Mohr v. Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. (Power Earth) and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 13
Date Issued: January 15, 2025
File(s): CS-000283
Indexed as: Mohr v. Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. (Power Earth) and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 13
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jeannie Mohr
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. (Power Earth) and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 258 and Gilles Gagnon
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf: Jeannie Mohr
Counsel for IBEW: Jeremy Bryant
For the other Respondents: No submissions sought
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On December 18, 2018, Jeannie Mohr filed a human rights complaint against her former employer, Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. [ Power Flagging ], her former union, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 258 [ IBEW ], and her former co-worker, Gilles Gagnon [collectively, Respondents ]. Against Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon, she alleges discrimination in employment based on sex in contravention of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . Against IBEW, she alleges sex discrimination in union membership under s. 14.
[2] Each Respondent denies discriminating and applied to dismiss the complaint. In Mohr v. Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. (Power Earth) and others , 2024 BCHRT 275 [ First Decision ], I denied the dismissal applications of Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon in their entirety. In addition, I denied part of IBEW’s dismissal application; namely, its application to dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and (f) of the Code . However, I determined that IBEW was not given a clear opportunity to make submissions regarding the dismissal of the complaint against it under ss. 27(1)(b) and (c). I concluded that the Tribunal would decide this part of IBEW’s dismissal application following a further submissions process.
[3] The Tribunal subsequently invited submissions from Ms. Mohr and IBEW. The submissions process closed late last year. I thank both parties for their submissions.
[4] This decision is about whether Ms. Mohr’s complaint against IBEW should be dismissed without a hearing under ss. 27(1)(b) and/or (c). IBEW says the acts and omissions alleged by Ms. Mohr do not contravene s. 14 of the Code , so her complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(b). Further, IBEW says the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(c).
[5] I find I can most efficiently decide this matter under s. 27(1)(c) alone. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint against IBEW will succeed. The complaint against IBEW is therefore dismissed under s. 27(1)(c). Ms. Mohr’s complaint against Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon will continue to proceed to a hearing.
[6] To make my decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties, including the materials filed in the original dismissal application process. In my reasons below, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[7] The following information is drawn from the materials before me and is set out here as background. It is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of the information filed by the parties. Further background regarding Ms. Mohr’s complaint and additional information about her allegations is set out in the First Decision: see paras. 8-31.
[8] Ms. Mohr and Mr. Gagnon worked together at Power Flagging’s northern division. Ms. Mohr says that, on several occasions between 2016 and 2018, Mr. Gagnon sexually harassed her, sexually assaulted her, and threatened her at work.
[9] It is not disputed that Ms. Mohr disclosed Mr. Gagnon’s alleged conduct to IBEW. IBEW’s business manager [ Business Manager ] says this disclosure happened in the “Spring or Summer of 2018.” Text message evidence indicates that Ms. Mohr was first in contact with IBEW’s assistant business manager [ ABM ] regarding the alleged conduct and a related police investigation as early as February 2018.
[10] Ms. Mohr’s complaint against IBEW centres on how the union responded to her disclosure. Among other things, she says the union “did nothing” to assist her, while treating her in a way that was abusive and degrading.
III DECISION
[11] Section 14 of the Code prohibits discrimination by unions against their members. For a complaint to succeed under s. 14, the complainant must prove the three elements of their case; namely, that (1) they had a personal characteristic protected by the Code , (2) they were adversely treated or impacted in union membership, and (3) their protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse treatment or impact: Moore v. British Columbia , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33; see Byelkova v. BC Nurses’ Union , 2019 BCHRT 119 at para. 44 and Redmond v. Hospital Employees’ Union , 2024 BCHRT 203 at para. 27.
[12] An allegation that a union failed to pursue a member’s claim of workplace discrimination – without more – is not an allegation of discrimination: Redmond at para. 72; see Badour v. Provincial Health Services Authority and others , 2012 BCHRT 112 at para. 29. It is not enough for a complainant to say they had a protected characteristic and their union represented them in a way that was inadequate or inappropriate. The complainant must also allege (and ultimately prove) a connection between their protected characteristic and the union’s poor representation: Badour at para. 29.
[13] Broadly speaking, I understand Ms. Mohr’s complaint to assert that IBEW’s response to her disclosure of alleged sex discrimination at work was inadequate and inappropriate and therefore discriminatory. In her complaint, she makes a number of allegations against IBEW. First, she alleges that, when she sought help from IBEW regarding Mr. Gagnon, the union treated her in a way that was abusive and degrading. Second, she accuses IBEW of not believing her allegations against Mr. Gagnon, and believing Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon over her. Third, she alleges that IBEW failed to help her. Fourth, she asserts that IBEW protected Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon.
[14] IBEW denies discriminating. In its recent submissions, it argues that there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Mohr will succeed in proving discrimination under s. 14 of the Code . It does not dispute that Ms. Mohr had a personal characteristic (sex) protected by the Code . However, it says she has not demonstrated any adverse impacts in her union membership due to any acts or omissions of the union, let alone adverse impacts where her sex was a factor.
[15] Section 27(1)(c) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success and therefore do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at paras. 22-26, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 171; Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill , 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27 [ Hill ]. Under s. 27(1)(c), my task is to look at the information filed by the parties to decide if there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact supporting Ms. Mohr’s complaint against IBEW could be made on a balance of probabilities after a hearing of the evidence: Berezoutskaia at para. 22. To succeed against IBEW at a hearing, Ms. Mohr would need to make her case with respect to one or more of her allegations by proving that she experienced sex-related adverse treatment or impacts in her union membership. On the whole of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of doing so. I will explain this conclusion in reference to Ms. Mohr’s allegations in turn.
A. Abusive and degrading treatment
[16] In her complaint, Ms. Mohr says IBEW treated her in a way that was “abusive and degrading.” I take this to be a reference to the alleged conduct of the Business Manager. Ms. Mohr’s evidence is that, when she phoned the Business Manager to tell him criminal charges were approved against Mr. Gagnon, he called her a liar and told her she was “full of shit,” saying that he had been told there were no such charges [ Alleged Comments ]. IBEW says the Business Manager denies making the Alleged Comments. In any event, it argues that the Alleged Comments were not connected to Ms. Mohr’s sex.
[17] In my view, the Alleged Comments, if proven, could amount to sex-related adverse treatment in certain circumstances. For example, evidence that the comments were based on stigma or stereotypes about sexual assault could support a finding of discrimination. But no such evidence has been provided in this case. More generally, Ms. Mohr has not alleged, and there is no evidence before me to support a finding or inference, that the Alleged Comments had any connection to her sex. On the contrary, Ms. Mohr’s evidence seems to be that the comments arose from a misunderstanding. She says the Business Manager’s information probably came from the police in 100 Mile House, where her file had been closed. She says criminal charges against Mr. Gagnon were approved in Williams Lake.
[18] In a dismissal application, the Tribunal must base its decision on the materials before it, not on speculation about what information might come out at a hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77. In the absence of evidence before me of a connection between the Alleged Comments and Ms. Mohr’s sex, I am satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of proving the comments were discriminatory.
B. Not believing her
[19] Related to the Alleged Comments, Ms. Mohr says IBEW did not believe her claims against Mr. Gagnon. She alleges that IBEW believed Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon over her.
[20] I have already decided that Ms. Mohr has no reasonable prospect of proving the Alleged Comments were discrimination. Beyond those comments, I find Ms. Mohr’s allegations regarding who IBEW believed (or did not believe) to be entirely speculative and not supported in the materials before me. The evidence filed by the parties does not take these claims out of the realm of conjecture, and so they cannot proceed forward: Hill at para. 27.
C. Not helping her
[21] At its core, Ms. Mohr’s complaint against IBEW is about its alleged failure to help her. Her evidence is that IBEW declined to help her deal with Mr. Gagnon’s alleged sexual misconduct. She says IBEW’s legal counsel told her that the only way the union could help was if there were problems with WorkSafeBC. She says IBEW told her Mr. Gagnon’s conduct “was a criminal matter,” which was “something [IBEW] was not able to deal with.”
[22] IBEW denies any deficiencies in the quality or level of representation it provided to Ms. Mohr. It says that, when Ms. Mohr came forward, union representatives had several conversations with her and advised her to make her complaint to the police. It says it chose not to file a grievance on Ms. Mohr’s behalf because she did not provide requested information and did not return its calls, and because the matter was being dealt with by the police and Crown Counsel.
[23] IBEW’s evidence is that the Business Manager spoke to Ms. Mohr about her allegations of workplace sexual harassment and assault two or three times. The Business Manager says that, during their second or third phone call, he told Ms. Mohr that he had spoken to Power Flagging, and the company advised that the police “had told [Ms. Mohr] that no charges had been laid against the alleged harasser.” He says he asked Ms. Mohr to tell him “the name of the officer(s) she had spoken to regarding the sexual assault/harassment, but she would not name them.” He says he “asked her to provide this information, or any information, so that [he] could investigate her allegations,” but she “refused to provide any further details.” He says he subsequently contacted Ms. Mohr to follow up, but was unable to reach her. The Business Manager says he referred Ms. Mohr to the ABM for further assistance. The evidence indicates that Ms. Mohr and the ABM were in contact in February and March 2018 regarding Ms. Mohr’s allegations against Mr. Gagnon and a related police investigation.
[24] I find that the evidence before me raises questions regarding the adequacy and appropriateness of the representation that IBEW provided to Ms. Mohr. In my view, an employee’s union is uniquely placed to help address serious allegations of sexual harassment and assault in the workplace. For example, if the employee says the employer has not addressed the alleged misconduct, the union can file a grievance on their behalf, even if the employee has been difficult to contact or communicate with. The union can also advise the employee of other potential avenues of recourse, such as internal procedures for reporting and investigating incidents or complaints of workplace bullying and harassment. In these types of situations, the union has a strong interest in ensuring the employer conducts an appropriate investigation, if for no other reason but to safeguard the broader union membership against the person accused of the serious misconduct, who may still be in the workplace. In the present case, the Business Manager’s evidence suggests he intended to investigate Ms. Mohr’s allegations himself, and he says he asked for the name of the police officer she had spoken to. His evidence does not speak to any steps IBEW took, or intended to take, to make sure Power Flagging – as the party empowered and obligated to manage and direct the workplace – properly dealt with Ms. Mohr’s allegations. I find this concerning.
[25] Despite my concerns, however, my role is not to assess the quality or level of IBEW’s representation of Ms. Mohr: Redmond at para. 36. Rather, my task in this dismissal application is to determine whether Ms. Mohr has any reasonable prospect of proving that she experienced sex-related adverse treatment or impacts in IBEW’s representation. On the information before me, I am satisfied that she does not. I see no evidentiary basis for a finding or inference that Ms. Mohr’s sex was a factor in IBEW’s alleged failure to help her. Nor do I understand Ms. Mohr to have even asserted such a nexus.
D. Protecting Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon
[26] Finally, Ms. Mohr asserts that IBEW protected Power Flagging over her, “as well as the co-worker who sexually assaulted [her],” allowing him to remain in the workplace and the union. She alleges that IBEW told her it would revoke Mr. Gagnon’s membership, but did not follow through. IBEW denies this allegation.
[27] Ms. Mohr’s general assertion that IBEW protected other parties over her is conjecture and not supported in the materials before me. Her allegation that IBEW reneged on expelling Mr. Gagnon is more concrete and specific; however, there is no argument or evidence to connect this to Ms. Mohr’s sex. I am therefore satisfied that none of these claims have any reasonable prospect of success.
[28] In sum, then, there is no reasonable prospect that the s. 14 complaint against IBEW will succeed. As a result, the complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code .
IV CONCLUSION
[29] IBEW’s dismissal application is granted. The complaint against IBEW is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c). Ms. Mohr’s complaint against Power Flagging and Mr. Gagnon will continue to proceed to a hearing.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member