Student Y by Grandparent S v. Board of Education of School District No. X, 2024 BCHRT 353
Date Issued: December 31, 2024
File: CS-004301
Indexed as: Student Y by Grandparent S v. Board of Education of School District No. X, 2024 BCHRT 353
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Student Y by Grandparent S
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Board of Education of School District No. X
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c), 27(1)(d)(ii), and 27(1)(g)
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
Agent for the Complainant: Grandparent S
Counsel for the Respondent: Karen N. Orr
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Student Y filed her complaint on January 27, 2021. Student Y alleges that School District No. X discriminated against her in the area of services on the grounds of mental and physical disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code when it excluded her from school [ Exclusion Allegation ] and, before that, allowed her to attend school for partial days only [ Partial Days Allegation ]. She says the School District neglected and isolated her when she was at school by making her play in a room alone “on countless occasions” [ Neglect Allegation ]. She further alleges that in 2018, a teacher locked her in a closet, and the school did not permit her to travel on the bus with her peers to a field trip location [ 2018 Allegations ]. She says in grade one the School District labelled her as violent, which ultimately caused her peers to reject her [ Grade One Allegation ].
[2] The School District denies discriminating and applies to dismiss Student Y’s complaint under ss. 27(1)(c), 27(1)(d)(ii), and 27(1)(g) of the Code . Under s. 27(1)(g), the School District says that many allegations in the complaint are out of time. The main thrust of its argument under s. 27(1)(c) is that it is reasonably certain to prove a justification defence. Finally, under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), the School District says that Student Y “short-circuited” the accommodation process by filing the complaint and moving out of the School District’s catchment area.
[3] I must decide the following issues:
a. in terms of the 2018 Allegations, Neglect Allegation and Grade One Allegation, whether they are out of time, and, if so whether it is nevertheless in the public interest to accept them and whether it would cause substantial prejudice to any party to do so;
b. in terms of the Exclusion Allegation and the Partial Days Allegation, whether the School District is reasonably certain to prove that it took all reasonable and practical steps to address the challenges Student Y was experiencing in accessing her education; and
c. In terms of the Exclusion Allegation and Partial Days Allegation, whether it would not further the purposes of the Code to hear the complaint because Student Y “short circuited” the accommodation process by moving out of the School District’s catchment area.
[4] For the following reasons, I deny the application to dismiss with respect to the Partial Days Allegation and the Exclusion Allegation. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I refer only to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact on the merits of the complaint.
II ANONYMIZATION
[5] Neither party applied to limit the publication of information that could identify Student Y in these reasons, which will be accessible to the public. Given Student Y’s young age and the sensitive information about Student Y contained in the submissions and other documents before me, I anonymize Student Y’s and Grandparent S’s names as well as the name of the School and the School District in these reasons for decision. I do so on my own motion pursuant to Rule 5(7) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure , which presumes that a minor’s privacy interests outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings.
[6] As such, I order that the Tribunal will anonymize Student Y, Grandparent S, the School, and School District No. X in this decision, and the style of proceeding will be Student Y by Grandparent S v. Board of Education of School District No. X . The parties will have the opportunity to apply for a further anonymization order at the commencement of the hearing of this matter.
III BACKGROUND
[7] In 2017, Student Y began kindergarten at an elementary school in the School District. The School District says that Student Y’s time at the elementary school was marked by “significant behavioural issues”.
[8] During kindergarten, Student Y was referred to the school’s inclusion support team due to her escalated behaviour, which the School District says included physically aggressive behaviour towards other students and staff, escaping, and verbally protesting classroom activities. At that time, the school designated Student Y as Category H: Intensive Behaviour/Severe Mental Health. The designation remained in place for the duration of Student Y’s attendance at the school. The materials before me do not further explain the meaning or consequences of this designation.
[9] While she was in grade one, the school held a meeting to discuss Student Y’s ability to function within the classroom setting. In the materials are notes from that meeting, which state that Student Y was rarely able to manage a school day without physical aggression towards staff and sometimes other students. The School District says that Student Y started on a partial day program in December 2018, during her grade one year, due to her “ongoing dysregulated behaviour.” The School District says that Student Y’s instruction was part of a “personalized program to help her to build capacity and stamina to function within the class and school safely.” This personalized program included one-on-one support from an education assistant.
[10] The partial day program continued during Student Y’s grade 2 year.
[11] In October 2020, when Student Y was in grade 3, she was diagnosed with:
a. unspecified neurodevelopmental disorder;
b. language disorder;
c. attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, combined presentation; and
d. developmental coordination disorder.
Student Y says that as a result of her physical and mental disabilities, she has difficulty regulating her emotions, navigating social environments, and coping with unplanned changes and transitions.
[12] In the materials before me is an employee safety plan developed by the school during Student Y’s grade 3 year. It describes Student Y’s behaviour as follows:
[Student Y], on occasion, will refuse to comply with requests, yell, spit, push, hit, kick, scratch, throw objects (including rocks) and elope from the classroom and/or school grounds. Risk behaviours are significant in both intensity and frequency. [Student Y] has difficulty expressing her emotions, impulsive, moves through people and places with limited personal space or body awareness. She is motivated by her sense of immediate needs/wants.
[13] The employee safety plan also describes Student Y as an energetic, empathetic and caring child, who “seeks positive relationships with peers.”
[14] The School District says that Student Y was provided with two educational assistants during Student Y’s grade three year, “one to provide direct support and the other to scan the environment to identify potential triggers and make adaptations as needed.” According to the School District, many interventions were in place to facilitate Student Y’s learning, including class-wide social skills training, individualized social stories, continuous frontloading and play planning, communication among school team members, alternate environments for learning, access to preferred activities, highly structured and consistent routines, and attachment building with staff who were provided student-specific training and orientation to her plan.
[15] The School made the decision to continue the partial day program in Student Y’s grade three year. However, a reintegration plan was developed whereby her time at school would be increased if she had 10 consecutive days at school maintaining “safe, hands to self behaviour.” Under the reintegration plan, Student Y would be sent home if she displayed physical aggression towards staff or peers. On the third consecutive day of being sent home, the school could decide to decrease her daily time at school.
[16] Grandparent S, Student Y’s legal guardian, appealed the decision to keep Student Y on the partial day program, requesting that Student Y be reinstated to a full-time program with “all required levels of support”. The school principal denied the appeal, keeping Student Y on the gradual reintegration plan.
[17] In mid-October 2020, Student Y had 10 consecutive days of safe behaviour and her time at school was increased as per the reintegration plan.
[18] The School District says that Student Y continued to have behavioural issues in the second half of October 2020, including throwing items at other students and staff, and unwanted touching of other students.
[19] Grandparent S appealed the school principal’s decision to keep Student Y on the gradual reintegration plan, and, at the end of October 2020, the Assistant Superintendent of Learning Services granted Grandparent S’s request that Student Y attend full days of school starting after the winter break on January 4, 2021.
[20] In the materials before me are daily logs and incident reports which were written by Student Y’s educators in November and December 2020. Although Student Y seems to have had some good days during these months, the School District says these materials also demonstrate ongoing issues with Student Y’s behaviour in the classroom, including yelling, throwing things, pushing, kicking, spitting, and pinching her peers.
[21] According to the School District, Student Y’s reintegration to full days of school did not go well, culminating on January 7 & 8, 2021. On January 7, Student Y is reported to have hit another student and thrown a rock at the School’s principal. On January 8, 2021, the School District says Student Y screamed and swore, hit the educational assistant with a tennis racquet, threw rocks and other items, and kicked the principal.
[22] Due to this behaviour, which the School District says threatened the safety of students and staff, the school excluded Student Y from school under the School Act s. 91(5).
[23] Section 91(5) of the S chool Act reads:
(5) If a teacher, principal, vice principal or director of instruction suspects a student is suffering from a communicable disease or other physical, mental or emotional condition that would endanger the health or welfare of the other students, the teacher, the principal, the vice principal or the director of instruction
(a) must report the matter to the school medical officer, to the school principal and to the superintendent of schools for the district, and
(b) may exclude the student from school until a certificate is obtained for the student from the school medical officer, a private medical practitioner or a private nurse practitioner permitting the student to return to the school.
[24] Grandparent S says that Student Y did not pose a threat to staff and students at the school, citing Student Y’s small size and the lack of reported injuries.
[25] After Student Y was excluded from the school, the School District says school staff worked with a “multidisciplinary team” to review the supports and interventions in place for Student Y so that she could return to school. This team included the school’s medical health officer, Student Y’s family doctor, pediatrician, child psychologist, social worker, MCFD team lead, the program coordinator for the Child & Youth Mental Health and Substance Use Services program, the school principal, the classroom teacher, the case manager, the education assistant, the school’s child and youth care worker, a District inclusion support coordinator, and a District inclusion support education assistant. The School District says that Grandparent S also attended some planning meetings to provide feedback on a draft plan.
[26] While the planning meetings were taking place, the School District says it offered work packages to Grandparent S for Student Y. It says that this included the use of a chromebook and videoconferencing with the school principal, who offered to provide Student Y with instruction. As I understand it, Grandparent S rejected the School District’s offers.
[27] As a result of the planning meetings, the School District created an outreach program for Student Y. The outreach program employed a specialist teacher and a Child & Youth Family Support Worker [ CYFSW ]. The teacher and Student Y would spend time learning together on a playground at a nearby closed school, while the CYFSW would collect observational data. Grandparent S was given an opportunity to provide feedback on the outreach program.
[28] The School District says that the outreach program appeared to go well for several weeks.
[29] On May 13, 2021, Student Y’s pediatrician wrote a letter speaking to the success of the outreach program and the next steps so that Student Y could return to a full-time learning environment:
[Student Y’s] ongoing trauma, lack of problem-solving ability, and challenging behaviour has resulted in increased supports, reduction in class time, and involvement by community clinicians. Despite extensive revisions to her academic program and environment … [Student Y] continued to exhibit dysregulated behaviours at school. Ultimately, the safety risk to staff and students associated with [Student Y’s] escalating behaviour culminated in her exclusion from school…
….
Since her exclusion, additional assessments have been recommended and are in the planning stages.
….
Through the recent intensive collaborative process, [the School District] has been able to place [Student Y] in an Outreach Program in order to return her to teacher-led educational opportunities that are designed to increase her readiness for learning. A month into the process, the outreach team has seen slow and steady success in [Student Y’s] ability to develop trust with her teachers, participate in outdoor learning activities, and extend her capacity to work on non-preferred activities while maintaining her emotional regulation and focus. The next steps are to increase the time spent in the program on a day to day basis, and start to incorporate peers into her environment… The hope is that [Student Y], though a very graduated process, will eventually return to a full-time educational program that supports her neurodevelopmental differences in a positive and progressive manner.
[30] Grandparent S says that she and Student Y had no choice but to move from the School District’s catchment area in May 2021. I understand that the move occurred while the outreach program was still ongoing. Student Y no longer attends a school within the School District.
IV DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(g)
[31] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62 , 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[32] There is no question that the Exclusion Allegation was filed within the one-year time limit. The first issue is whether the other allegations are timely because they are part of a continuing contravention. If not, the second issue is whether they should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code or whether I should exercise my discretion to accept them because it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3) , School District v. Parent obo the Child , 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68.
[33] I find that the Partial Days Allegation is part of a continuing contravention. The other Allegations – the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation – are not. Because it is not in the public interest to accept these other allegations, I dismiss them.
1. Are the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation Part of a Continuing Contravention?
[34] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code , s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child , 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68 . A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code , and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 23 ; School District at para. 50 .
[35] The assessment of whether discrete allegations are a continuing contravention is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209 at para. 17 . A relevant consideration is whether there are significant gaps between the allegations: Dickson at paras. 16-17. Whether or not a gap is significant will be assessed contextually, considering the length itself and any explanations for the gap: Reynolds v Overwaitea Food Group, 2013 BCHRT 67, at para. 28. A significant, unexplained, gap in time will weigh against finding a continuing contravention: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General , 2018 BCHRT 204 at para. 14 .
[36] Student Y says that the discrimination was ongoing and constant, creating a “landscape of exclusion”, starting in November 2018 and ending when Student Y was excluded under the School Act . However, the general statement that the discrimination was ongoing is not enough to establish a continuing contravention: Parent on behalf of A v. School Board , 2019 BCHRT 196 at para. 33. Rather, Student Y must demonstrate how the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation are anchored in time to the Exclusion Allegation. This Student Y has not done. Indeed, the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation do not appear to have the same character as the Exclusion Allegation and are separated in time by large, unexplained gaps. The 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation are not part of an alleged continuing contravention.
1. Is the Partial Days Allegation part of a continuing contravention?
[37] My conclusion is different with respect to the Partial Days Allegation. First, the Partial Days Allegation and the Exclusion Allegation are similar in character. The implementation of the partial days program was the first step in what eventually led to Student Y’s exclusion from school. Indeed, the effect of the policy was the partial exclusion of Student Y. Further, the Partial Days Allegation is made up of a succession of separate acts of alleged discrimination and not simply one contravention with continuing effects. The policy was reviewed and renewed each year beginning in December 2018 up until Student Y resumed full day attendance at the school on January 4, 2021.
[38] Second, there are no large, unexplained gaps in time. Again, the partial days policy was first implemented when Student Y was in grade one (in December 2018) and continued up until Student Y was permitted to attend school for full days, on January 4, 2021. The only gaps were presumably during the summers, when Student Y was not in school. This is explained by the natural gap in the school year, which I do not find to be significant enough to sever the chain that anchors the Partial Days Allegation to the Exclusion Allegation. For this reason, I find that the Partial Days Allegation is a timely alleged continuing contravention.
2. Should the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation be Accepted under s. 22(3) of the Code?
[39] The burden is on Student Y to persuade the Tribunal to accept the 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation despite finding that they are untimely. I must consider two things: public interest and substantial prejudice.
[40] The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late-filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code . These include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a remedy for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. It may consider factors like the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite , 2014 BCCA 220 [ Mzite ] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria) , 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152 ; Mzite at para. 55 . The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[41] Here, I do not find it in the public interest to accept the untimely 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation. Student Y does not explain why it would be in the public interest to accept these allegations, and I am persuaded by the School District’s argument that allegations of these kind are not novel, and the law is well settled in these kinds of school accommodation cases.
[42] Further, the delays in filing complaints about these allegations are significant and date back to two to three years before the complaint was filed. There is no explanation for the delays in this case. I find that the delays would significantly interfere with the School District’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints. Additionally, the nature of these allegations would require evidence from particular witnesses whose memories may have faded and who may not have written anything down regarding the events in question. I therefore find that it is not in the public interest to accept the untimely 2018 Allegations, the Neglect Allegation, and the Grade One Allegation.
[43] Because of my public interest determination, it is unnecessary for me to consider whether accepting the late-filed complaint would give rise to substantial prejudice.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[44] The Exclusion Allegation and Partial Days Allegation are in time. However, the School District applies to dismiss these allegations on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the School District to establish the basis for dismissal.
[45] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[46] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence ” : Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan , 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77 .
[47] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority , 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20 ; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission , [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [ Hill ] at para. 27 .
[48] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Student Y will have to prove she has a characteristic protected by the Code , she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the School District to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[49] The School District seems to accept for the purposes of this application that Student Y would be able to make out her complaint of discrimination. It says that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because it is reasonably certain to prove a defence at the hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others , 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50.
[50] To justify the adverse impacts to Student Y at a hearing, the School District would have to prove that: (1) it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed, (2) it adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate purpose; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This third element encompasses the duty to accommodate the complainant to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 at para. 20.
[51] The main issue between the parties is the third element – whether it is reasonably certain the School District will prove it fulfilled its duty to accommodate Student Y. The School District was obligated to take all reasonable and practical steps to remove the disability-related barriers to Student Y’s meaningful access to education. For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the School District is reasonably certain to prove that it did so.
[52] From the materials before me, I am satisfied that the School District was actively and intensively involved in attempting to accommodate Student Y’s disabilities from the time that Student Y was in grade one up until the time that she was excluded from school in grade three. However, the question before me on this application is whether the School District is reasonably certain to prove that it “could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact on the individual”: Moore at para. 49 [Emphasis mine]. In my view, there is a lack of information in the materials before me that would allow me to conclude that the School District is reasonably certain to do so.
[53] Here, the School District partially excluded Student Y from school for two and a half years and then completely excluded her from school thereafter. Student Y says that the negative impact on her has been substantial, including falling far behind in her social and educational development. Student Y says that had the School District put in place more robust interventions earlier as they eventually did in 2021, Student Y’s might have been managed such that she might not have been excluded from school.
[54] While Student Y was not entitled to a perfect accommodation, I do need some evidence regarding whether other accommodation could or could not have been implemented earlier to avoid some of the negative impact to Student Y. I do not have submissions from the Respondents on whether providing other options would have been possible or would have constituted an undue hardship, financially or otherwise. I do have a lot of evidence before me what the School District did to accommodate Student Y but what is missing is how this accommodation was all that it could have done. Given the lack of evidence before me on undue hardship, I am not persuaded that the School District is reasonably certain to prove they discharged their duty to accommodate.
[55] Finally, the School District says that given Student Y’s behavioural issues, it had authority to put her on a partial day program. It says that Student Y cannot use this forum to challenge the validity of the Ministerial Order granting it that authority. In my view, that is not what Student Y is trying to do with her compliant. The School District’s actions or inactions could still be found to be discriminatory even though it was acting pursuant to Ministerial Order. If there is a conflict between the Code and any other enactment, the Code prevails: Code s. 4.
[56] I am not satisfied that the School District is reasonably certain to prove it took all reasonable and practical steps to address the challenges Student Y was experiencing in accessing her education. While at a hearing of this matter, the School District may adduce evidence that it accommodated Student Y up to the point of undue hardship, it has not done so here, and I decline to dismiss the Exclusion Allegation and the Partial Days Allegation under s. 27(1)(c).
C. Section 27(1)(d)(ii) – Proceeding would not further the purposes of the Code
[57] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code . These purposes include both private and public interests: s. 3. Deciding whether a complaint furthers those purposes is not only about the interests in the individual complaint. It may also be about broad public policy issues, like the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in a hearing: Dar Santos v. UBC , 2003 BCHRT 73 , at para. 59 , Tillis v. Pacific Western Brewing and Komatsu , 2005 BCHRT 433 at para. 15, Gichuru v. Pallai (No. 2) , 2010 BCHRT 125 at paras. 113-118.
[58] Here, the School District says it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint because it was Student Y herself who “short-circuited” the accommodation process by moving outside of the School District’s catchment area while accommodations were ongoing. I decline to dismiss the complaint on this basis.
[59] Student Y says I should not dismiss her complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because her efforts were ongoing over many years:
…the respondent claims that I short-circuited their efforts, due to leaving the district, where in actuality I had been doing my best for nearly three years to get my child adequately supported and included without success.
[60] Student Y also submits that she was required to move out of the catchment area due to no fault of her own.
[61] I agree with Student Y that her complaint should not be dismissed because she moved out of the district while accommodations were ongoing. In the context of two and a half years of accommodation efforts and in light of the evidence of Grandparent S’s efforts to work with the School District to come up with a workable plan for Student Y, I cannot say that Student Y short-circuited the accommodation process.
[62] Further, I find that it would be in the public interest to proceed with the complaint. This case raises issues of public interest including exclusion under the School Act and partial exclusion under Ministerial Order. To my knowledge, these issues have never been adjudicated before this Tribunal. While school accommodation cases are generally not rare, the Partial Days Allegation and Exclusion Allegation seem to raise issues the adjudication of which will be useful to guardians and school districts alike.
V CONCLUSION
[63] For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the School District is reasonably certain to prove that it has not breached the Code in its efforts to support Student Y in accessing her education.
[64] The application to dismiss is denied.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member