Mansouriyan v. Fincorp Holdings Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 16
Date Issued: January 24, 2025
File(s): CS-004908
Indexed as: Mansouriyan v. Fincorp Holdings Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 16
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mina Mansouriyan
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fincorp Holdings Ltd. and Kyle Johnston
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam
On their own behalf: Mina Mansouriyan
Counsel for the Respondent: Declan C. Redman
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mina Mansouriyan alleges Fincorp Holdings Ltd. and Kyle Johnston, [together, the Respondents ] discriminated against her in employment based on her place of origin, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . She alleges her supervisor called her “stupid” in relation to her ability to speak English.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code on the basis it has no reasonable prospect of success. They say the Complainant’s supervisor never made the alleged comment, and even if he did, that by itself, does not amount to discrimination under the Code .
[3] Ms. Mansouriyan did not respond to the application, but I am satisfied she had notice of the application and an opportunity to respond.
[4] The issue in this case turns on whether there is no reasonable prospect the single alleged comment could rise to the level of an adverse impact within the meaning of the Code .
[5] For the following reasons, I grant the application. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] At all material times, Ms. Mansouriyan and Mr. Johnston were co-workers.
[7] Ms. Mansouriyan alleges that on one occasion, Mr. Johnston called her stupid in relation to her ability to speak English. She describes this comment as harassment. Ms. Mansouriyan has provided no further details about this allegation.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[8] The Respondents apply to dismiss Ms. Mansouriyan’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[9] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[10] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77 .
[11] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20 ; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [ Hill ] at para. 27 .
[12] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia , 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34 . However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City) , 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[13] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Mansouriyan will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code , she was adversely impacted in employment and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[14] The Respondents assert that there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Mansouriyan will prove that the alleged single comment – “stupid” – rises to the level of adverse impact that would constitute discrimination within the meaning of the Code . I agree.
[15] I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect the alleged comment rises to the level of adverse impact that would constitute discrimination within the meaning of the Code . Assuming without deciding, her supervisor did, in fact, call her stupid, Ms. Mansouriyan’s complaint could be considered, at best, in the nature of a “single slur.” The Tribunal has said that in most cases, one comment, even though it may be offensive, will not amount to a contravention of the Code .
[16] In circumstances where alleged discrimination arises from a single comment, the Tribunal will consider all of the circumstances to determine whether it violates the Code . Those circumstances include, “the egregiousness or virulence of the comment, the relationship between the involved parties, the context in which the comment was made, whether an apology was offered, and whether or not the recipient of the comment was a member of a group historically discriminated against”: Pardo v. School District No. 43 , 2003 BCHRT 71 [ Pardo ] at para. 12. Because the Code focuses on effects, the impact of the incident is an important consideration.
[17] The Tribunal is also cognizant that:
[…] not every negative comment that is connected to a protected characteristic will be discriminatory harassment contrary to the Code . It is certainly undesirable for people to treat each other rudely, disrespectfully, or inappropriately. However, it is not the Tribunal’s purpose to adjudicate disputes other than where a person’s protected characteristic has presented as a barrier in their ability to fully, and with dignity, access an area of life protected by the Code . In performing this function, the Tribunal is cognizant that the disputes brought to it arise between human beings, with all the imperfection that entails. Not every failure to be kind or professional requires state intervention. This includes failures with discriminatory overtones – and therefore highlights a distinction between comments that may be “discriminatory” in the everyday sense of that word, and comments that amount to discrimination, within the meaning and scope of human rights legislation.
Brito v. Affordable Housing Societies and another , 2017 BCHRT 270 [ Brito ] at para. 41.
[18] In essence, the context of the comment is critical: Brito at para. 43. In this instance, Ms. Mansouriyan has provided minimal context. Based on the skeletal information before me, the only persuasive Pardo factors to consider are the relationship between the involved parties and the egregiousness or virulence of the comment.
[19] There is relatively little information before me of the relationship between the parties other than Mr. Johnston was her supervisor. Presumably, Mr. Johnston was in a position of authority over Ms. Mansouriyan. While this weighs in favour of denying the application, it is not the only determinative factor. The determinative consideration in this complaint is the egregiousness or virulence of the comment.
[20] The Tribunal has previously dismissed complaints where isolated impugned comments or conduct, while inappropriate or offensive, were found not so virulent or inherently damaging to a complainant’s dignity so as to trigger the protection of the Code : Patria v. Winners , 2018 BCHRT 164; Shen v. Bryan’s Bride and another , 2013 BCHRT 196 (CanLII), at para 23; Campbell and Abraham v. Krizmanich , 2009 BCHRT 5 at paras. 33-37 ; Banwait v. Forsyth (No. 2) , 2008 BCHRT 81 .
[21] The Tribunal has explained that, “[u]sually repeated conduct is required to establish racial/religious harassment. However, if the conduct is considered extreme, there is less need to establish a pattern of behaviour and a single act may be sufficient evidence”: Hadzic v. Pizza Hut Canada (c.o . b. Pizza Hut) , [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 44 at para. 33.
[22] Ms. Mansouriyan’s complaint does not allege the kind of extreme, virulent slur that could attract the protection of the Code on its face. Further, she has not provided information sufficient to explain why, in the particular context of her complaint, she has a reasonable prospect of proving her supervisor’s comment is enough to breach the Code . Ms. Mansouriyan being called “stupid” in one instance, while demeaning and inappropriate, does not approach the “threatening, offensive and repeated comments of the sort reference in [ Hadzic ]” let alone the more direct slurs related to a protected ground found in Khota , Falou , or Bainwait : Falou , at para. 56.
[23] Ms. Mansouriyan provides no details about her place of origin that would allow me to assess whether she is a member of a group historically discriminated against. She does not provide details of the context in which the statement was allegedly uttered, the impact it had on her, or whether she reported it to Fincorp and, if so, what its response was.
[24] For the above reasons, I am persuaded that Ms. Mansouriyan has no reasonable prospect of establishing that being called “stupid” on one occasion by her supervisor had a discriminatory impact in employment, contrary to the Code .
IV CONCLUSION
[25] The Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code is granted.
Laila Said Alam
Tribunal Member