Johnson v. Conseil Scolaire Francophone de la Colombie-Britannique and others, 2024 BCHRT 253
Date Issued: August 29, 2024
File: CS-001472
Indexed as: Johnson v. Conseil Scolaire Francophone de la Colombie-Britannique and others, 2024 BCHRT 253
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mark D. Johnson
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Conseil Scolaire Francophone de la Colombie-Britannique (CSF)
and Melissa Breton and Claude Martin
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Sections 27(1)(c) and (g)
Tribunal Member: Beverly Froese
On their own behalf: Mark D. Johnson
Counsel for the Respondents: Sari A. Wiens
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In December 2018, Mark Johnson made a complaint against the Respondents alleging discrimination regarding his employment based on his ancestry and place of origin contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code . Mr. Johnson alleges he experienced ongoing discrimination when he was a teacher with Conseil Scolaire Francophone de la Columbie-Britannique (CSF) [CSF] because he is an Anglophone from Western Canada. More particularly, Mr. Johnson alleges he was discriminated against when he did not get a position for which he was qualified, and when CSF refused to annul a flawed teaching evaluation.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They say that all times, Mr. Johnson’s status with CSF, including his eligibility for positions, was governed by the terms of the collective agreement between CSF and the B.C. Teachers’ Federation/le Syndicat des Enseignantes et Enseignants du Programme Francophone de la Colombie-Britannique [Union]. The Respondents say that CSF does not, and did not in Mr. Johnson’s case, distinguish between applicants or employees based on their ancestry or place of origin.
[3] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Codeon the basis it has no reasonable prospect of success. They also apply to dismiss part of the complaint under s. 27(1)(g) of the Codeon the basis it was late filed. Lastly, the Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint against the individual Respondents, Melissa Breton and Claude Martin, under s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
[4] For the following reasons, the Respondents’ application to dismiss part of the complaint under s. 27(1)(g) is granted on the basis that it is filed late and would not be in the public interest to accept. The Respondents’ application to dismiss the remainder of the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) is granted on the basis that Mr. Johnson has no reasonable prospect of establishing that any employment-related adverse impacts were connected to his protected characteristics. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
[5] I apologize to the parties for the length of time it has taken the Tribunal to issue this decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] CSF is the Francophone education authority established under the School Act. It operates public schools around the province that provide educational programs to students in French. At all material times, Mr. Martin was a school principal employed by CSF and Ms. Breton was a human resources manager employed by CSF.
[7] The Respondents say that proficiency in French is an important consideration when hiring and selecting teachers. They say that when a teacher with limited French skills is hired, which happens occasionally to meet specific recruitment challenges, the expectation is that the teacher will continue to improve their French language skills and be able to demonstrate proficiency in French when being considered for other positions. The Respondents say that a teacher’s proficiency in French is based on demonstrated ability and commonly includes a French language exam [Exam].
[8] Mr. Johnson’s CV indicates that he has teaching certificates in Alberta and British Columbia. It indicates that the focus of his educational and professional background is music theory and composition. Mr. Johnson says he is qualified to teach music in elementary and secondary schools, and in the International Baccalaureate music programs that exist in some CSF schools.
[9] The parties do not appear to dispute that in 2011, Mr. Johnson was hired by CSF as a specialist music teacher and initially held two part-time music teaching positions outside of Vancouver. The parties appear to agree that when Mr. Johnson was hired, there was a shortage of teachers able to teach music in French and his French language skills were limited. They also appear to agree that before Mr. Johnson was hired, he was not required to take the Exam.
[10] Mr. Johnson says that before he applied for a teaching position with CSF, he spent two years on courses and self-study to improve his French. He also says he was hired based on his high-level qualifications to teach music and two vigorous interviews to ensure his French skills were adequate.
[11] The Respondents say that after Mr. Johnson was hired, he was expected to continue to improve his French skills. Mr. Johnson disputes that and says he was never expected to reach a higher level of French as a condition of continuing with his original position or any other teaching positions. In any event, Mr. Johnson says that after a positive performance evaluation in May 2012, he took steps to improve his French.
[12] The parties do not appear to dispute that for the 2013-14 school year, music teacher positions at the schools where Mr. Johnson taught were eliminated. They also do not appear to dispute that sometime after Mr. Johnson was laid off in 2013, he applied for a teaching position at another school. The parties appear to agree that when he applied for that position, Mr. Johnson was required to take the Exam. Mr. Johnson says CSF was obligated to place him in a comparable position and the requirement that he take the Exam was a breach of the collective agreement. The Respondents dispute that and say Mr. Johnson’s eligibility for teaching positions was governed by the collective agreement and that every applicant is required to pass the Exam.
[13] The parties appear to agree that Mr. Johnson did not pass the Exam or get the teaching position. The Respondents say Mr. Johnson did not get the position because he failed the Exam. Mr. Johnson says he failed the Exam because of financial and personal stress. He also says that the only purpose of the Exam was to disqualify him for the position so CSF could hire a Francophone with less specialist qualifications [Exam Allegation].
[14] Sometime after he did not get the teaching position, Mr. Johnson contacted the Union and expressed his concerns about the hiring process and the requirement that he pass the Exam. In its response, the Union told Mr. Johnson that all CSF teachers must pass the Exam and that “this does not seem to be a matter of grievance”. The Union also told Mr. Johnson he could take the Exam again if he provided proof that he completed a French course from a recognized institution.
[15] The parties do not appear to dispute that after he did not get the teaching position in 2013, Mr. Johnson continued to be employed with CSF, specifically as a “teacher teaching-on-call” [TTOC]. Mr. Johnson says the areas he was allowed to teach as a TTOC were limited and he was not given steady work. He also says that despite not passing the Exam, he was permitted to teach music in French up to the Grade 12 level.
[16] The parties appear to agree that in or around the 2017-18 school year, Mr. Johnson was teaching in two temporary contract positions. Mr. Johnson says that both these positions required a high level of French. The parties also appear to agree that in or around May 2018, Mr. Martin completed a performance evaluation of Mr. Johnson, and the results were less than satisfactory [Evaluation]. Mr. Johnson alleges that the Evaluation was “irregular and unnecessary” and that Mr. Martin “behaved in a belittling and offensive manner, cut out steps and falsified information in his final document”.
[17] Mr. Johnson alleges that the impacts of the Evaluation on him were significant. Specifically, he says that because the Evaluation was done near the end of the school year, it was too late for him to avail himself of any recourse to which he was legally entitled, for instance requesting another evaluator. He says the “career-damaging” Evaluation stayed on his personnel file and prevented him from holding high level positions with CSF. Mr. Johnson believes the Evaluation was done to prevent him from further career track positions because he is an Anglophone from Western Canada [Evaluation Allegation].
[18] Mr. Johnson contacted the Union about the Evaluation. The parties do not appear to dispute that Mr. Johnson requested that the Evaluation be annulled. It is not clear from the materials whether the Union filed a grievance about the Evaluation, however the parties do not dispute that the Evaluation was never withdrawn or annulled. Mr. Johnson says he was kept in the dark during the summer of 2018 about what the Union was doing.
[19] The parties do not appear to dispute that Mr. Johnson has not returned to teaching with CSF since the 2017-18 school year.
III PRELIMINARY ISSUE
[20] As a preliminary matter, the Respondents argue that Mr. Johnson improperly added new allegations in his response to the application to dismiss.
[21] A complainant who wants to amend their complaint during an outstanding application to dismiss must apply to do so: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 24(4)(b). The purpose of Rule 24(4)(b) is to ensure that a respondent who files an application to dismiss a complaint does not face a moving target: Pausch v. School District No. 34 and others, 2008 BCHRT 154 at paras. 28-29. Respondents are entitled to know the allegations against them to assess whether, or on what basis, to bring their application to dismiss the complaint: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at paras. 35-37.
[22] At the same time, the Tribunal’s complaint forms are not the equivalent of pleadings in a civil litigation process: White v. Nanaimo Daily News Group Inc. and Klaholz, 2004 BCHRT 350at para. 23. It is not uncommon, or a violation of the Rules, for a complainant to add new particulars of their complaint in response to an application to dismiss. The distinction between particulars and new allegations was set out in Powell v. Morton, 2005 BCHRT 282at para. 20:
… I must consider whether the amendment contains, on the one hand, further details of the facts on which the complainant intends to rely, or whether, on the other, it constitutes an expansion of the allegations made against the respondents. If the former, it will constitute particulars; if the latter, an amendment. This determination is not to be made in a narrow or technical way, but in a manner which will ensure that the parties are accorded procedural fairness, and that particulars are not used to expand a complaint beyond what can reasonably be said to have been alleged in it. Another way of looking at the questions is to ask whether the materials in issue come within the scope of the complaint filed with the Tribunal, or whether they seek to expand the scope of the complaint.
[23] The Respondents submit that the new allegations are found in sections of the response under the headings “Obstruction and Injurious Treatment”, “Contradictory Argument: The CSF and Parity”, “Failure to Accommodate”, “Inconsistency and Arbitrariness”, “Geographical Discrimination”, and “Cultural Nepotism”.
[24] After reviewing the complaint and Mr. Johnson’s response to this application, I find that the allegations at issue add further details to existing allegations and are not new allegations.
[25] In his complaint, Mr. Johnson alleges that for years he experienced systematic discrimination by his employer. Mr. Johnson alleges that CSF favours Francophone teachers from Quebec and elsewhere over Anglophone teachers who speak French as a second language. He alleges that CSF treats Anglophone teachers whose French is their second language as a “temporary fix” to a shortage of Francophone teachers and as “place-holders” until Francophone teachers can be successfully recruited.
[26] Mr. Johnson alleges that the Respondents discriminated against him in two ways. First, he says they obstructed him from obtaining permanent or prominent positions in the CSF school system. Second, he says their conduct was injurious to his quality of life, for instance they “took extreme actions for which no demonstrable need existed” and “maximized injury by inflicting multiple hardships over a long period”. Mr. Johnson alleges discrimination against him from 2012 to 2018, but only particularizes two specific allegations, namely the Exam Allegation and the Evaluation Allegation.
[27] In his response, Mr. Johnson uses words or phrases in certain sections that he does not use in the complaint, for example “geographic discrimination”. However, I find his explanation of those terms and the allegations he makes in the sections at issue come within the scope of the complaint. Put another way, I find the allegations the Respondents argue are new allegations do not expand the scope of the complaint “beyond what can reasonably be said to have been alleged in it”: Powell at para. 20.
IV DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(g) – the Exam Allegation occurred before the one-year time limit
[28] It is appropriate to begin my analysis with the Respondents’ argument that the Exam Allegation is untimely and should be dismissed, as the scope of the complaint informs my analysis as to whether it has no reasonable prospect of success.
[29] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code,s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[30] There is no question that the Evaluation Allegation was filed within the one-year time limit. The first issue is whether the Exam Allegation is timely because it is part of a continuing contravention. If not, the second issue is whether it should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(g) of the Codeor whether I should exercise my discretion to accept it because it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code,s. 22(3), School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68.
1. Continuing Contravention
[31] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened with one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child , 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City),2015 BCCA 57 at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[32] The onus is on Mr. Johnson to establish that the Exam Allegation is a continuing contravention: Dove v. GVRD and others (No. 3) , 2006 BCHRT 374 [Dove No. 3] at para. 21. The assessment is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209at para. 17. A relevant consideration is whether there are significant gaps between the allegations: Dickson at paras. 16-17. Whether or not a gap is significant will be assessed contextually, considering the length itself and any explanations for the gap: Reynolds v Overwaitea Food Group, 2013 BCHRT 67, at para. 28. A significant, unexplained, gap in time will weigh against finding a continuing contravention: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 204at para. 14.
[33] My analysis takes into consideration “the purpose of the Code, including ensuring that individuals who claim to have suffered discrimination are given a means of redress while at the same time ensuring that respondents are treated fairly”: Dove No. 3 at para. 20. At the end of the day, my goal is to try to “draw the line in a fair, principled and reasoned way”: Dove No. 3 at para. 20.
[34] The Respondents argue that the Exam Allegation is not a continuing contravention. They submit that the Exam Allegation and the Evaluation Allegation are not of the same character because one concerns a dispute about a language test and eligibility for positions and the other involves a performance evaluation.
[35] In support of its argument, the Respondents rely on Lloyd v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority , 2008 BCHRT 3. In that case, the Tribunal held that an allegation that statements in the complainant’s professional review were discriminatory on the basis of his sexual orientation and his allegation that his employer was attempting to discredit his qualifications “describe different conduct and entirely different issues”: at para. 16. The Respondents also rely on Alexander v. Northern Health Authority and others, 2008 BCHRT 168, where the Tribunal held that events related to the complainant’s need for a leave of absence were of a different character from events related to her work performance: at para. 13. Lastly, the Respondents cite Widenmaier v. Victoria Shipyards and another (No. 3) , 2012 BCHRT 313, where the Tribunal held that allegations that the complainant was laid off because he associated outside of work hours with someone who had complained of racial and family status discrimination was of a different character from his unparticularized allegations that he was laid off based on his family status: at para. 23.
[36] Mr. Johnson argues that the Exam Allegation is a continuing contravention. He submits that the Exam Allegation and the Evaluation Allegation are “separated in time but are parallel and involve documents of evaluation and the uses to which they were put”. Specifically, Mr. Johnson argues that both the Exam and the Evaluation were unreliable indicators of his teaching performance, both “were used to eclipse and nullify previous positive assessments”, and both were used to obstruct his career opportunities.
[37] Even accepting Mr. Johnson’s argument that there are common threads between the Exam Allegation and the Evaluation Allegation – which is rather broad and which I am reluctant to accede to – the gap between them is significant and I am unpersuaded by his explanation. In his response, Mr. Johnson explains why he did not raise human rights issues when he contacted the Union in 2018 about the Evaluation. What Mr. Johnson does not do is explain why there is an almost five-year gap between the Exam Allegation, an alleged act of discrimination with continuing consequences, and the Evaluation Allegation. This weighs against finding a continuing contravention.
[38] In the absence of a persuasive explanation for the significant gap between the two allegations, I cannot find that the Exam Allegation is a continuing contravention. In my view, finding the Exam Evaluation to be a continuing contravention would not be fair to the Respondents because it would “improperly sweep in allegations which would otherwise be far outside the Code’s time limits: Dove v. GVRD and others (No. 2) , 2006 BCHRT 197 at para. 42.
[39] I now turn to consider whether the Exam Allegation should be accepted under s. 22(3) of the Code.
2. Should the Exam Allegation be accepted under s. 22(3) of the Code?
[40] The burden is on Mr. Johnson to persuade the Tribunal to accept the Exam Allegation. I must consider two things: public interest and substantial prejudice.
[41] The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late-filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code. These include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a remedy for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. It may consider factors like the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns,2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria) , 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon,2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mziteat para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[42] When determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2012 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 244 at para. 60.
[43] Mr. Johnson submits that the complaint is in the public interest because CSF is a publicly funded institution and the number of schools it operates in the province may increase. He submits that due to teacher shortages, CSF may need Anglophone teachers who speak French as a second language to fill those positions. Mr. Johnson submits that the timeline in the complaint reveals a pattern of egregious actions by CSF and gives rise to legitimate concerns about institutionalized discrimination.
[44] The Respondents submit that it is not in the public interest to accept the Exam Allegation. They say whether CSF may need to fill teaching positions with Anglophone teaches who speak French as a second language is not a reason to accept the Exam Allegation. They further say Mr. Johnson has not provided any explanation that could justify the five-year gap between the Exam Allegation and the Evaluation Allegation.
[45] I am not aware of any Tribunal decisions that have dealt with a complaint alleging a Francophone education authority discriminated against an Anglophone teacher from Western Canada whose first language is not French. Nor have the parties referred to any such decisions in their submissions. This factor, therefore, weighs in favour of accepting the Exam Allegation.
[46] However, in my view any public interest in having a unique, novel, or unusual complaint heard is outweighed by the length of delay in making a complaint about the Exam Allegation. Again, in his submission Mr. Johnson only explains why he did not raise human rights issues when he contacted the Union in 2018 about the Evaluation. There is little, if any, information in the complaint or his response to this application that explains why Mr. Johnson waited until 2018 to make a complaint about the Exam Allegation to the Tribunal. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay, I decline to exercise my discretion to accept the Exam Allegation under s. 22(3) of the Code.
[47] Having found it is not in the public interest to accept the late-filed allegation, I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[48] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code,s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[49] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[50] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) , 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan, 2013 BCSC 942at para. 77.
[51] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[52] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Johnson will have to prove that being an Anglophone from Western Canada was at least a factor related to the Evaluation and that the Evaluation was used to prevent him from further career track teaching positions: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he does that, the burden will shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fideoccupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[53] The Respondents submit that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because Mr. Johnson will not be able to prove a connection between his protected characteristics and any adverse impacts related to the Evaluation. They say Mr. Johnson’s allegation that his protected characteristics were at least a factor regarding the Evaluation is purely speculative and he has offered no evidence of any kind that suggests the Evaluation was motivated by his protected characteristics. The Respondents say this is an employment dispute governed by the terms of the collective agreement and not a claim of discrimination under the Code .
[54] I recognize that discrimination is often subtle and not overt and that it is often proven by inference rather than direct evidence: Durrani v. ICBC and others, 2022 BCHRT 100 at para. 106. To decide whether Mr. Johnson has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between his ancestry and place of origin, I consider whether, if the Tribunal accepted his evidence at a hearing, it would be open to the Tribunal to infer that those characteristics were a factor in how he was treated at work. For the complaint to proceed, there must be some evidence that would support such an inference. It is not enough to speculate that Mr. Johnson’s ancestry and place of origin were factors in the adverse impact: Durraniat para. 106.
[55] Based on the materials before me, I am not persuaded that Mr. Johnson has a reasonable prospect of proving his ancestry and place of origin were factors related to the Evaluation.
[56] Mr. Johnson alleges that the Respondents knew he would struggle with performing well on an evaluation because he had replaced a teacher on leave, and they knew he had recently been targeted in a serious cyber-bullying incident. He alleges that the Respondents knew the Evaluation breached numerous articles of the collective agreement and would “eclipse” his positive 2021 performance evaluation. He alleges that he “outlived my initial usefulness to the CSF” because he made the Respondents aware that he wanted to apply for permanent or prominent positions in CSF schools in Vancouver. He alleges that the Evaluation prevented any CSF principal from wanting to hire him. Mr. Johnson asserts that the only logical explanation for the Respondents’ conduct is the fact that he is an Anglophone from Western Canada.
[57] The materials before me indicate that Mr. Johnson communicated with the Union and Mr. Martin to express his concerns about the Evaluation. In his lengthy and detailed communications, Mr. Johnson never suggests that any adverse treatment is connected to being an Anglophone from Western Canada. Rather, Mr. Johnson expresses concerns about what he believed were numerous breaches of the collective agreement and difficulties he experienced with some of his students that Mr. Martin should have known affected the Evaluation. In his communications with the Union, Mr. Johnson opines that Mr. Martin concluded that his performance was less than satisfactory because Mr. Martin wanted to blame him if the music program failed. In his response, Mr. Johnson says he did not refer to human rights in his communications with the Union because after what happened in 2013, he did not believe the Union would support him.
[58] Even accepting Mr. Johnson’s explanation, based on the totality of the evidence before me, I find there is insufficient evidence to take the complaint out of the realm of conjecture. Even taking into account the frequently subtle nature of discrimination, in my view it would not be open to the Tribunal to infer from the evidence that Mr. Johnson’s ancestry and place of origin were factors connected to the Evaluation. In my view, such an inference would be based solely on speculation.
[59] Having found the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success, the Respondents’ application to dismiss it under s. 27(1)(c) of the Codeis granted.
V CONCLUSION
[60] The Respondents’ application to dismiss the Exam Allegation under s. 27(1)(g) of the Codeis granted.
[61] The Respondents’ application to dismiss the remainder of the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Codeis granted.
Beverly Froese
Tribunal Member