accessing the tenancy at issue.
[52] Ms. Baylis cites Neale v Princeton Place Apts. Ltd . , 2001 BCHRT 6 [ Neale ], in support of her argument that Ms. Louie’s comments can amount to a separate adverse impact for the purposes of the Code . However, Neale is distinguishable from the present case. In Neale , the Tribunal did not address the issue of whether any of the alleged conduct, including comments made by a resident manager to a prospective tenant, amounted to an adverse impact. Further, the Tribunal’s finding that the resident manager’s comments amounted to discrimination, was based on more than just the comments. Beyond the comments, the Tribunal also found the manager had made an assumption about the prospective tenant’s ability to afford to rent an apartment, and on the basis of that assumption, made comments which indicated the prospective tenant’s application would not be considered. The Tribunal then focussed on the result of the manager’s comments, being that the prospective tenant ceased participating in the rental application process. Together, the full context of the rental application process in Neale , and not just the comments made by the resident manager, is what grounded the finding of discrimination. As such, I find the analysis in Neale is not helpful with respect to the analysis in the present case about whether Ms. Louie’s comments, on their own, amount to an adverse impact for the purposes of the Code .
[53] Notwithstanding the above, I do consider Ms. Louie’s comments about tenants who use shelter information forms to be a key part of Ms. Baylis’ broader discrimination complaint. Ms. Louie’s comments may well support an inference that the Respondents treated Ms. Baylis’ rental application differently or refused to rent her the apartment, at least in part, because they found out she was receiving government financial assistance. Whether I will draw such an inference will depend on the entire context of the rental application process in this case.
[54] I next move on to consider whether Ms. Baylis has proved a connection between her inability to rent the apartment, and her disability and lawful source of income.
3. Connection Between Protected Characteristics and Adverse Impact
[55] This Tribunal has recognized that parties rarely announce discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, and such discrimination must often be established by reasonable inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances [citations omitted]: Complainant v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of BC (No. 2) , 2018 BCHRT 189 [ Complainant ], at para. 96. An inference of discrimination may arise “where the evidence offered in support of it renders such an inference more probable than the other possible inferences or hypotheses”: Vestad v. Seashell Ventures Inc , 2001 BCHRT 38 at para. 44; Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4) , 2019 BCHRT 275, at para. 103.
[56] In the present case, Ms. Baylis says a connection between the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her and her disability and lawful source of income can be inferred based on the timing of when the Respondents began asking about her employment information and exposing her rental application to heightened scrutiny. She says that the evidence demonstrates that the Respondents’ behaviour towards her changed after she provided them with her shelter information form on July 22. She says that after she asked Ms. Louie to sign the form, Ms. Louie became mistrustful of her and sceptical of her ability to afford to rent the apartment. She says that Ms. Louie made erroneous and unfair assumptions about her ability to pay rent, subjected her employment income to heightened scrutiny, and then refused to rent the apartment to her. Ms. Baylis argues that if the Respondents had not been singularly focused on her employment income, they could have assessed her reliability as a tenant through speaking with her previous landlords, checking her credit references, and considering information about the amount she received through Disability Assistance. For the reasons that follow, I disagree.
[57] The Respondents submit that they had a completely non-discriminatory reason for refusing to rent the apartment to Ms. Baylis, which was that Ms. Baylis refused to provide them with the information they required in order to assess whether she could afford to rent the apartment. The Respondents submit that they would have accepted proof of any source of income as long as it demonstrated Ms. Baylis could afford to rent the apartment. They further submit that the only reason they focussed on employment income, was because Ms. Baylis became angry when Ms. Louie asked her about her other source of income and refused to discuss it with her. The Respondents say it was clear from the beginning of the process that what they were looking for with respect to Ms. Baylis’ employment income, was confirmation from Ms. Baylis’s employer of Ms. Baylis’ hourly rate and an average number of hours she worked per pay period. They say Ms. Baylis blocked her employer from providing this information, and the only information they received was Ms. Baylis’ hourly wage.
[58] Whether I will draw an inference that Ms. Baylis’ disability and/or lawful source of income were at least a factor in the Respondents’ decision not to rent the apartment to her, depends on the overall context of the rental application process, including: the timing of when the Respondents began seeking information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income and when they found out she was receiving government financial assistance; whether and why the Respondents continued to focus on Ms. Baylis’ employment income after they found out she had another source of income; and whether, ultimately, Ms. Baylis provided the Respondents with sufficient information to be able to confirm she could afford to rent the apartment.
i. Does the timing of when the Respondents began seeking information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income, and when they found out she was receiving government financial assistance, support an inference of discrimination?
[59] Timing is key in this complaint, as the inference of discrimination Ms. Baylis asks the Tribunal to draw in relation to her disability and lawful source of income is primarily based on how she says the Respondents’ started asking her about her employment income after they discovered she was receiving government financial assistance. As such, I must determine when the Respondents began seeking information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income, and when they found out that she was receiving government financial assistance.
[60] First, I consider when the Respondents first started asking Ms. Baylis about her employment income.
[61] At the hearing, Ms. Louie testified that on the First Call, she reviewed the rental application with Ms. Baylis and asked Ms. Baylis if the number “27”, which was written in the application next to “salary range”, referred to Ms. Baylis’ hourly wage. She said that when Ms. Baylis confirmed that it did, she told Ms. Baylis that an hourly wage was not enough, and she needed more information. Ms. Louie further testified that she asked Ms. Baylis to provide information about how many hours Ms. Baylis worked per month so that she could calculate Ms. Baylis’ monthly income. Ms. Louie also testified that when she was asking Ms. Baylis about her employment income, Ms. Baylis advised Ms. Louie that she received “some type of ICBC insurance, type of injury payment” and told her that “don’t worry, I have lots of money”. Ms. Louie testified that ultimately, on the First Call, she told Ms. Baylis she needed to know Ms. Baylis’ total income. She said that it was Ms. Baylis who suggested the provision of an employment letter in response to the questions about employment income.
[62] In contrast, Ms. Baylis testified that it was Ms. Louie who initially requested the “employment letter” referenced in the July 22 email setting out the terms of tenancy. Further, she testified that at the time it was requested, the Respondents did not specify what the letter was supposed to contain, and she understood the Respondents simply wanted proof of her employment. She testified that it was not until July 24 that the Respondents asked her for her “total income”, and that during the entire rental application process they never asked her for the number of hours she worked in a given period. In cross-examination, Ms. Baylis denied that Ms. Louie asked for the number of hours she worked during the First Call. She testified “that took place in writing after you asked me for proof of employment – that was the initial ask – proof of employment – you didn’t ask me that until days later, which I still provided” and “you asked me for information and I provided it, the amount of hours I worked was never asked”.
[63] The parties provide different versions of events with respect to what Ms. Louie and Ms. Baylis discussed on the First Call. As such, I must decide whose evidence I prefer. In order to make this assessment, I must assess the credibility and reliability of both parties’ evidence. In doing so, I will apply the following criteria set out in Bradshaw v. Stenner , 2010 BCSC 1398, aff’d 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 392, at para. 186:
Credibility involves an assessment of the trustworthiness of a witness’ testimony based upon the veracity or sincerity of a witness and the accuracy of the evidence that the witness provides … The art of assessment involves examination of various factors such as the ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of his memory, the ability to resist the influence of interest to modify his recollection, whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes his testimony during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness’ testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely, whether a witness has a motive to lie, and the demeanour of a witness generally …. Ultimately, the validity of the evidence depends on whether the evidence is consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole and shown to be in existence at the time … [citations omitted]
[64] The First Call occurred approximately three and a half years prior to the hearing. Further, the call was a fairly brief interaction in what ended up being a fairly brief relationship. Nevertheless, both parties recalled the phone call with some specificity, and appeared to testify sincerely about their recollection of what was discussed. I do not believe either party was purposely untruthful in their testimony. However, memories fade over time, and a witness may be truthful and provide evidence to the best of their recollection, and nevertheless provide evidence which is not reliable.
[65] I have considered Ms. Baylis’ and Ms. Louie’s testimony about what was discussed during the First Call carefully, in light of the documentary evidence in the complaint, and conclude that where their evidence differs, I prefer Ms. Louie’s evidence. I make this finding because Ms. Louie’s evidence is more in harmony with the documentary evidence and the logical reality of the information a landlord would need in order to determine whether a person could afford to rent an apartment.
[66] In particular, Ms. Baylis did not dispute that Ms. Louie asked her on First Call whether 27 was her hourly rate in dollars. This would be a logical and reasonable question for a landlord to ask in the situation where a prospective tenant wrote only a two-digit number in the “salary range” field on the rental application. Equally logical and reasonable, would be for Ms. Louie to then use Ms. Baylis’ hourly wage to try to figure out how much money she made, either monthly or yearly, in order to be able to ascertain whether she could afford to rent the apartment. Having a person’s hourly rate is not enough information to be able to understand whether they can afford a certain monthly rent. A person could make $27 per hour and work any number of hours per week, or per month, which would result in any number of monthly incomes. Ms. Louie would have needed to know how many hours, at least on average, Ms. Baylis worked in a given period in order to know whether she could afford to rent the apartment.
[67] For the above reasons, I find it is more likely than not that on the First Call, Ms. Louie asked Ms. Baylis questions either about how many hours she worked in a pay period, or more generally, how much money she made in a given period (i.e. monthly or yearly). I further find that the reason she asked these questions was to ascertain whether Ms. Baylis could afford to rent the apartment. As such, I find that from the beginning of the rental application process, the Respondents were seeking information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income.
[68] Next, I consider when the Respondents became aware that Ms. Baylis was receiving government financial assistance.
[69] As I mentioned above, the Respondents deny that during the rental application process they knew Ms. Baylis was receiving Disability Assistance or that she had a disability.
[70] Ms. Baylis testified that she told Ms. Louie that she had a disability during the Third Call, when she asked Ms. Louie to sign the shelter information form. She says that as of the time of the Third Call, Ms. Louie was aware both that she had a disability and was on Disability Assistance.
[71] In contrast, Ms. Louie testified that it was only at the hearing that she learned about Ms. Baylis’ disability, and the fact that Ms. Baylis asked her to sign the shelter information form does not mean she knew that Ms. Baylis had a disability. Ms. Louie said that she simply understood from the shelter information form that Ms. Baylis was receiving some kind of government financial assistance. In cross-examination, Ms. Louie agreed that it was possible that Ms. Baylis advised her she had a disability during one of their phone calls.
[72] It is clear from the parties’ evidence and submissions that they agree that it was July 22, when Ms. Baylis emailed Goodrich her shelter information form, that the Respondents became aware that Ms. Baylis was receiving some kind of government financial assistance. Although after the First Call the Respondents may have become aware that Ms. Baylis was receiving income other than employment income (described as “ICBC or “Injury” payments), I find it was not until July 22 that they knew or ought to have known that she was receiving government financial assistance. For the purpose of assessing the connection between Ms. Baylis’ disability and lawful source of income and the Respondents’ conduct in refusing to rent the apartment to her, it does not matter whether the Respondents knew Ms. Baylis had a disability during the rental application process. Nor does it matter whether they knew the government financial assistance she was receiving was, specifically, Disability Assistance. The relevant and undisputed facts are that:
a. Ms. Baylis did have a disability,
b. Ms. Baylis’ disability was the reason she was receiving Disability Assistance,
c. Disability Assistance is a type of government financial assistance,
d. All types of government financial assistance are lawful sources of income for the purposes of the Code , and
e. As of July 22, the Respondents knew Ms. Baylis was receiving some kind of government financial assistance.
[73] I find Ms. Baylis’ disability and lawful source of income are inextricably linked for the purposes of assessing the connection between the adverse impact and Ms. Baylis’ protected characteristics in this complaint. The reason Ms. Baylis receives Disability Assistance, her lawful source of income, is because she has a disability. Therefore, if Ms. Baylis proves a connection between the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her and her lawful source of income, then she will also have proved the requisite connection between her disability and the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her. In coming to this conclusion, I note that intent to discriminate is not a pre-requisite to a finding of discrimination: Code s. 2.
[74] For the above reasons, I find that from the very beginning of the rental application process, before they were aware that Ms. Baylis received government financial assistance, the Respondents sought information about Ms. Baylis’ employment income, including the number of hours she worked in a given period or the overall amount of money she made in a given period. This finding undermines Ms. Baylis’ argument that the timing of when the Respondents started asking her about her employment income (in relation to when they found out she was receiving government financial assistance) supports an inference of discrimination.
[75] I next consider whether, after they found out Ms. Baylis was receiving government financial assistance, the Respondents subjected her rental application to heightened scrutiny by focussing only on her employment income.
ii. Did the Respondents subject Ms. Baylis’ rental application to heightened scrutiny after they found out she received government financial assistance by focussing only on employment income?
[76] I find the Respondents did not subject Ms. Baylis’ rental application to heightened scrutiny after they discovered she received government financial assistance. Although I agree that the Respondents focussed on trying to ascertain Ms. Baylis’ total employment income even after they discovered she received government financial assistance, I find they did so because Ms. Baylis refused to discuss her other source of income with them, and because she did not provide them with enough information to be able to calculate her total employment income.
[77] With respect to the events that followed the First Call, the timing of certain events was not clearly set out by the parties in their evidence or their submissions. In particular, Ms. Louie testified that immediately after the First Call, in response to her request for information about Ms. Baylis’ total income, Ms. Baylis sent two screenshots of her bank account information for February and April 2020. In her submissions, Ms. Baylis says Ms. Louie’s evidence about being sent the screenshots is “contrary to [Ms. Baylis’] evidence on this point”. However, at the hearing, Ms. Baylis did not address/dispute having sent these two screenshots to Ms. Louie early in the process, even though in the response to the complaint the Respondents expressly reference that Ms. Baylis sent “screenshot of deposit” early in the process. Further, during Ms. Louie’s cross-examination, although she asked Ms. Louie about the February and April screenshots, she did not cross-examine her on the timing of when she received the screenshots. That Ms. Baylis testified that she sent a series of screenshots to Ms. Louie at the end of the rental application process, does not make Ms. Louie’s evidence that she received the February and April screenshots earlier in the process “contrary” to Ms. Baylis’ evidence. As such, I accept Ms. Louie’s evidence that shortly after the First Call, she received the February and April screenshots of Ms. Baylis’ banking information.
[78] The April 2020 screenshot was produced by Ms. Louie at the hearing and it shows an $1851.08 deposit into Ms. Baylis’ account from the “PROVINCE OF BC”. Ms. Louie did not produce the February 2020 screenshot at the hearing. However, as I set out above, at the hearing Ms. Baylis produced a series of screenshots of her bank account information, including one that shows deposits for February 2020. These screenshots were attached to an email she sent to a news reporter and not to Goodrich. Regardless, I accept, and Ms. Louie does not dispute, that the February 2020 screenshot attached to that email contains the same information as what Ms. Baylis provided to Ms. Louie after the First Call. The February 2020 screenshot shows a deposit of $1551.08 into Ms. Baylis’ account from “THE PROVICE OF BC”. As I mention above, together I will refer to the February and April deposits as the “BC Deposits”.
[79] Ms. Louie testified that during the Second Call, she asked Ms. Baylis about the BC Deposits, and in particular, their amount and frequency. She said that she wanted to check with Ms. Baylis about these payments because they did not appear to “match” what Ms. Baylis said during the First Call about receiving some kind of “ICBC” or “injury” payment. She said that when she asked about the BC Deposits, Ms. Baylis became very irritated and “I was stopped right away…my head was being chewed off”. Ms. Louie testified she told Ms. Baylis that the deposit information Ms. Baylis provided for two non-consecutive months did not demonstrate the frequency of the payment, and that she told Ms. Baylis “I do not know what this ‘Alma Bay Province of BC ’ payment is”. Ms. Louie testified that because Ms. Baylis became upset and refused to answer questions about this payment, and because she knew Ms. Baylis had employment income, she focussed solely on Ms. Baylis’ employment income.
[80] At the hearing, Ms. Baylis did not dispute or cross-examine Ms. Louie about her evidence that she spoke with Ms. Baylis about the BC Deposits and that Ms. Baylis became angry and refused to discuss them. Similarly, in her submissions she does not respond directly to the Respondents’ argument that Ms. Baylis’ conduct in relation to questions about the BC Deposits was the reason the Respondents continued to focus on Ms. Baylis’ employment income. At most, Ms. Baylis submits that it was clear from the description of the BC Deposits that it was a payment to Ms. Baylis from the Province, and that the payments shown in the February and April 2020 screenshots should have been enough to demonstrate that Ms. Baylis had a consistent stream of income that was sufficient to show she could afford to rent the apartment.
[81] Ms. Louie’s evidence about asking Ms. Baylis about the BC Deposits stands uncontested, and therefore I accept her description of what took place. I further accept Ms. Louie’s undisputed evidence that during the First Call Ms. Baylis referenced some kind of “ICBC” or “injury” type of payment, and that Ms. Louie was asking about the BC Deposits because they did not appear to match what Ms. Baylis said about receiving ICBC or injury payments.
[82] Neither party specified when the Second Call took place, and it could have either been before July 22, or on July 22 when the parties spoke about the shelter information form. In my view, nothing turns on the timing of the discussion about the BC Deposits. I have accepted that Ms. Baylis refused to discuss the BC Deposits with Ms. Louie, which undermines Ms. Baylis’ argument that the Tribunal should draw an inference of discrimination because Ms. Louie focussed so intently on her employment income after July 22 when she found out Ms. Baylis was in receipt of government financial assistance. Whether the Second call took place on or before July 22, the Respondents have demonstrated that at least one reason they continued to ask Ms. Baylis about her employment income was because she refused to discuss her other sources of income with them.
[83] What remains to be decided is whether, despite her refusal to discuss her other income with Ms. Louie, Ms. Baylis nevertheless provided the Respondents with sufficient information to demonstrate she could afford to rent the apartment. If she did, that would support an inference that the Respondents ultimately refused to rent the apartment to Ms. Baylis, at least in part, because she was receiving government financial assistance.
iii. Does the totality of the information Ms. Baylis provided to the Respondents support an inference of discrimination?
[84] On the material before me, I find Ms. Baylis’ evidence about the information she provided to the Respondents in support of her rental application does not support an inference of discrimination. Ultimately, she has not demonstrated that she provided adequate information to the Respondents so that they could reasonably satisfy themselves that she would be able to rent the apartment.
Employment Income
[85] Despite multiple requests that Ms. Baylis provide the Respondents with information about her total employment income in a given period, she never did so. When Ms. Baylis did not provide the average number of hours she worked, and when the employment letter failed to reference the number of hours she worked, Ms. Louie reached out to Ms. Baylis’ HR representative and specifically asked about the average number of shifts or hours Ms. Baylis worked in a pay period. This is supported by CH’s comments in her text to Ms. Baylis that “I would have to specify if it is before or after taxes when I give an average amount of shifts . Do I have your permission to do so?” [emphasis added]. In CH’s follow up text, it is unclear whether Ms. Baylis expressly declined to provide permission for CH to give Ms. Louie an average amount of shifts, or whether CH contacted Ms. Louie on her own before hearing back from Ms. Baylis. Either way, in the end CH only provided Ms. Louie with Ms. Baylis’ hourly wage and a statement that casual workers had the option of working up to foll time with overtime.
[86] At the hearing, Ms. Baylis testified that at the time of the rental application, she was working “over forty” hours per week if she was not in a flare up, and described herself as an “overtime hound”. She said that on average, she worked 5-6 days per week when she was not in a flare up. However, even at the hearing, Ms. Baylis did not testify about the actual number of hours she worked during the period of time relevant to the rental application, because she did not testify about whether and when she experienced flare ups between February and June 2020.
[87] Ms. Baylis acknowledged during cross examination that by at least July 24 she understood that Ms. Louie was seeking information to be able to determine her total income, but she said she was never asked for the number of hours she worked per pay period so she never provided them. Given Ms. Baylis evidence about her lengthy and extensive experience as a renter, it seems odd that she would not have understood, even without being expressly asked, that Ms. Louie would need an average number of hours she worked in a given period in order to calculate her employment income. Without knowing the average number of hours that Ms. Baylis worked in a given period, the Respondents could not calculate, or even estimate, her employment income.
Disability Assistance
[88] Beyond employment income, Ms. Baylis’ refusal to discuss details about her government financial assistance with the Respondents left the Respondents with insufficient information about the frequency and amount of any government assistance Ms. Baylis may have been receiving.
[89] Ms. Louie testified that when she saw Ms. Baylis’ shelter information form, she wondered what kind of income Ms. Baylis was receiving. She said she didn’t know if Ms. Baylis was receiving income assistance, some kind of ICBC payment unrelated to the shelter information form, and/or employment income. On the evidence before me it appears that Ms. Baylis did not explain to Ms. Louie that the BC Deposits were her Disability Assistance (or any form of government financial assistance) payments, nor did she explain when she would receive such payments and in what amounts. This was all important information the Respondents needed in order to be able to understand Ms. Baylis’ financial situation.
[90] Although Ms. Baylis provided the Respondents with information setting out the BC Deposits for February and April 2020, the amount for each deposit was different, and she did not explain why the amounts were different or whether the deposits were made every month. Ms. Baylis argues that the February and April banking information alone demonstrates “the type of consistent income for which the Respondents were looking”, and therefore it is “reasonable to infer that the Respondents did not consider this to be reliable evidence of income because of its source”. I disagree. February and April are non-consecutive months. The Respondents did not know the source of the payments, and they had no way of knowing whether the payments were stable and ongoing. Further, because the amounts were different in each deposit, without further details, the Respondents could not determine the amount of any future deposits.
[91] Beyond the February and April 2020 banking information, Ms. Baylis testified that on July 24, as a last attempt to provide the Respondents with proof of her total income, she sent Ms. Louie a series of five consecutive months worth of banking information spanning February to June 2020. As I have referenced above, she produced screenshots of her banking information for this period in an email from August 2020 that was addressed to a news reporter. She did not produce the email or text she says she sent to the Respondents. The text of the email she sent to the reporter reads “I am trying to find the exact dialog but these were the screenshots I sent”.
[92] In her testimony, Ms. Louie denied ever receiving this banking information, either by text or by email. She said that all information Goodrich receives from potential renters goes into a file, and that she looked in the file before the hearing, and only found the banking information for February and April. She further testified that she recalled there only being two non-consecutive months worth of information, because she recalled being unable to calculate the frequency of the BC Deposits based on two non-consecutive months.
[93] Again, because the parties’ evidence conflicts on this point, I must decide whose evidence I prefer. I have already found that the parties both testified sincerely as to their recollection of events, and that they were both credible witnesses. The question is not the veracity of the parties’ evidence, but its accuracy and reliability. Ms. Baylis’ email to the reporter was close in time to the events that gave rise to the complaint, but even in that correspondence she did not include the actual email or text she says she sent to the Respondents, and although she implies she would follow up with the reporter, no evidence of her having done so was produced at the hearing. Further, despite producing numerous contemporaneous texts and emails for the period of time that is relevant to this complaint, at the hearing, Ms. Baylis did not produce the text or email attaching the banking information that she says she provided to the Respondents at the time. Conversely, Ms. Louie’s evidence that she did not receive the additional screenshots is consistent with her evidence that she was never able to calculate the frequency of the payments.
[94] Ultimately, it is Ms. Baylis’ burden to prove her version of events on a balance of probabilities. Without more evidence from her on this point, I am left with equally persuasive evidence on both sides of the question. As such, I find Ms. Baylis has not proved on a balance of probabilities that she sent the screenshots of her baking information for the months of February 2020 to June 2020 to the Respondents on July 24, as she alleged.
[95] However, even if I were to find that she did send these screenshots, the information set out in the screenshots is inconsistent with the information Ms. Baylis provided to the Respondents at the time of the rental application and may well have required some further explanation. For example, although Ms. Baylis told the Respondents, or at least strongly implied, that she was receiving regular monthly income from her employer, only one of the five screenshots shows deposits from Ms. Baylis’ employer.
[96] Further, the fact that Ms. Baylis did not explain the nature of the BC Deposits to the Respondents means that even if the Respondents had five months worth of banking information, they had no way of knowing if the BC Deposits were ongoing (as would be the case with her Disability Assistance), or were time-limited. Without more concrete and consistent information from Ms. Baylis about the source, amount, and frequency of her Disability Assistance payments, the Respondents were left, at most, with five screenshots showing deposits from an unconfirmed source, which they had no way of knowing would continue consistently on an ongoing basis.
[97] I move on next to consider Ms. Baylis’ argument that even without confirmation of her employment income and details about her Disability Assistance, the Respondents should have had enough information to confirm she could afford to pay rent.
Other Information Available on Rental Application
[98] Ms. Baylis argues that the Respondents’ narrow approach to assessing her ability to pay rent was a barrier to her ability to rent the apartment, and that she was more than able to afford rent. She says that the Respondents had the February and April 2020 banking information, and had they consulted her credit references, and relied on the information they received from her prior landlords, including confirmation that the rent she was paying at the time was higher than what was being asked by the Respondents, they could have reasonably confirmed that she was able to pay for the apartment. In support of this argument, Ms. Baylis provided documentary evidence demonstrating that after the failed rental application process with the Respondents, she was ultimately able to rent a unit in a co-operative housing complex for $380 more per month than she would have paid for the Respondents’ apartment.
[99] Ms. Louie testified that credit references are not a key factor for Goodrich when it is assessing rental applications. She said that credit checks only provide an “overall gauge” of a person’s financial situation, and that Goodrich only relies on the information from credit checks “very lightly”. Ms. Louie emphasised in her testimony that the most important factor for her and Goodrich is “total income” to “protect the owners’ income flow – to protect their interests”.
[100] Although I accept that at the hearing Ms. Baylis provided substantial information which suggested that she likely had enough total income to be able to afford to rent the apartment from the Respondents, she did not provide this same information to the Respondents during the rental application process. On my review of the evidence, I do not accept Ms. Baylis’ argument that based on the information she provided to the Respondents at the time, I should draw an inference that the Respondents refused to rent the apartment to her, at least in part, because she was receiving government financial assistance.
[101] There may well be different ways for a person to demonstrate that they are able to afford to rent an apartment, and I accept that Ms. Baylis did provide some information to the Respondents that supported her rental application. However, she did not provide the Respondents what they were looking for from the beginning of the rental application process, which was proof of total income. It is not inherently discriminatory for a prospective landlord to ask about a potential tenant’s income, just as it is not inherently discriminatory for a potential employer to ask a job candidate where they are from or the origin of their last name: Jahromi v Control Solutions Ltd , 2018 BCHRT 2. Proof of income is a common criterion for the assessment of rental applications. As long as a landlord does not refuse to consider a lawful source of income (such as government financial assistance) as proof of income, then requiring a prospective tenant to provide proof of income, by itself, is not discriminatory. In other words, something more would be required to ground an inference of discrimination that is more probable than a landlord’s explanation that they required proof of income to support a rental application.
[102] I disagree that I should infer a connection between Ms. Baylis’ lawful source of income and the Respondent’s decision not to rent to her because she provided the Respondents with credit references, prior landlord information, and two non-consecutive months worth of deposits. The Respondents were entitled to satisfy themselves that Ms. Baylis could afford to rent the apartment by ensuring she had funds to do so. That the Respondents insisted on information about Ms. Baylis’ total income, and were not satisfied with the other types of information she provided, does not, on its own, give rise to an inference of discrimination on the facts of this case. Having said that, the Respondents conduct and specificity about what they required from Ms. Baylis, must be considered in light of Ms. Louie’s comments to Ms. Baylis about people who use shelter information forms.
Ms. Louie’s Comments
[103] As I have found above, both parties agree that Ms. Louie made comments to Ms. Baylis to the effect that she had problems with tenants who used shelter information forms in the past. However, Ms. Baylis testified that in addition to those comments, Ms. Louie told her that she was reluctant to sign Ms. Baylis’ shelter information form. Ms. Baylis says that Ms. Louie’s comments, including her reluctance to sign the form, should give rise to an inference that Ms. Louie made stereotypical assumptions about Ms. Baylis’ ability to pay rent, which tainted the whole application process and eventually brought it to an end. She says this is especially the case because before Ms. Louie made the comments, she had paid the deposit and the tenancy had been confirmed.
[104] Ms. Louie denies saying she was reluctant to sign the shelter information form. She testified that typically, such forms are only signed after a tenancy has been confirmed, and Ms. Baylis never submitted the information that was required to confirm her tenancy. She points out that the July 22 email setting out the terms of the tenancy was clear that an “employment letter” was still outstanding and the tenancy was never confirmed, even though Ms. Baylis paid the deposit.
[105] Ultimately, even if I accept that Ms. Louie told Ms. Baylis she was reluctant to sign Ms. Baylis’ form, I find that Ms. Louie’s comments to Ms. Baylis, when considered alongside the rest of the evidence in this complaint, do not give rise to an inference of discrimination. This is the case even though Ms. Louie’s comments demonstrate that she may have held stereotypical views about people who receive government financial assistance.
[106] People in receipt of income assistance, disability benefits, and other forms of fixed income, have long faced discrimination in the housing market based on discriminatory assumptions about their ability to pay rent [citations omitted]: McLaren v. Lookout Housing and Health Society , 2019 BCHRT 52 at para. 20. As I have set out above, there is a significant social stigma attached to the receipt of government financial assistance, and Ms. Louie’s comments imply that she considered that because Ms. Baylis used a shelter information form and was in receipt of government financial assistance, she could or would cause a problem for Ms. Louie. However, whether or not Ms. Louie held stereotypical views about people who receive government financial assistance, the evidence in this complaint does not demonstrate that she acted upon any such views.
[107] First, the evidence is clear that from the beginning of the rental application process, before Ms. Louie became aware that Ms. Baylis was receiving government financial assistance, she sought employment information that would allow her to be able to calculate Ms. Baylis’ total employment income.
[108] Next, the evidence shows that after she became aware that Ms. Baylis was receiving government financial assistance, Ms. Louie asked Ms. Baylis about the BC Deposits in the limited banking information Ms. Baylis had provided, and Ms. Baylis refused to answer her questions.
[109] Next, at the hearing, Ms. Louie submitted a series of applications made by other people to rent apartments managed by the Respondents. Counsel for Ms. Baylis questioned Ms. Louie about these applications. Ms. Louie’s evidence in direct and cross-examination, and as supported by the applications themselves, was that Goodrich seeks total income from all applications to rent apartments it manages. There is no evidence before me which suggests that the Respondents treated Ms. Baylis’ application differently than others by insisting that she provide them with income information demonstrating she could afford to rent the apartment.
[110] Finally, that Goodrich sent the July 22 email requesting a deposit and setting out the terms of tenancy does not demonstrate that the Respondents were satisfied with the information Ms. Baylis had provided to that point. On the contrary, the reference in that email to the outstanding employment letter made it clear the Respondents still required information in order to complete the application process. As I have set out above, I do not accept Ms. Baylis’ argument that the employment letter was always meant to be simply proof of employment. The evidence demonstrates that the Respondents, from the beginning, were seeking information that would allow them to understand what Ms. Baylis’ total income from employment was.
[111] It could be that had Ms. Baylis provided the average number of hours she worked per pay-period, and/or information about the frequency and amount of her Disability Assistance payments, the Respondents would still have refused to rent to her. Such a situation may well have raised an inference that there was a connection between Ms. Baylis’ source of income and the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her. In this case, however, the parties never got that far because Ms. Baylis did not provide the Respondents with enough information. Considering the overall context of the rental application process, I am unable to conclude that Ms. Louie acted on any stereotypical views about people who receive government financial assistance when interacting with Ms. Baylis and considering Ms. Baylis’ rental application.
4. Conclusion on discrimination based on disability and lawful source of income.
[112] For the above reasons, I find Ms. Baylis has not proved a connection between her disability and/or lawful source of income, and the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her. Therefore Ms. Baylis has failed to prove the Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability and/or lawful source of income.
[113] I next move on to consider whether Ms. Baylis has proved the Respondents discriminated against her based on her race.
B. Discrimination based on Race
1. Protected Characteristic and Adverse Impact
[114] With respect to race, the Respondents do not dispute that Ms. Baylis is Black and Indigenous, and I accept that she is. Ms. Baylis does not assert that the Respondents knew she was Indigenous at the relevant time, and I accept Ms. Louie’s evidence that she did not know Ms. Baylis was Indigenous until the complaint was filed. Therefore, in this section I will focus my analysis on Ms. Baylis’ identity as a Black woman, and the extent to which the Respondents may have discriminated against her on that basis.
[115] I have found above that in relation to disability and lawful source of income, Ms. Baylis’ ultimate inability to rent the apartment amounts to an adverse impact for the purposes of the Code . That finding is equally applicable to the analysis of racial discrimination in this complaint. For clarity, Ms. Baylis does not allege any additional adverse impacts specifically in relation to her complaint of racial discrimination.
[116] What is left to consider, is whether Ms. Baylis has proved a connection between her identity as a Black woman and the adverse impacts she experienced.
2. Connection between Protected Characteristic and Adverse Impact
[117] As I have identified above, discrimination is typically established by reasonable inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances: Complainant at para. 96. Further, this Tribunal has identified that the timing of an event may support an inference that a protected characteristic was a factor in a complainant’s adverse treatment: Parry v. Vanwest College , 2005 BCHRT 310, at para. 63.
[118] The parties agree that the Respondents first learned Ms. Baylis was Black on July 24, at approximately 9:04 a.m., when Ms. Baylis emailed a copy of her photo-identification to Goodrich.
[119] Ms. Baylis argues the inference of racial discrimination arises in two ways on the evidence. First, she says that on July 27, “almost immediately” after she provided her photo-identification, the Respondents ended the tenancy process by emailing her and telling her the refund cheque for her rental deposit was ready to be picked up. Second, she says that the Respondents’ belief throughout the rental application process that she was not cooperating with their requests, stemmed from stereotypes that depict Black women as “angry” or “aggressive”.
[120] The Respondents deny treating Ms. Baylis’ differently or more negatively because she is a Black woman. Ms. Louie testified that before Ms. Baylis provided her photo-identification on July 24, she had no idea what Ms. Baylis’ race was, and it was prior to July 24 that she felt Ms. Baylis was being uncooperative. Further, Ms. Louie testified and provided an out of court statement from another Goodrich employee, about Goodrich’s experience renting to tenants of various races and from “all walks of life”.
[121] Ms. Baylis objects to the out of court statement of the other Goodrich employee on the basis that the evidence therein is hearsay and inherently unreliable because it was not tested through cross-examination. Ms. Baylis further argues I should give little weight to Ms. Louie’s evidence about renting to people from various ethnic backgrounds because she says Ms. Louie was basing her assessment of ethnicity on visual inspections of tenants and tenants’ last names, and therefore her evidence is speculative and imprecise at best.
[122] Finally, Ms. Louie testified about her own experiences as a person of Canadian and Chinese origin, who has experienced significant racial discrimination in Canada throughout her life. She testified that she experiences racial discrimination regularly in both her professional and personal life, and is acutely aware of the harms caused by racial discrimination. She adamantly denies treating Ms. Baylis differently or more poorly because of her race.
[123] In my view, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Respondents discriminated against Ms. Baylis based on her race. In coming to this conclusion, I did not need to rely on the out-of-court statement of the Goodrich employee, nor did I need to rely on Ms. Louie’s evidence about the racial diversity of Goodrich’s tenants, or her own experiences as a person who has experienced racial discrimination.
[124] I will first consider Ms. Baylis’ argument about the timing of the July 27 email. Then I will move on to consider Ms. Baylis’ argument about how Ms. Louie viewed her and her rental application through the lens of anti-Black stereotypes.
i. Timing of July 27 email
[125] I disagree with Ms. Baylis’ argument that timing of the July 27 email gives rise to or supports an inference of discrimination. Leading up to the July 24 email at 9:04 a.m., the parties had already gone back and forth by email several times about information that was missing from Ms. Baylis’ rental application. Goodrich emailed Ms. Baylis at 7:04 asking for her “average income by pay period, or total income for this period”, to which Ms. Baylis had replied at 7:46 a.m., that she was beginning to feel like the application process was “extremely intrusive”, and she was “starting to feel like you are being discriminatory, maybe even it’s because of my race you are looking for reasons to now decline”. Then Ms. Louie responded at 8:47 setting out that she did not know what Ms. Baylis’ race was, and giving Ms. Baylis until 1:00 p.m. to provide the missing information.
[126] Following Ms. Baylis’ provision of her photo-identification at 9:04. a.m., Ms. Louie continued to seek Ms. Baylis’ employment information, and in particular, “average income by pay period, or total income for this period”, and maintained the 1:00 p.m. deadline she had set before receiving the photo-identification. Ms. Baylis ultimately did not provide the information Ms. Louie was requesting.
[127] Based on the timing of these emails, nothing between the parties changed, at least in writing, after Ms. Baylis provided her photo-identification. Ms. Louie did not stop the application process at that point or change the information she was seeking, and it was before she received the photo-identification that she set the 1:00 p.m. deadline. Further, given how quickly the rental application progressed, and given how many back and forth emails the parties sent, I do not agree that it was “immediately after” Ms. Louie received Ms. Baylis’ photo-identification that she “ended the tenancy” by refunding Ms. Baylis’ deposit cheque. It was not until three days after she received the photo-identification that she sent the July 27 email.
ii. Anti-Black stereotypes
[128] I also do not accept Ms. Baylis’ argument that Ms. Louie applied anti-Black stereotypes to her throughout the application process. Ms. Baylis’ argument on this point ignores the fact that the majority of the application process occurred prior to when Ms. Louie found out she was Black.
[129] Human rights case law, including from this Tribunal, has recognized that Black women are often exposed to harmful stereotypes, including the “angry Black woman” stereotype: Young Worker v. Heirloom and another , 2023 BCHRT 137 at paras 61 – 62; Buchanan v. Providence Health Care and others , 2023 BCHRT 50, at para. 27; Graham v. Enterprise Rent A Car Canada Company representing Enterprise, Alamo, and National Car Rental , 2020 HRTO 424 [ Graham ]. The angry Black woman stereotype operates to unfairly expose Black women to heightened scrutiny, over-reaction, and often negative consequences when they are involved in situations that pose challenges to individuals in authority: Graham , at para 60. I accept that the angry Black woman stereotype is, very unfortunately, alive and well in Canadian society. Whether an inference of discrimination can be drawn in a case where a Black woman has been characterized as “angry”, “demanding”, “rude”, “belligerent”, or in other ways that are consistent with the stereotype, will depend on the specific facts of the case, viewed in context.
[130] In the present case, counsel for Ms. Baylis cross-examined Ms. Louie extensively on whether and why she found Ms. Baylis to be “aggressive” and/or “uncooperative” during the rental application process. Ms. Louie was consistent in her evidence that during the First Call, she felt Ms. Baylis was friendly and the call was “very good”, but that the interactions during the Second Call were “not as friendly”. There is no dispute that both of these calls occurred before July 24.
[131] Further, counsel for Ms. Baylis asked Ms. Louie about notes she had made on the April 2020 screenshot of Ms. Baylis’ banking information that Ms. Louie produced at the hearing. In particular, counsel asked Ms. Louie about her note “[b]ut when DL asked the applicant about this income and the frequency of it, the applicant became aggressive and uncooperative”. Ms. Louie confirmed those were her comments and that she focussed on employment income with Ms. Baylis after this conversation because Ms. Baylis had become aggressive and uncooperative. Again, there is no dispute that the conversation referenced in Ms. Louie’s note took place before Ms. Baylis provided her photo-identification on July 24.
[132] Ms. Baylis argues that after Ms. Louie found out she was Black, Ms. Louie declined to “circle back” with her with respect to her Disability Assistance payments or credit checks. Ms. Baylis says this supports an inference that her race was at least a factor in the Respondents’ refusal to rent the apartment to her. I disagree.
[133] As I have found above, in earlier discussions with Ms. Louie, Ms. Baylis refused to discuss her Disability Assistance payments and Ms. Louie perceived her to be angry and upset that Ms. Louie was asking questions about the payments. In the face of Ms. Baylis’ disinclination to discuss these payments, it was not incumbent on Ms. Louie to “circle back” with Ms. Baylis to press her about these payments when Ms. Baylis failed to provide Ms. Louie with adequate information about her employment income. That Ms. Louie did not do so was reasonable in the circumstances, and any suggestion that her conduct was based (at least in part) on Ms. Baylis’s race, does not rise above the level of speculation.
[134] Ultimately, the evidence before me demonstrates that Ms. Louie considered Ms. Baylis was “aggressive and uncooperative” before she learned Ms. Baylis was Black. As such, the evidence does not support an inference that Ms. Louie stereotyped Ms. Baylis as angry or aggressive based on her identity as a Black woman.
[135] For the above reasons, I find Ms. Baylis has not proved that the Respondents discriminated against her based on her race.
V CONCLUSION
[136] For the above reasons, I dismiss Ms. Baylis’ complaint in its entirety. I also dismiss the Respondents’ application to limit publication.
Shannon Beckett
Tribunal Member